

**THE ENTENTE'S SECOND INTER-UNION MISSION  
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF JOSEPH BARTHÉLEMY  
(FEBRUARY 20 – MARCH 3, 1919)**

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**Abstract:** *The article examines the activities of the second Entente peacekeeping mission in Eastern Galicia under French General Joseph Barthélemy, analyses the reasons for its establishment and highlights the consequences of its diplomatic efforts for both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict of 1918–1919. It was proved that, in addition to their formal duties, the mission members were given important instructions on how further to penetrate and, subsequently, to strengthen the Entente's positions in the Galician region. Furthermore, the aim was to devise counter-measures to the revolutionary movement and socialist ideas in the newly created states of Eastern Europe. Its equally crucial purpose was to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and examine the prospect of using Polish and Ukrainian troops in the fight against Bolshevik Russia. Despite the informative nature of the mission, its members began negotiations with Ukrainians and Poles in January, but the talks did not result in a real ceasefire around Lviv. It should be highlighted that Joseph Barthélemy's mission did not only fail to reconcile the parties involved in the war but rather incited them to fight each other. At the same time, it promised the Ukrainians the political support of the Entente and the Poles – the Drohobych-Boryslav basin, which was under Ukrainian control. With such recommendations, it was clear that a truce was unlikely. Not wanting to lose rich oil lands that were a substantial source of income, the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic refused to agree to the demarcation line proposed by Joseph Barthélemy unconditionally.*

**Keywords:** *Peacekeeping mission, Joseph Barthélemy, Western Ukrainian People's Republic, Poland, Entente, Eastern Galicia.*

**Rezumat:** *Articolul examinează activitățile celei de-a doua misiuni de menținere a păcii în Galiția de Est, derulată de Antanta sub conducerea generalului francez Joseph Barthélemy, analizează motivele înființării ei și evidențiază consecințele eforturilor diplomatice întreprinse în favoarea ambelor părți implicate în conflictul militar polono-ucrainean din 1918-1919. S-a dovedit că, pe lângă sarcinile oficiale, membrii misiunii aveau instrucțiuni importante cu privire la modul de intrare și, ulterior, de consolidare a pozițiilor Antantei în regiunea Galiției. În plus, misiunea trebuia să dezvolte măsuri de combatere a mișcării revoluționare și a ideilor socialiste din statele nou create în Europa de Est. Cea mai notabilă sarcină a misiunii a fost studierea circumstanțelor conflictului polono-ucrainean, deopotrivă cu evaluarea perspectivelor de utilizare a trupelor poloneze și ucrainene în lupta împotriva Rusiei bolșevice. În ciuda caracterului informativ al misiunii, în luna ianuarie, membrii acesteia au început negocierile cu ucrainenii și polonezii, fără a se ajunge la o reală încetare a focului în confruntările din jurul Lvovului. Trebuie subliniat faptul că misiunea lui Joseph Barthélemy nu numai că nu a reușit să reconcilieze părțile beligerante, ci, dimpotrivă, a incitat și mai mult pe una împotriva celeilalte. În același timp, misiunea le-a promis ucrainenilor sprijinul politic al Antantei, iar polonezilor bazinul Drohobych-Boryslav, aflat sub control ucrainean. Era evident că aceste recomandări aveau să facă dificilă încheierea unui armistițiu. Nedorind să piardă teritorii bogate în rezerve petroliere, care reprezentau o sursă semnificativă de venit, Secretariatul de stat al Republicii Populare a Ucrainei de Vest a refuzat să accepte, necondiționat, linia de demarcație propusă de Joseph Barthélemy.*

## INTRODUCTION

Ukraine is currently engaged in the process of establishing its statehood. Relationships with other countries and international organisations and institutions are at the heart of this process. In this context, it is vital to investigate the issues of peacekeeping missions during the 1918-1919 Polish-Ukrainian war. It is, therefore, essential to explore further into the subject of the Entente's policy of resolving the Polish-Ukrainian armed confrontation during this period. After all, historical experience is vital for Ukraine in the current reality of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the efforts of international organisations to bring it to an end.

Memoirs are an indispensable source for the study of this problem. The testimonies of eyewitnesses and memoirs of Carton de Wiart<sup>1</sup>, Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko and Mykhailo Lozynsky<sup>2</sup>, which concerned the analysis of

<sup>1</sup> Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey. The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1950, 287 p.

<sup>2</sup> Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919* [The Ukrainian-

the negotiations of the second inter-union mission at the beginning of the Entente, drew attention to the hostilities that preceded and resulted from these unsuccessful agreements on the territory of the region. Tangentially, the events are also mentioned in the volumes of memoirs of some contemporaries (Stepan Shukhevych<sup>3</sup>, Ivan Karpynets<sup>4</sup>, Ruben Fahn<sup>5</sup>) with the process of organising Galicia after the end of the Great War.

Valuable is the information gleaned from periodicals of central and county authorities and party-political life of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic (ZO UPR), the Polish government in Eastern Galicia: "Gazeta Lwowska" ("Lviv Newspaper"), "Chwila" ("Minute"), "Kurjer Częstochowski" ("Kurier Czestockhovski"), "Република" ("Republic"), "Вперед" ("Forward"), "Стрілець" ("Sagittarius"), "Наша мета" ("Our goal"), "Дрогобицький листок" ("Drohobych leaf"). The preconditions, course, and results of J. Barthélemy's Second Inter-Allied Entente Mission in Eastern Galicia in February-March 1919 and the circumstances following the failure of the official European mission's negotiations with Ukraine were all documented in this collection of documents.

The topic was addressed by researchers from the Ukrainian diaspora: Vasyl Kuchabsky<sup>6</sup>, Lev Shankovsky<sup>7</sup>, and Sydir Yaroslavyn<sup>8</sup>. Ukrainian historians such

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Polish War of 1918–19], Praha, 1929, 72 s.; Idem, *Spohady ukrainskoho komandarma. Na Ukraini, 1918-1920. Ukrainsko-polska viina. Na Ukraini, 1919. Zymovyi pokhid, 1920* [Memoirs of a Ukrainian Commander. In Ukraine, 1918-1920. Ukrainian-Polish War. In Ukraine, 1919. Winter Campaign, 1920], Kyiv, 2002, 460 s.; Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v rr. 1918 - 1920* [Galicia in the Years 1918 - 1920], Viden, 1922, 228 s.; Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi* [Galicia at the Peace Conference in Paris], Kamianets-Podilskyi, 1919, 31 s.

<sup>3</sup> Stepan Shukhevych, *Spomyny z Ukrainskoi Halytskoi Armii (1918 - 1920). Ch. 1 (vid lystopada 1918 do kvitnia 1919)* [Memoirs from the Ukrainian Galician Army (1918 - 1920). Part 1 (from November 1918 to April 1919)], Lviv, 1929, 176 s.

<sup>4</sup> Ivan Karpynets, *Istoriia 8-oi Halytskoi bryhady* [History of the 8th Galician Brigade], in *Litopys "Chervonoi Kalyny"* [Chronicle of the "Red Viburnum"], Lviv, 1933, no. 7-8, s. 33-34.

<sup>5</sup> Ruben Fahn, *Istoriia Yevreiskoi natsionalnoi avtonomii v period Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Respubliky* [History of Jewish National Autonomy in the Period of the Western Ukrainian Republic], Lviv, 2019, 272 s.

<sup>6</sup> Vasyl Kuchabskyi, *Zakhidna Ukraina u borotbi z Polshcheiu ta bilshovyzmom u 1918 - 1923 rokakh* [Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923], Lviv, 2005, 448 s.

<sup>7</sup> Lev Shankovskyi, *Ukrainska Halytska Armiia: voienno-istorychna studiia* [Ukrainian Army of Galicia: a Study in Military History], Vinnipeh, 1974, 396 s.

<sup>8</sup> Sydir Yaroslavyn, *Vyzvolna borotba na Zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemliakh u 1918 - 1923 rr.* [The Liberation Struggle in the Western Ukrainian Lands in 1918 - 1923],

as Oleksandr Karpenko, Mykola Lytvyn, Kim Naumenko, Stepan Makarchuk<sup>9</sup>, Hanna-Melania Tychka<sup>10</sup>, Orest Krasivskyi<sup>11</sup>, Roman Tymchenko<sup>12</sup>, Vadym Adadurov<sup>13</sup>, Borys Tyshchuk<sup>14</sup>, Andriy Korolko<sup>15</sup>, Polish historians Maciej Kozłowski, Michał Klimiecki, Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, Rafał Galuba<sup>16</sup>, France

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Filadelfia, 1956, 182 s.

- <sup>9</sup> Oleksandr Karpenko (ed.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika. 1918 – 1923. Istoriiia* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic. 1918 – 1923. History], Ivano-Frankivsk, 2001, 628 s.; Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919* [Ukrainian-Polish War 1918-1919], Lviv, 1998, 488 s.; Mykola Lytvyn, Kim Naumenko, *Istoriiia halytskoho striletstva* [History of Galician Shooters], Lviv, 1991, 198 s.; Stepan Makarchuk, *Ukrainska respublika halychan* [Ukrainian Republic of Galician Ukrainians], Lviv, 1997, 192 s.
- <sup>10</sup> Hanna-Melania Tychka, *Skhidna Halychyna u politytsi Frantsii (1918–1919): dys. kand. ist. nauk* [Eastern Galicia in the Politics of France (1918–1919): dis. cand. of hist. sciences], Lviv, 2018.
- <sup>11</sup> Orest Krasivskyi, *Halychyna v pershii chverti XX st.: Problemy polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn* [Galicia in the First Quarter of the XXth Century: Problems of Polish-Ukrainian Relations], Lviv, 2000, 416 s.
- <sup>12</sup> Roman Tymchenko, *Vidnosyny Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky i Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky (lystopad 1918 – kviten 1920 rr.)* [Relations between the Ukrainian Peoples Republic and the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic (November 1918 – April 1920)], Kyiv, 2013, 347 s.
- <sup>13</sup> Vadym Adadurov, *Polityka Frantsii stosovno ukrainsko-polskoho konfliktu za Skhidnu Halychynu v period z lystopada 1918 po berezen 1919 rr.* [French Policy on the Ukrainian-Polish Conflict over Eastern Galicia in the Period from November 1918 to March 1919], in *Ukraina v mynulomu* [Ukraine in the Past], Kyiv, Lviv, 1995, Vol. 7, s. 18-32.
- <sup>14</sup> Borys Tyshchuk, *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika (1918 – 1923): Istoriiia derzhavy i prava* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic (1918 – 1923): History of State and Law], Lviv, 2004, 392 s.
- <sup>15</sup> Andrii Korolko, *Rumunska okupatsiia Pokuttia i Halytskoi Hutsulshchyny (traven – serpen 1919 r.): peredumovy, perebih, naslidky* [Romanian Occupation of Pokutia and Galician Gutsulshchyna (May-August 1919): Background, Course, Consequences], in “Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova. Seriia Istorychni nauky” [Scientific Journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Historical Sciences], 2016, Vol. 14, s. 195-210; Stepan Borchuk, Andrii Korolko, Aleksandr Reient, *Accession of part of Eastern Galicia to Romania in 1919: military and political aspects*, in “Codrul Cosminului”, 2020, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 169-187, <https://doi.org/10.4316/CC.2020.01.010>
- <sup>16</sup> Maciej Kozłowski, *Między Sanem a Zbruczem. Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią, 1918 – 1919* [Between the Rivers Sian and Zbruch. Battles for Lviv and Eastern Galicia, 1918 – 1919], Krakow, 1990, 311 s.; Michał Klimecki, *Polsko-ukraińska wojna o wschodnią Galicję 1918-1919 r. Polskie spojrzenie* [Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern Galicia 1918-

historians Daniel Murat<sup>17</sup>, Mylène Mihout<sup>18</sup>, Cyril Grange<sup>19</sup>, American and England historians John M. Thompson<sup>20</sup>, Ilya Prizel<sup>21</sup>, Norman Davies<sup>22</sup> and Romanians historians Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan<sup>23</sup>, Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, Ion Rîșnoveanu<sup>24</sup> have all written on this subject.

The proposed scientific article describes the activities of the Second Entente Peacekeeping Mission, led by Joseph Barthélemy, a continuation of his first mission, and took place in Lviv from January 25 to February 11, 1919. The above activities are devoted to the scientific articles of one of the proposed study's authors, Yevhen Lyzen.<sup>25</sup>

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1919. Polish View], in "Ukraina: kulturna spadshchyna, natsionalna svidomist, derzhavnist" [Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Consciousness, Statehood], 2009, no. 18, s. 373-384; Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski 1918-1921* [Polish-Czech conflict 1918-1921], Warszawa, Neriton, 2001, 476 p.; Rafał Galuba, „*Niech nas rozsądzi miecz i krew*”. *Konflikt polsko-ukraiński o Galicję Wschodnią w latach 1918-1919* ["Let us be judged by sword and blood." The Polish-Ukrainian conflict over Eastern Galicia in 1918-1919], Poznań, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2004, 335 p.

<sup>17</sup> Daniel Murat, *L'Intervention de l'État dans le secteur pétrolier en France* [State Intervention in the Oil Sector in France], Paris, Edition Technip, 1969, 331 p.

<sup>18</sup> Mylène Mihout, *Les capitaux nordistes en quête de nouveaux horizons: « le groupe pétrolier du Nord » & le pétrole galicien (1911-1928)* [Northern Capital in Search of New Horizons: "The Northern Oil Group" & Galician Oil (1911-1928)], in "Revue du Nord", 1993, tome 75, No. 300, p. 421-441.

<sup>19</sup> Cyril Grange, *Les classes privilégiées dans l'espace parisien (1903-1987)* [The Privileged Classes in the Parisian Area (1903-1987)], in "Espace, Populations, Sociétés", 1993, No. 1, p. 11-21.

<sup>20</sup> John M. Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967, 438 p.

<sup>21</sup> Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 443 p.

<sup>22</sup> Norman Davies, *Polish National Mythologies*, in Geoffrey Hosking, George Schöpflin (Eds.), *Myths and Nationhood*, New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 141-157.

<sup>23</sup> Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan, *În apărarea României Mari. Campania armatei române din 1918-1919* [In Defense of Greater Romania. The Campaign of the Romanian Army from 1918-1919], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1994, 336 p.

<sup>24</sup> Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, Ion Rîșnoveanu, *Războiul de Întregire (1916-1919). Comandanți militari români [War of Integration (1916-1919). Romanian Military Commanders]*, București, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2016, 320 p.

<sup>25</sup> Yevhen Lyzen, *Diialnist myrotvorchoi misii J. Barthélemy u vrehuliuvanni polsko-ukrain-skoho viiskovoho konfliktu u liutomu-berezni 1919 r.* [The Activity of the Peaceful

The main objectives of Joseph Barthélemy's first mission, on the one hand, were to investigate the circumstances surrounding the November 1918 Jewish pogrom in Lviv, the true extent of Polish-Ukrainian hostility, and the French government's military assistance to Poland. An essential aim of Barthélemy's second mission, on the other hand, was to end hostilities between the warring sides as soon as possible, to negotiate a temporary truce and a demarcation line.

### ARGUMENTATION

The second mission, led by Joseph Barthélemy, only began after the Ukrainian general offensive threatened the Polish-occupied city of Lviv in mid-February 1919. In a highly hopeless position, a coalition expedition commanded by Joseph Barthélemy set off on February 17, 1919, at 10 a.m. by special train from Warsaw to Lviv. It also included Lieutenant-General Carton de Wiart, prof. Robert Howard Lord, Col. Harry Smith, Major de Létoile, Lieutenant Lamarck, Lieutenant Forster and Lieutenant Pergolesi. This mission represented France, Great Britain, the United States and Italy and was under the patronage of Joseph Noulens. As can be seen, the mission was not solely French-English, and it was given inter-Union character. Polish officers Andrzej Hempel, Roman Michalowski, Zigmund Mycelsky and Stefan Shchepanovsky were also officially assigned to Joseph Barthélemy's mission during his stay in Lviv.<sup>26</sup>

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Mission by Joseph Barthélemy in the Resolution the Polish-Ukrainian Armed Conflict of the February-March of 1919], in "Vcheni zapysky Tavriiskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. I. Vernadskoho. Serii: Istorychni nauky" [Scientific Notes of Tavriya National University Named after V.I. Vernadsky. Series: Historical Sciences], 2019, Tom 30 (69), № 2, s. 130–134; Idem, *Persha misiia Antanty pid kerivnytstvom J. Barthélemy (25 sichnia – 11 liutoho 1919 r.)* [The First Mission of the Entente Under the Leadership of J. Barthélemy (January 25 - February 11, 1919)], in "Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Serii: Istoriia" [Scientific Bulletin of Uzhhorod University. Series: History], 2020, No. 2 (43), s. 130–137; Idem, *Dialnist myrotvorchoy misii J. Barthélemy v pratsiakh M. Lozynskoho* [Activities of J. Barthélemy's Peacekeeping Mission in the Works of M. Lozynsky], in "Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii do 100-richchia utvorennia Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky. Halychyna. Naukovyi i kulturno-prosvitnii kraieznavchyi chasopys" [Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference Dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of the Formation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Galicia. Scientific and cultural-educational local lore journal], 2019, No. 32, s. 226–232.

<sup>26</sup> *Misya Konferencyi pokojowej przybywa do Lwowa* [The mission of the Peace Conference comes to Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 17 lutego, no. 35, s. 1.

Thus began the second stage of Joseph Barthélemy's activity in Eastern Galicia. It should be noted that the only task of the new mission under the leadership of the French general was to conclude a Polish-Ukrainian temporary truce in Eastern Galicia. After all, leaving the western part of Eastern Galicia under Poland was in the interests of the Entente, notably France.<sup>27</sup>

Already on the second day of the Vovchukhiv offensive operation on February 18, 1919, the initial team of the Ukrainian Galician Army (NC UGA), led by Colonel Victor Kurmanovych, received a telegram from the Supreme Council of the Entente, demanding an immediate end to fighting near the Przemyśl-Lviv railway line to allow the Barthélemy mission to arrive in Lviv. On February 20, the UGA National Committee received the Entente mission's second request from Lviv to provide passage from Lviv to the village of Khodoriv for negotiations with the UGA leadership on a ceasefire; it was stated that any refusal to meet this requirement would be considered an act of hostility against the Entente.<sup>28</sup> Thus, during the decisive phase of the struggle for Lviv, Barthélemy's mission demanded an end to hostilities on the Polish-Ukrainian front so that it could negotiate with both sides in the military conflict.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, as noted above, on February 20, 1919, at 6:45 p.m., Joseph Barthélemy's mission arrived in Lviv with an official order to achieve a truce between Poland and the UPR and went to Potocki Square.<sup>30</sup> The peacekeepers immediately began work. On February 21, 1919, members of the mission Mole and Forster, together with Polish officer Bolesław Zaleski, went to the village of Zboivska in the northern part of the Lviv Front. Carton de Wiart visited a military hospital in Lviv, where he spoke with Polish and Ukrainian soldiers about their attitudes towards the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.<sup>31</sup> On the same day, members of the mission interviewed three Ukrainian officers who the Polish UGA troops had captured in Lviv.<sup>32</sup> Entente delegates met with representatives of the Red Cross to

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<sup>27</sup> Vasyl Kuchabskyi, *op. cit.*, s. 274.

<sup>28</sup> Lev Shankovskyyi, *op. cit.*, s. 122.

<sup>29</sup> Sydir Yaroslavyn, *op. cit.*, s. 36.

<sup>30</sup> *Misyi koalicyi we Lwowie* [Mission of the coalition in Lviv], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 21 lutego, no. 43, s. 3.

<sup>31</sup> *Z pobytu misyi koalicyjnej we Lwowie* [From the coalition mission's stay in Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 22 lutego, no. 40, s. 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Z ostatniej chwili (Z kwatery misyi. Delegaci misyi na froncie w Zboiskach)* [In the latest news (From the mission's quarters. Mission delegates at the front in Zboiska)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 22 lutego, no. 44, s. 3.

discuss the humanitarian situation in the city.<sup>33</sup>

Given the difficulties associated with conducting remote negotiations with the Ukrainian side or their absence altogether, members of the mission of Joseph Barthélemy decided to personally visit the leadership of the UGA, which was at that time in the town of Khodoriv.<sup>34</sup> Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko recalled the arrival of the Entente mission to the UGA National Committee: "On February 22, at noon, Colonel Victor Kurmanovych and the officers of the headquarters met the deputies of the almighty union of states at that time."<sup>35</sup>

Since General Joseph Barthélemy was considered an opponent of the UPR, Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko asked Victor Kurmanovych to advise the Entente delegation that Carton de Wiart should chair the meeting for a better course of negotiations. The delegates of the Western states accepted this proposal, and the first meeting began at 12.15 in the room of the operational department of the UGA NC headquarters. It is worth noting that fighting on the Polish-Ukrainian front continued during the negotiations. After a few minutes of silence, Carton de Wiart addressed Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko: "We, all four deputies of the Entente states – England, America, France and Italy – declare to you that on February 18 we addressed you with a request to hang weapons in order for our mission to arrive from Przemyśl to Lviv. Instead, you responded with a general battle on the entire front. We ask you: is this a challenge against the Entente states? If not, we immediately demand that you stop the general battle you have begun. We offer you 5 minutes to answer."<sup>36</sup> Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko replied that he was only the commander of the UGA troops, of which he was extremely proud. Moreover, above him was the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which was the only one able to resolve this issue finally. Surprisingly, this answer satisfied the members of the Entente mission, and it was decided to wait for information from the city of Stanisławow, the ZO UPR's then capital.

Subsequently, General Joseph Barthélemy made proposals for a cessation of hostilities. He stated that the Entente states desired an agreement between the opponents, which required the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a temporary demarcation line. According to it, the Ukrainian army was offered to retreat to the East beyond the line that ran along the Bug River, the western

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<sup>33</sup> *Koalitsiina misiia u Lvovi* [Coalition mission in Lviv], in "Nasha meta" [Our goal], 1919, 23 liutoho, no. 3, s. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Hanna-Melania Tychka, *op. cit.*, s. 95.

<sup>35</sup> Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...*, s. 44.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, c. 45.



borders of Lviv, Peremyshlyany, and Bibrsk counties, and further along the Stryi River. In this way, the city of Lviv, the Drohobych-Boryslav oil region, and most of Eastern Galicia were ceded to Poland.<sup>37</sup> As Mykhalo Lozynsky rightly remarked, this was “a unilateral order that the commission decided to impose on Ukrainians on the premise of an agreement with the Poles.”<sup>38</sup> At around 2.30 p.m., on February 22, a telegram arrived from the city of Stanisławów stating that no answers could be sent at the proposed time and that on the morning of February 23, DS ZO UPR would provide its decision. The Entente mission did not object and was sent to Lviv.<sup>39</sup> On the same day, some members who did not take part in the Khodorkovsky talks visited the Lviv Front for information purposes.<sup>40</sup>

Undoubtedly, such conditions were unacceptable for the Ukrainian side, given the successful development of the Vovchukhiv military offensive operation, the blockade of the city of Lviv and the complete stability of the front in other areas. It should be noted that Ukrainians were represented only by the military, who even opposed a temporary truce in the whole offensive. Unlike the military, Yevhen Petrushevych ordered the leaders of the Galician delegation in Lviv, Colonels Myron Tarnavsky and Lev Bachynsky, to sign an armistice agreement. On February 23, 1919, preparatory work was carried out, and on February 24, the newspaper “Republika” stated that “at 12.25 an agreement was signed between the Ukrainian and Polish troops, consisting of seven points,” and that “all military actions cease” at 6 a.m. “This agreement was signed by Colonel Myron Tarnavsky, Lev Bachynsky and Father Bonn, on the Ukrainian side, and Colonel Mieczysław Kulinsky, Major Jerzy Hempel and Major Wacław Maryansky, on the Polish side. According to this document, the Lviv-Sykhiv road was to remain free of hostilities to maintain communication between the parties involved in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation. The military was forbidden from being on the front lines, and inspection checkpoints were put up. The Poles were allowed to only send three trains from Przemyśl to Lviv with food.<sup>41</sup> The prospect conditioned such actions by the UPR’s political leadership for assistance from the Entente and the belief in its position that Poland should arise only on unquestionably Polish areas (Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Versailles – *Authors*). Since Eastern Galicia is Ukrainian land,

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<sup>37</sup> Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 265.

<sup>38</sup> Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...*, s. 45.

<sup>40</sup> *Deliehaty koalitsiinoi misii po tamtim botsi* [Delegates of the coalition mission on the other side], in “Nasha meta” [Our goal], 1919, 25 liutoho, no. 4, s. 1.

<sup>41</sup> *Umova pro zavishannia oruzhzhia na Hal. fronti* [Condition for surrender of weapons on the Galician front], in “*Republyka*” [Republic], 1919, 26 liutoho, no. 21, c. 2.

the ZOUNR government hoped that the Entente would order the Poles to end the war of aggression against the Eastern Galicians. In this regard, Mykhalo Lozynsky noted: "This faith of Ukrainians was a great disappointment."<sup>42</sup>

Accordingly, on February 25, at 6 a.m., the Council of State Secretaries of the Ukrainian People's Republic ordered the cessation of all combat operations. At that time, Ukrainian troops were advancing on Lviv, and the Poles occupied only a strip along the Przemyśl-Lviv railway. It should be noted that the fighting stopped as the situation of the Polish army became critical, and the Ukrainians expected to capture the capital of Eastern Galicia soon.<sup>43</sup> On the same day, officers of the coalition mission, appointed to monitor compliance with the cessation of hostilities, went to pre-determined places on the Polish-Ukrainian front line.<sup>44</sup> Polish historian Witold Hupert, referring to the temporary ceasefire, wrote that it was of great strategic importance to the Poles. Within five days, they managed to deliver weapons, ammunition, and reinforcements and strengthen the fighting positions to the besieged UGA Lviv.<sup>45</sup> One example is that the first railway transport with American flour arrived in Lviv on the morning of February 25, 1919, due to the mediation of the Entente; the echelon consisted of 40 cars.<sup>46</sup>

Negotiations with Joseph Barthélemy's mission proceeded on February 25, 1919, in Lviv, where a Ukrainian People's Republic delegation, consisting of civilian leaders, diplomats, and soldiers, arrived. The members of the delegation were Osyp Burachynsky, Stepan Vytvytsky, Mykhalo Lozynsky, Volodymyr Temnytsky, Colonels Kost Slyusarchuk and Witold Fidler, Ataman Theodor Rozhankovsky, translator Fr. Franz Xavier Bonn, while general management was carried out by Volodymyr Okhrymovych.<sup>47</sup>

Adam Skarbek led the Polish mission. On the same day, the program of meetings was agreed as follows: first, the Entente representatives would meet a delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, followed by a joint meeting with the Poles. If no agreement could be reached in the negotiations between the

<sup>42</sup> Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi ...*, s. 12.

<sup>43</sup> Roman Tymchenko, *op. cit.*, s. 199-200.

<sup>44</sup> *V spravi umovy z 1. liutoho 1919* [In the case of agreement from February 1, 1919], in "Vpered" [Forward], 1919, 27 liutoho, no. 66, s. 1.

<sup>45</sup> Ivan Karpynets, *op. cit.*, c. 33.

<sup>46</sup> *Z ostatniej chwili (Mąka amerykańska)* [In the latest news (American flour)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv Gazette], 1919, 25 lutego, no. 46, s. 4.

<sup>47</sup> *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 5 bereznia, no. 10, s. 5.

warring parties, Barthélemy's mission was to propose its armistice terms.<sup>48</sup>

After the conference, the Entente mission initiated direct talks between the Polish and Ukrainian delegates. The main discussion revolved around the demarcation line proposed by Joseph Barthélemy. The Ukrainian delegation advocated a temporary demarcation line along the San River, emphasising that the state border between the UPR and Poland should run much further west, according to the ethnic boundary of the two peoples. At the same time, the Polish side defended the demarcation line along the Zbruch River. During the discussion, it offered its own compromise option: the line Berestechko – Busk – Peremyshlyany – Rohatyn – Halych – Kalush – Mount Popadya.<sup>49</sup> This position was most likely taken to show later that the Poles were willing to compromise. They knew that the Ukrainians would not agree to such a demarcation option since the UGA would require to abandon a substantial part of the eastern Galician territory it had controlled for several months. Obviously, no armistice was appropriate for both sides in the war; thus, each put tight territorial demands on the other.

Under such conditions, Barthélemy's mission decided to ultimately push the opponents to accept their compromise version of the truce. The coalition mission summoned the Polish and Ukrainian representatives on February 28, 1919, at 3:40 p.m., and dictated the terms of the armistice, to which they were to respond by March 5, 1919, at 8 p.m.<sup>50</sup> General Joseph Barthélemy presented a demarcation line along which almost a third of Eastern Galicia, including Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin, would be seized by Poland. Representatives of the Entente assured that it was a temporary line of demarcation, and the Paris Peace Conference (PMC) would establish the final border. In turn, US representative Robert Lord pointed out that the Poles will better manage the oil basin and use its fields more rationally. At the same time, the Entente mission promised that if the Galician government agreed to it, the Entente would recognise ZOUNR and provide all possible assistance.<sup>51</sup>

It is worth noting that before handing over the draft truce to the conflicting parties, Joseph Barthélemy delivered a speech for the representatives of the UPR, in which he vividly described, on the one hand, the growing strength of Poles,

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<sup>48</sup> Borys Tyshchyk, *op. cit.*, s. 278.

<sup>49</sup> *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 12 bereznia, no. 11, s. 5-6.

<sup>50</sup> Taras Hunczak (ed.), *Ukraine and Poland in Documents. 1918 – 1922. Part I*, New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto, 1983, p. 86.

<sup>51</sup> Sydir Yaroslavyn, *op. cit.*, s. 36.

including Józef Haller's army, and the Entente's wrath, if Ukrainians do not accept the terms of the Entente, and on the other – the commitment of the allied powers, if the Galicians agree to their proposals.<sup>52</sup> Based on this project, Poland was to receive not only the tiny parts of Eastern Galicia that it had conquered, but the UPR was also to cede large areas of Galician territory, which the UGA held firmly in its hands, along with oil fields near Drohobych and Boryslav. And these were the main elements of the UPR's revenue budget. In general, Galicians had to cede 1/3 of the territory of Eastern Galicia.<sup>53</sup> General Joseph Barthélemy demanded that the delegates of the Entente be heard because then it would recognise the sovereignty of the UPR. Incidentally, Poland's political and military forces assured that they were making compromises because it was legal for them to demand a demarcation line along the Zbruch River.<sup>54</sup>

The fact that he assured the Polish delegation that the temporary demarcation line did not deprive Poland of the right to capture the whole of Eastern Galicia also testifies to a particular bias in General Joseph Barthélemy's views. In fact, this was the essence of his plan to "settle the Polish-Ukrainian conflict."

At that time, Symon Petliura was in Eastern Galicia. On February 24, 1919, he arrived in Stanisławów, where he met the representatives of the civil and military authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic. On February 26, 1919, a festive dinner took place, at which Yevhen Petrushevych made a toast in honour of the state development of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Symon Petliura. In response, the Chief Ataman of the Ukrainian People's Republic stressed the great importance of Eastern Galicia in building a united Ukraine, expressed hope that "thanks to the unity of all Ukrainian lands we will defeat enemies and ensure freedom for future generations of the Ukrainian people," and raised a toast to the unity of Ukrainian lands.<sup>55</sup>

On February 27, 1919, the diplomatic mission of the Entente, learning of Symon Petliura's stay in Eastern Galicia, decided to meet him in the city of Khodoriv, as well as the delegates of the UPR, Yevhen Petrushevych and Sydir Golubovych.<sup>56</sup> Symon Petliura agreed to support Joseph Barthélemy on the condition that the Entente recognises the UPR and ZO UPR and assists Ukrainians

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<sup>52</sup> Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 122-123.

<sup>53</sup> Mykhalo Lozynskiy, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi ...*, s. 13.

<sup>54</sup> Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

<sup>55</sup> *Pobut holov Dyrektorii u Stanyslavovi* [The life of the leaders of the Directory in Stanislaviv], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 5 bereznia, no. 10, s. 2.

<sup>56</sup> *Negotiations with the Mission of the Entente* [Negotiations with the Mission of the Entente], in "Republic" [Republic], 1919, March 1, no. 24, p. 1.

in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Symon Petliura advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposals of General Joseph Barthélemy, as this would open the way to the recognition of the UPR in Europe and would allow them to receive aid with ammunition and military goods to continue the struggle for Ukraine's independence.<sup>57</sup> "Even then, Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern Galicia," said Mykhalo Lozynsky, "to obtain peace with Poland and the recognition of the Entente for them."<sup>58</sup> Symon Petliura insisted on a temporary territorial concession to the Poles, which allowed the Allies to recognise the UPR and set favourable conditions for support. Such steps were due to the critical situation on the front with the main enemy of Ukrainians from the Dnieper region (Greater Ukraine). In mid-February 1919, the Bolshevik army launched a large-scale offensive against the UPR Active Army and captured the city of Fastiv. Soon the Kyiv group of Russian troops occupied the cities of Bila Tserkva and Korosten and advanced on Zhytomyr. In March, the Bolsheviks were already in Kozyatyn, Berdychiv, and Vinnytsia. The Directory's army retreated further south and southwest.

According to Polish Commissioner Roman Michalowski, members of the Entente mission also had a positive impression that Symon Petliura was ready to accept the terms of the Entente mission.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, Symon Petliura wanted to be "protected from behind" to fight the Bolsheviks. His desire coincided with the intentions of the Entente. However, most ZO UPR officials did not agree to cede territory to Poland because they considered this state their main enemy. This view eventually prevailed. Sydir Golubovych stated that national interests preclude the possibility of handing over a part of the disputed territory. Thus, Symon Petliura's plans to enlist the support of the Entente failed.<sup>60</sup>

General Joseph Barthélemy made great efforts to end the war – of course, on his terms, calling primarily on the Ukrainians to make various concessions. As an experienced soldier, he realised that the situation on the front was critical for the Poles. However, the Galician Ukrainians only agreed to the demarcation line along the San River with the return of the city of Lviv. Of course, they were influenced by the successes on the front. However, as Prof. Robert Lord of the

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<sup>57</sup> Oleksandr Klymchuk (ed.), *Symon Vasylovych Petliura. Statti* [Symon Vasylovych Petliura. Articles], Kyiv, 1993, s. 226.

<sup>58</sup> Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 77.

<sup>59</sup> Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

<sup>60</sup> Ruben Fahn, *op. cit.*, s. 145.

Polish delegation in Lviv stated before departing for the city of Khodorkovsky, the line along the San River would not be taken into account by the mission, and the oil basin would be the oil basin fall back to Poland.<sup>61</sup> On the last day of the Khodorkovsky talks, Joseph Barthélemy also failed to break the resistance of the Ukrainian delegation. According to mission member Robert Foster, “this attempt at a truce was a mistake because under its terms Ukrainians had to abandon their oil centres, leave Lviv and give up half of Galicia.”<sup>62</sup>

To summarise the mission’s operations, it should be noted that negotiations with Joseph Barthélemy’s mission in Lviv proved ineffective. Handing the project to the delegates of the UPR Osyp Burachynsky, Stepan Vytvytsky and Mykhalo Lozynsky, Joseph Barthélemy warned them that although the situation at the front is currently in favour of the UPR, Poland might soon launch an offensive with the help of Józef Haller’s army.<sup>63</sup> The draft armistice of the Entente mission had four documents: two explanatory notes, an agreement and a delimitation map. Their essence was reduced to the cessation of hostilities since the signing of the armistice, the retreat of troops beyond the so-called Bartholomew demarcation line; this position concerned only Ukrainians and the release of prisoners and internees. A special appendix stated that Poles should sell half of their oil production to the Ukrainian side.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, the project stipulated that “Ukrainian forces must withdraw beyond the proposed line within 14 days; there should be no concentration of troops in the three-kilometre strip on both sides of the line; release all prisoners of war, internees and hostages, and do not violate property rights.”<sup>65</sup> In a special

<sup>61</sup> Derzhavnyi arkhiv Lvivskoi oblasti, f. 257 *Lvivske naukove tovarystvo z vyvchennia oborony Lvova ta Pivdenno-skhidnykh voievodstv u 1918 – 1920 roky* [Lviv Scientific Society for the Study of the Defense of Lviv and South-Eastern Voivodeships in 1918-1920], op. 2, spr. 228 *Protokoly zasidan derzhavnoho sekretariatu ZUNR 17.01.1919 – 23.05.1919 rr.* [Minutes of meetings of the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic January 17, 1919 – May 23, 1919], ark. 3.

<sup>62</sup> Yaroslav Yosypyshyna, *Symon Petliura: Polshcha y Antanta. U 70-richchia trahedii 1926–1996: zb. materialiv pro vidznachennia 70-richchia zahybeli Symona Petliury* [Symon Petliura: Poland and the Entente. To the 70th anniversary of the tragedy of 1926-1996: Collection of materials for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the death of Symon Petliura], Kyiv, 1997, s. 75.

<sup>63</sup> Yaroslav Isaievych, Mykola Lytvyn, Ivan Pater, Ihor Soliar (Eds.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska narodna respublika. 1918–1923. Uriady. Postati* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic. 1918–1923. Governments. Famous figures], Lviv, 2009, s. 161.

<sup>64</sup> Mykhalo Lozynskiy, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 78-80.

<sup>65</sup> Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

memorial to the Ukrainian and Polish sides, the general warned that his competence comprised the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a temporary truce. Then the problem would be resolved by the PMC. At 7 p.m. on February 28, 1919, the Ukrainian delegation went to Khodoriv to agree with the ZO UPR government, leaving only Major Alfonse Erle in Lviv.<sup>66</sup>

The Entente Mission gave the conflicting parties four days to reflect, from March 1, 1919, at 8 a.m. until March 5, 1919, 8 a.m., after which the representatives of Poland and the ZO UPR were required to provide an official response. At the same time, if one of the parties chose to resume hostilities, it had to warn the mission members no later than 12 hours before they started. The mission members stressed that this decision would have a temporary effect, and the PMC will adopt the final political and territorial settlement of the conflict in Eastern Galicia.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the pressure of Joseph Barthélemy's mission and the desire of the leadership of the UPR to maintain good relations with the Entente, the State Secretariat of the UPR rejected these conditions. The delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, leaving Lviv via Khodoriv, in agreement with the Ukrainian government and the UGA command, decided to denounce the armistice agreement of February 25, 1919, and instructed the UGA to resume hostilities at the front.

In connection with the resumption of hostilities on March 1, 1919, Joseph Barthélemy, who was waiting for a certain date in Lviv, sent an ultimatum telegram to Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko: if the Ukrainian side does not ceasefire, it will take responsibility for breaking the ceasefire, and the mission will leave the city of Lviv on March 2. Sydir Golubovych, the head of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, noted in a radiogram that Joseph Barthélemy's mission, in its activities and proposals, took into account only the interests of the Polish side, intending to give Poland half of the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Despite a sincere desire to live in peace with their neighbours, Ukrainians must defend themselves. Sydir Golubovych suggested sending another independent mission to Galicia.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, the Ukrainian delegation, returning from Lviv to Stanisławow via Khodoriv, late at night on February 28, instructed the UGA to resume hostilities as part of the Vovchukhiv military offensive. The headquarters immediately carried out the order of the Ukrainian People's Republic government "To the Galician

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<sup>66</sup> Taras Hunczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>67</sup> *U wstępu do zawieszenia broni* [On the eve of the ceasefire], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 2 marca, no. 51, s. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 269.

Army”, dated March 1, 1919, and signed by Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko and Victor Kurmanovych. All officers and soldiers were called to redouble their energy in the fight against the Poles: “negotiations offered us a final demarcation line, which is an image of our most sacred feelings, because, based on this line, Kaminka-Strumylova, Lviv, Drohobych and from these areas to the large west areas of Ukrainian territory should remain in the hands of Poles until the final decision in Paris... To arms, comrade commanders, sergeants, shooters and Cossacks! Let iron and blood judge us.”<sup>69</sup> At 18.00 on March 1, 1919, NK UGA reported a coalition mission to resume hostilities against the Poles.

By radio telegram on March 1, 1919, Joseph Barthélemy summoned the Ukrainian delegates until 00.00 to explain non-compliance with the agreements on the temporary cessation of hostilities. The Ukrainian side reported to the Entente mission in a telegram that for purely military reasons, the UGA commander was forced to resume hostilities, which had ceased on February 26, 1919, and was implementing the decision of the UPR government. The DS ZO UPR agreed to submit its official statement within the specified period following previous agreements, i.e. by March 4, 1919.

For their part, members of the Barthélemy mission noted, “the failure of the Ukrainians to cease hostilities is directed against all the great Entente powers, so the UPR authorities are directly responsible for such contemptuous steps before the Entente for further war with the Poles”. At the same time, representatives of the mission informed the Ukrainian delegation that if it does not change its decision by midnight, the Entente mission will leave Lviv on March 2 at 11.00 a.m.<sup>70</sup> By this time, no response was received from the Ukrainians, so the official continuation of hostilities on the Ukrainian side took place on March 1 at 4.30 p.m. On March 2, 1919, combat operations of the enemy armies resumed.<sup>71</sup> On March 1, 1919, on behalf of Tadeusz Rozwadowski, an almost identical order for the resumption of hostilities was issued, in which he appealed to the Polish army and the inhabitants of Lviv: “Polish troops are forced to continue the war against a treacherous and insidious enemy. I call on civilians to calm down and persevere because the entire Polish people are behind us.”<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Mykhailo Omeljanovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...* s. 49-50.

<sup>70</sup> *Z ostatniej chwili (Wyjazd misji ze Lwowa)* [In the latest news (Departure of the mission from the city of Lviv)], in “Gazeta Lwowska” [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 4 marca, no. 52, s. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 123.

<sup>72</sup> *Ukraińcy zerwali zawieszenie broni. Dowództwo Wojsk Polskich na Galicyę wschodnią* [Ukrainians violated the ceasefire. Command of the Polish army for Eastern Galicia], in “Gazeta Lwowska” [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 4 marca, no. 52, s. 1.



On March 2, 1919, the Council of State Secretaries of the Ukrainian People's Republic convened in Stanisławow. After a report from the Lviv delegation, it rejected the Entente mission's proposal without discussion. At the same time, a decision was made on four points: 1) to protest to the Entente states about the unacceptable commitments proposed by the mission of Joseph Barthélemy, which forced them to continue the war against Poland to protect their land; 2) to request the creation of a new Entente mission to investigate the Polish-Ukrainian territorial dispute; 3) to have the government publish a statement on the Ukrainian delegation's negotiations with the Entente mission; 4) to make a public request to the people to defend the Ukrainian land.<sup>73</sup>

The Entente delegation left Lviv at 11.00 a.m. on March 3, 1919, aboard the regular train № 28, draped with the flags of the Entente countries, for Warsaw.<sup>74</sup> In his interview with the Polish press, Joseph Barthélemy emphasised: "France and England are sympathetic to you; we would like to see you big and strong, with a powerful army as a counterweight to Germany."<sup>75</sup> Joseph Barthélemy, leaving Lviv, stated, "the resumption of hostilities is zero for relations between Ukrainians and Western countries." A crowd of people gathered on the platform of the Lviv railway station to say goodbye to the Entente mission.<sup>76</sup>

Of the mission in Lviv, only Colonel Harry Smith remained, tasked with reporting on the further situation in Lviv and its surroundings, and if necessary, speaking on behalf of the Entente.<sup>77</sup> Shortly afterwards, on March 8, Colonel Harry Smith took a special train to Paris; on the way, he was to meet General Joseph Barthélemy, who, at that time, had left Warsaw for the same place. English Major King, who remained in place, brought this order of Harry Smith to Lviv.<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, as expected, negotiations between opponents of the Polish-

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<sup>73</sup> *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 12 bereznia, no. 11, s. 5-6.

<sup>74</sup> *Propozycja Ukraińców* [Offer of Ukrainians], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 1 czerwca, no. 125, s. 5; *Ostrzeliwanie misji ententy przez Ukraińców* [Departure of the Entente mission through the Ukrainians], in "Kurjer Częstochowski" [Courier Czestochowa], 1919, 5 marca, no. 3, s. 2.

<sup>75</sup> Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 123.

<sup>76</sup> *Zerwanie stosunków koalicyji z Ukraincami* [Breaking coalition relations with Ukrainians], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 4 marca, no. 50, s. 1.

<sup>77</sup> *Misya koalicyjna opuściła Lwów* [The coalition mission left Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 3 marca, no. 49, s. 1.

<sup>78</sup> *Z ostatniej chwili (Wyjazd pułk. Smytha do Paryża)* [In the latest news (Departure of colonel Smith to Paris)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 9 marca, no. 57, s. 4.

Ukrainian military conflict were unsuccessful. This was inevitable because the conditions proposed by Joseph Barthélemy's mission, as the English historian Harold Timperley wrote, did not correspond to either the ethnographic principle or the parties' position to front confrontation.<sup>79</sup>

While in Warsaw for a short time, Joseph Barthélemy immediately left for Poznań, where he reported to the head of the Entente Inter-Union Mission in Poland, Joseph Noulens, on the failure of the peace talks caused by the Ukrainians.<sup>80</sup>

In this context, Joseph Noulens, in expressing his indignation, mostly blamed Symon Petliura. On March 10, 1919, the Bartholomew Mission left Poland for Paris. On March 12, 1919, as soon as they arrived in the French capital, Joseph Barthélemy, Carton de Wiart, and Robert Lord compiled a report for the Jules Cambon Commission. According to their statements, the situation near Lviv was critical for the Poles and threatened to defeat the Ukrainians. The loss of the city of Lviv, they said, would harm Poland and be interpreted as the defeat of the Entente, which would immediately strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks and the agency hired by Germany to conspire against the Entente in Eastern Europe. In these circumstances, the Polish Affairs Committee drew the attention of the High Council to the need to transfer Yosef Haller's troops to Poland.<sup>81</sup> On March 14, 1919, Jules Cambon's commission, based on another report by the Entente delegation of Generals Joseph Barthélemy, Carton de Wiart, and Lieutenant Robert Foster, recommended sending General Józef Haller's army and a large number of weapons to Poland as soon as possible, citing the plight of the Poles and the threat of losing Lviv. As a result, the commission informed the Supreme Council of the need to transfer Józef Haller's army to Eastern Galicia immediately and stressed the need to use allied contingents of nearby troops.

Ukrainian and Polish scholars hold dramatically divergent views on the actions of Joseph Barthélemy's mission and the behaviour of Ukrainian People's Republic politicians. For example, according to Ivan Lysyak-Rudnytsky, a well-

<sup>79</sup> Oleksandr Karpenko (ed.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika. 1918 – 1923. Istoriiia ...*, s. 409.

<sup>80</sup> *Gen. Berthelemy wyjechał w ważnej misji do Poznania* [General Barthelemy left on an important mission to the city of Poznan], in "Kurjer Częstochowski" [Courier Czestochowa], 1919, 7 marca, no. 5, s. 2.

<sup>81</sup> Oleksandr Karpenko, Kateryna Mytsan (com.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika 1918–1923. Dokumenty i materialy: u 5-kh tomakh* [West Ukrainian Peoples Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Ivano-Frankivsk, 2009, Vol. 5 (1) *Zovnishnia polityka i mizhnarodne stanovyshe. 1918–1919 rr.* [Foreign Policy and International Situation. 1918–1919], s. 105.

known Ukrainian historian in the diaspora, Joseph Barthélemy's proposal was a real opportunity to resolve the Polish-Ukrainian war. The Western Front of the Ukrainian People's Republic was liquidated with its adoption. The main burden of the struggle was shifted to the East, where the Directory's troops tried their best to restrain the onslaught of Bolshevik troops. The arrival of a well-organised UGA to help the Dnieper region would give Ukrainians a military advantage on the Eastern Front. In addition, the preservation of the territory of the UPR, although significantly reduced by the Barthélemy line, would provide the UPR with a well-organised civilian rear for military operations in the East of the state.<sup>82</sup> In this regard, historian Vadym Adadurov argues that the rupture of the armistice harmed the leadership of the UPR, which adopted the fatalist strategy of either all or nothing.<sup>83</sup>

Mykhaylo Kapustyansky, a military and political figure in the Ukrainian People's Republic, believed that there were only two political and military opportunities in this situation: "Either with the Bolsheviks against the Entente or with the Entente against the Bolsheviks... There is no other way out." He stressed that it was necessary to choose a "union with the Entente", since Joseph Barthélemy planned to use the UGA army on the anti-Bolshevik front after the armistice with Poland<sup>84</sup> Vasil Kuchabsky considered the rejection of the Entente's proposals to be a mistake since it caused Marshal Ferdinand Foch to have a negative attitude about the ZO UPR and accelerated the entry of Józef Haller's troops in Poland.<sup>85</sup> Modern Polish historians Macej Kozłowski, Michał Wzozek and Michał Klimecki consider the act of power of the ZO UPR to be suicidal. Thus, the dictation of General Joseph Barthélemy, in particular his proposed terms of the armistice, should be analysed in terms of the Ukrainian conciliar strategy, and not only through the prism of the Polish-Ukrainian military conflict, which was merely a side effect of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.<sup>86</sup>

In the context of the Allied mission, it must be acknowledged that the mission of Joseph Barthélemy and the Entente placed psychological barriers to the realisation of their plans. In a typically French effort to create a "strong Poland," yet leaving behind Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin, General Joseph Barthélemy formulated his demands in such a way that the Ukrainian side could

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<sup>82</sup> Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, *Polsko-ukrainski stosunki. Tiahar istorii* [Polish-Ukrainian Relations. The Burden of History], in *Istorychni ese. V 2 t.* [Historical Essays. In Two Volumes], Kyiv, 1994, vol. 1, s. 103.

<sup>83</sup> Vadym Adadurov, *op. cit.*, s. 30.

<sup>84</sup> Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 66-67.

<sup>85</sup> Orest Krasivskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 97.

<sup>86</sup> Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 175-176.

not accept them psychologically. One can agree with the opinion of some historians that if the demarcation line had been proposed along the lines of the front at that time, the Ukrainian side would indeed have accepted it. Moreover, in March 1919, a united Ukrainian army with the help of the Entente would defeat the main enemy of the independent UPR – Bolshevik Russia. However, suppose the dictates of Joseph Barthélemy are viewed from a historical retrospective. In that case, it becomes clear that the ZO UPR had no choice but to accept the conditions proposed by the Entente mission. This was probably the last chance for the desired understanding with the Entente.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, the attempts of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to find an understanding with the Entente proved futile, as the Entente considered the East Galician case only in the context of its global interests. The failure of the decisive Khodorkovsky armistice negotiations under the auspices of the PMC was a crucial moment in the Polish-Ukrainian war "because it marked a radical shift in the policy of the Entente leadership in favour of Poland. First, it accelerated the deployment of Józef Haller's army to Poland, whose presence resulted in a decision to conclude the war in Poland's favour."<sup>88</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

The efforts of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to reach an agreement with the Entente were useless because the Entente only evaluated the East Galician problem in the context of its worldwide objectives. The failure of the pivotal Khodorkovsky armistice talks under the auspices of the PMC was a key moment in the Polish-Ukrainian war "because it showed a significant shift in the Entente leadership's stance in favour of Poland. First and foremost, it sped the deployment of Józef Haller's army to Poland, whose presence resulted in a decision to conclude the war in Poland's favour.

Consequently, both missions led by Joseph Barthélemy, despite the enormous amount of work done, did not fulfil their primary task, namely the temporary cessation of the Polish-Ukrainian war. However, these delegations indirectly influenced the fate of the UPR, as their members actively spread in their future reports and speeches the unattractive image of Ukrainians as potential Bolsheviks, which later became one of the preconditions for the decision of the

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, s. 344-345.

<sup>88</sup> Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 270.

Supreme Soviet on June 25, 1919, that allowed Poles to occupy the entire territory of Eastern Galicia along the river Zbruch.

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