NATIONHOOD UNDER THE EASTERN BLOC:
ROMANIAN COMMUNIST MODE OF ETHNO-POLITICAL
CONSTRUCTION AS RESPONSE TO THE “ELDER BROTHER” (LATE 60s - 70s) (ANALYSTS’ ASSESSMENTS AND HISTORIANS’ VIEWS)*

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Abstract. The article explores evolution of so-called Communist Nationhood under the Ceauşescu regime in late 60es – early 70es. The author of this research has accentuated several main points of the process, which lasted approximately a decade since N. Ceauşescu has come to power and tightens his grip on domestic affairs in view to secure unchallengeable domination over state and society. Ideology of Communist Nationhood with strongly developed ethnic accents has been worked out on the grounds of obsolete concepts and based on the set of historical doctrines designed to serve vital interests of the Communist dictatorship and its head. As the situation in Romania was being developed to more obvious results both in domestic and foreign policy areas during 60-es - 70es, foreign

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experts and historians of the time were analysing tight connection between ideology, interpretation of national history and politics of the Ceauşescu regime.

Résumé: Le devenir de la nation sous le Bloc d'Est: la manière communiste roumaine de construction ethno-politique comme réponse au “frère aîné” (la fin des années ’60 – les ’70) (Evaluations des analystes et opinions des historiens)

L'article ci-joint analyse l’évolution du devenir de l’ainsi nommée Nation Communiste sous le régime Ceauşescu vers la fin des années ’60 et le début des ’70. L’auteur de cette courte étude accentua plusieurs aspects de ce processus, qui dura approximativement une décennie dès l’avènement de N. Ceauşescu au pouvoir et jusqu’au mélange de plus en plus prononcé dans les affaires quotidiennes afin d’assurer le contrôle total sur l’Etat et la société. On développa l’idéologie de la Nation Communiste qui reçut des accents ethniques sur les bases des concepts retro et sur quelques doctrines historiques conçues à servir les intérêts fondamentaux du dictateur Communiste et de son entourage. Comme la situation de la Roumanie évolua vers des résultats évidents dans le domaine de la politique interne, mais aussi externe durant les années ’60-’70, les spécialistes étrangers de cette période-là, ainsi que les historiens contemporains analysèrent les étroites connexions existant entre l’idéologie, l’interprétation de l’histoire nationale et la politique du régime Ceauşescu.

Keywords: Nicolae Ceauşescu, Bessarabian issue, protochronysts, Communist Romanian Nationhood

Introduction

As the distance between our times and those when the Communist regimes of East-Central Europe, Balkan countries and the USSR existed, is widening, then more evidences and sources of recent history come to light and fall into disposal of researchers. It makes possible to restore trustful picture of both national and international Communism. Special cases in this field represent those of the Communist countries that being officially included into so-called Socialist camp had their own “agenda” within the Eastern Bloc. Since the early 60s of the 20th century Communist Romania has demonstrated that sort of policy and consequently hastily drifted in this direction having the USSR scared of possible cleavage and making her allies at the Warsaw Pact to recall recent Albanian affair in a moment of growing Soviet-Chinese conflict. Ideology has been one of the most significant tools in the armoury of the Communist regimes and their chiefs who sought to use it in view of strengthening their legitimacy in both inside and outside governed countries. The ideology of national Communism was strengthened in most Communist states with a help of sets of ideas and doctrines
when history of the nation and state were frequently brushed up with colourful ethnicity of exaggerated ancientness. The aggrandizement of glorious past based in many ways on consciously and deliberately constructed ethnic history and it was designed to serve political goals of the Communist regime. The latter tried to stress its character as original preserver of eternal nationhood, sovereignty, and to pretend vigilant and vigorous “beefeater” of ethnicity.

The historiography of the Romanian Communism has proved universal correctness of conclusion on Soviet historiography made by well-known Russian historian Yu. Afanasyev, and which generally applicable to whole historiography of each Communist state. He wrote on Soviet historiography as of “distinct scientific-political phenomenon inextricably embedded into system of totalitarian state and adjusted to it to serve its ideological political demands”¹. In Romanian case as it was noted by modern Romanian historian A. Lupșor, in the early 60s national historiography has come to so-called second stage, characterized as the period of “recovery of national values” and after 1971 it was getting the form of “Ceaușist, national-Communist” mode².

The beginnings of deviation of the Romanian historiography from the 'internationalist' reflection rules, concerning the Romanian past

The first signs of the “fluctuations” in the Romanian Communist historiography have been manifested in 1959 when the centenary celebration of the Union of Danubian Principalities (meaning Moldavia and Wallachia) received strong official support which has sharply conflicted with the earlier imposed by the Communist authorities ban even on simple mention of the event in view of possible dissatisfactions of the Soviets. Next serious step on this path did not deserve any long waiting. During Plenary session of the CC of the Romanian Workers’ Party held on November 30 – December 5, 1961 the ideas of national valour were demonstrated further. The intra-party feud when so-called former exiles in the leadership of the RWP had been expelled from it ranks and so-called

indigenous members with the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on the top established their superiority\(^3\), new interpretation of events of August 23, 1944 gained special meaning. Henceforth, contrary to former official statements, the fall of the Marshal Ion Antonescu’ dictatorship was merely a result of activity of the Romanian Communists and it was not exclusively Soviet involvement into imbroglios Romanian affairs and decisiveness of Romanian King Michael I and his collaborators to topple down dictator. By this version of events called “Revolution of August, 23” the victorious Party fraction demonstrated its adherence to the idea of superior significance of Romanian domestic political force, i.e. the RWP, in establishing new political system. It was more important at the moment when the Kremlin has taken course of de-Stalinization which seriously scared the Party leaderships in many Communist countries. By this connotation to the events of August 23, 1944 Romanian Communist leaders with Gheorghiu-Dej on the top have pointed out their own decisive tribute to the cause of national independence and sought to strengthen role of Romania in international relations. Just one year later the official mouthpiece of the Institute of History of Party to the Central Committee of the RCP the journal “Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe lîngă CC al PCR”\(^4\) has published unusual and unexpected due its sharpness to domestic and foreign audience review of the book written by Soviet historian V. B. Ushakov under the title “Foreign Policy of Hitlerist Germany”. It was published by Soviet “nomenclature” publishing house called “International relations”\(^5\). The reviewers of the book have harshly criticized it for not mentioning the role of the Romanian CP in making Romania breaking alliance with Germany. They have stressed the fact of mass Communist activity inside Romania already on the eve of August 23, 1944 and its leading role in overthrow of I. Antonescu dictatorship, including organizing stubborn resistance to German troops. This development has been noticed both in Yugoslavia, one of the “dissent” Communist state, and in analytical circles in the West\(^6\).

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\(^4\) Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe lîngă CC al PCR, [Annals of the Institute of the Communist Party History attached to the CC of the PCR], București, 1962, no. 8.

\(^5\) В. Б. Ушаков, Внешняя политика гитлеровской Германии [Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany], Москва, ИМО, 1961.

\(^6\) “Soviet Historian Scored in Romanian Publication”, 18 December 1962. [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-3-6933; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research
In the spring of 1963 Romanian Communist authorities took up more energetic to promote ideas of Romania's non-Axis position during World War Two and German occupation of her in 1940-1941. To prove the latest thesis the documentary materials have been elicited from American archives in particularly the US State Department analysis on the Romanian affairs during the war in which Romania was characterized as occupied nation. The meaning of undertaken steps combined three important aspects of the problem. One of them was to renounce previously influenced by the Soviet “elder brother’s” version of Romania’s alignment with Axis States from the very beginning of the WW2.7 By rejecting this assessment of the Romanian role in Axis Bucharest sleeked to provide Romania with special statute in international relations in post-war period. Second aspect of the taken policy with reference to unnamed “foreign historians” was decisiveness to demonstrate Soviets that Romanian side will pursue its own way in interpreting the subject of the greatest political and ideological importance to the Kremlin masters of the Eastern Bloc. Finally, Bucharest seriously challenged Moscow leaving her no room to deprecate since the argument put forward to prove this position has been based on the official documents of the USA, which played one of leading roles in the anti-Axis Alliance. The concomitant process of contriving new version of Romanian history that has started in 1960 with publicizing of the first book from four volumes publication (last one has come to light in 1964 and then publication stopped) of the “History of Romania” (“Istorie a României”) demonstrated the RCP proclivity to come to more close ethnic grounds in construing Communist nationhood8. In this connection, the abovementioned Romanian historian A. Lupşor noticed that “the Roman conquest has been favourably presented, there has been acknowledged that the Romanian language is of Latin origin despite the fact that Slavic vocabulary played an important role in the formation of the Romanian language. According to that work, the Romanians [as a population] have been formed in VII-VI centu-


ries and that process completed with the arrival of the Slavs. The medieval period has been presented without putting special emphasis on the role of Russia. The real surprise occurred as the third volume has come to light, where the problem of Bessarabia was mentioned⁹. As was said, according to Treaty of Lutsk, Peter I had promised to return Moldova territories conquered by the Turks, particularly Budjak. Volume IV focuses on the nineteenth century and brought some critics of Russia, especially in the light of the Organic Statute. The fifth volume devoted to the period of [king] Carol rule, which had been to come, was not released due political reasons"¹⁰.

The Soviet response to the new emphases of the Romanian historians

The Soviets closely scrutinized new Romanian approaches to history with inaccurate hidden dissatisfaction and with strong feelings that the worst is yet to come. Simultaneously, they were not interested in wreaking politicized historical dispute in public. In order to appease Romanian side they resorted to so-called pluralistic assessments of the events of August 23, 1944 by publicizing the article written by E. D. Karpeshchenko under the title “The Victory of Socialism in the Rumanian People’s Republic” in spring 1963 issue of journal “New and Newest History”. As soon as this material had come to foreign analysts, they stated that “the magazine is aptly named because, after all, it is largely concerned with rewriting history in the light of the Kremlin’s latest requirements, and a reader of Karpeshchenko’s contribution tends to feel that this is some of the newest history he has ever read... it may have considerable influence among some of the Soviet officials directly concerned with the E.[ast] European countries, and Karpeshchenko appears to shed some light on the present murky state of Soviet-Rumanian relations”¹¹. Karpeshchenko was characterized as “a straight Khrushchevian” contrary to Ushakov who they considered was “a neo-Stalinist type of historian”. Now the new Soviet version of events sounded as follow “As a

⁹ For more details on evolution of historiography on the issue see: Wilhelmus Petrus van Meurs, Chestiunea Basarabiei în istoriografia comunistă [The Question of Bessarabia in Communist Historiography], Chişinău, 1996.


result of the rout of the German-fascist forces at Kishinev and Yassi and of the victorious offensive of the Soviet Army, a favourable atmosphere (underlined in the text of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty document – Ar. Ulunyan) was created in Rumania for the overthrow of the military-fascist dictatorship. The patriotic forces of the Romanian people, headed by the Communists (underlined in the text of Radio Free Europe document – Ar. Ulunyan), rose in arms on 23rd August 1944 and overthrew the hated government of Antonescu, thereby starting the people's revolution..."\(^{12}\) Noteworthy that E. D. Karpeshchenko, the author of the article in the "New and Newest History", was the employee responsible for Romanian “direction” in the Department of relations with Communist and Workers’ parties of the Socialist countries of the CC of the CPSU on the top with its head Yu. Andropov\(^{13}\). The Soviets demonstrated their concern over possible further Romanian "deviationism" in usage of history in pursue their goals and Moscow resorted to publishing a rich number of works on Romanian modern and contemporary history\(^{14}\). The group of high-level officials of the RWP who voiced in favour of a new course designed to distance from still existed close relations with the Kremlin consisted of several influential party figures with Gheorghiu-Dej at the helm. Modern Romanian researcher L. Ţăranu

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\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) After Andropov’s ascendance to Chairmanship of the KGB, Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich Karpeshchenko (Евгений Дмитриевич Карпещенко) was personally transferred by Andropov from the CC of the CPSU’ Department of Relations with Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist countries to the KGB administration. Later on, when Andropov took on Politburo, Karpeshchenko was appointed head of the Secretariat of the KGB in February 1979 where he served until April 1984 and finally promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general.

who works in the National Council for Study of Securitate Archives (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității) wrote that “Gheorghiu-Dej was labelled in many ways by those close to him, by analysts and historians as ‘Carpathian fox’ or ‘Machiavelli of the Balkans’ and his methods of governance were ‘Byzantinism’, ‘diplomatic skills’, ‘cruel’ or ‘cunning’”\textsuperscript{15}.

\textbf{1964: The year of the assault against the Soviet perspective on the Romanians past}

Three very significant events have happened in 1964 and their coincidence left no room for doubts. Their importance from political point of view consisted of apparent desire of the Romanian Communist leadership to resort to historical arguments with strong ethnic essence in view to produce new ethno-political construction designed to legitimize their domestic and foreign policy in more then ever independent of Moscow manner. First of them was so-called “Declaration of Independence of Romania” adopted at the plenary session of the CC of the RWP convened on April 15-22, 1964. As the Romanian historians L. Banu and F. Banu definitely noted, it had been “apogee of distancing policies pursued by Dej in relations with Moscow”\textsuperscript{16} and it openly ushered in a new stage by declaring sovereign right of the Romanian state to carry out its own policy by rejecting the very existence of any lawful “centre” (unambiguous hint on the USSR) which could give any orders to Bucharest. Second event closely linked to adoption of “April Declaration” and generally embedded into a new ethno-political construction while being its consistent part found its way in December 1964 with publication the book by K. Marx “Notes about Romanians” in the Romanian language and in the amount of 20.5 thousand copies, which was quite symptomatic phenomenon in itself\textsuperscript{17}. In complete accordance with the traditions

\textsuperscript{15} L. Țăranu, \textit{Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej în istoriografia actuală. Ce i se impută, ce i se recunoaște} [Gheorghiu-Dej in Current Historiography. What is being held, what is recognized], in “Dosarele Istoriei” [History Files], 2005, no. 7, p. 20.


\textsuperscript{17} K. Marx, \textit{Însemnări despre români} [Notes on Romanians], unpublished manuscripts edited by Acad. Prof. A. Șuteiu and Prof. S. Schwanin, București, Romanian Popular Academy Publishing House, 1964.
of Communist disputes, Romania’s Communist leadership used an appeal to so-called historical heritage of “classics of Marxism-Leninism”. In this work canonical Communist classic characterized in rather tough and extremely negative form politics of tsarist Russia in Bessarabia and in the Romanian principalities in the XVIII-XIX centuries, including the actions of the army under the command of Alexander Suvorov and the Russian troops in the region later. To certain extent, it was a reflection of the process of “de-Sovietisation started after 1963, and represented the mechanism of survival of the Romanian Communist elite that have adopted and manipulating patriotic symbols”\textsuperscript{18}. Later on one of the eyewitnesses of the time who was a young University student in those years reminded after the fall of Communism in Romania that “in those months of 1964 nobody who were sitting and reading in the library did not pay attention to shiny brown volume with golden band with inscription «Karl Marx. Notes about Romanians». I was so stuffed with Marxism that nothing incited to have me wanted to hear anything of Marx! We have not even put a question, what could be Marx’s notes about Romanians, we have known that he lived so far away from her and died in 1883!?! Volumes were standing for a long time on the shelf of district bookshop until one day, when a certain foreigner who seemed to come especially seeking for Marx and said bookseller that he wants all volumes. Surprised with requirements and hastiness of the foreign buyer the bookseller being caught with curiosity said that ‘more two left’. The stranger did not comment, paid, took them and disappeared with a car. For the first time, the bookseller has opened the volume and started reading. He quickly realized that it was Marx who the Romanians had never heard of and had never read earlier”\textsuperscript{19}.

The third event that has been noticed by the specialists and analysts who closely followed developments in Romania took a very peculiar form. They have found that in the new second edition of the third volume of “History of Romania” published in 1964 some previous statements in favour of the Russian foreign policy concerning Moldova and Walachia disappeared and in some cases they were replaced with new and more pro-Romanian thesis.

Soviet reaction on publishing of Marx’s notes has been noticed by foreign analysts. They wrote that “Soviet sensitivity concerning the publication of the


latest work by Karl Marx to appear in E. [ast] Europe seems to be reflected in a Moscow broadcast to Rumania on 24th January. The Marxian book is called «Notes about Romanians», edited by A. Oţetea, of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences. It quotes Marx as having supported Rumanian rights to Bessarabia and as saying that the Russians wrongly supported Hungary in 1848 when Moscow sided with the Hungarians in the suppression of a revolt in Transylvania. Special attention of the observers attracted statement of Radio Moscow, which was the mouthpiece of Soviet propaganda abroad. It stated in broadcast in Romanian that “Russia and France alone had pursued a policy aimed at reunifying Moldavia and Muntenia... Thanks largely to Russian efforts, ... the Austrian and Turkish armies were evacuated, there making reunion possible”. As the analysts stated this “argument seems to imply that in Moscow’s eyes, even if the USSR has occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Rumania still has reason to be grateful to Big Brother for her national existence”

An indirect appeal to Bessarabian, i.e. territorial, problem was the natural continuation of the course laid forth in April 1964 and considered to increase degree of Romanian independence within the ranks of the Eastern Bloc. Therefore both in the Soviet propaganda and diplomacy when the Kremlin addressed to Bucharest, “Bessarabian problem” was not interpreted as territorial but solely as historical one in the context of the formal recognition of the Soviet version of “objectively positive Russia’s role in the Balkans”, and the “liberation mission of the Soviet Union” in 1939-1945 in the region.

Crystallization of the 'national' approach in the Romanian historiography, simultaneously with installation of Ceauşescu regime

After the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965 who was the long-time leader of the RWP and Romania with consequent ascendance to power of the new leader Nicolae Ceauşescu formerly chosen course aimed at reconsidering of national history and build up a new ethno-political construction has been continued. This time main emphasis have been made on history of the Romanian Communist party since in Communist tradition admitted earlier by the Soviets and repeatedly used in all Communist states it was history of Communist Party that embodied a gist of national history being its part and parcel. Therefore the

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decision to write history of the RWP adopted in its IXth Congress in July 1965 seemed to be consequential and logical from the point of view of existed agenda. Western analysts viewed the situation as follow “...new Party leaders have finally decided, after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, to proceed with a house-cleaning in order to absolve the party of past mistakes and to adjust the tenets of Rumanian Communist ideology to the present nationalistic policy, designed to rally the whole people behind the Party. The latter is to be presented as continuing revolutionary and progressive Rumanian traditions”22. They paid special attention to peculiar aspects of Romanian national history in conjunction with connections between Romanian Communist Party (as it was called since 1965) and the USSR when they wrote “to mention another case where the past Party decisions do not fit in easily with current policy, it may be recalled that the Fourth Congress of the RCP, held in 1928, strongly supported the view that Bessarabia had to be returned to the Soviet Union. Although the recent Soviet-Rumanian communiqué (of September 11) referred to the “inviolability of frontiers in Europe,” it is clear that it would be difficult for the Party to pursue a more nationalistic policy without at the same time venturing to tackle a new interpretation of such a controversial past decisions of its own”23. The results of chosen course were not long to wait. As soon as the book by well-known specialist on Romanian literature E. M. Dvoychenko-Markova under the title “Romanian-Russian literary connections in the first half of the 19th century”24, has come in 1966 to light in Moscow publishing house “Nauka” it was subjected to critical review in Romanian scientific magazine “Secolul XX” (“Age XX”). The dispute has been unfolded around the person of Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, the prominent Romanian intellectuals of Bessarabian descent and his belonging to Romanian literature while the author of the book wrote of him as Russian writer25.


23 Ibid., p. 5.

24 Е. М. Двойченко-Маркова, Русско-румынские литературные связи в первой половине XIX века [Russian-Romanian literary connections in the first half of the XIX century], Издательство “Наука”, 1966.

The seriousness of the plans contrived by the chiefs of the Romanian Communist regime and their strivings to pursue policy of indigenization of national history in view to mobilize population in the interests of the Communist authorities inside the country together with strengthening their positions abroad have found a way in further explorations in Romanian national history. The idea was to emphasize durable character of the Romanian state, its important role in the international relations in the past and to legalize continuation of the national tradition in modern times. Foreign observers noticed in spring of 1967 that “the current rewriting of Rumanian history meets with difficulties in keeping pace with the rapid evolution of political thinking in Rumania and the ever increasing emphasis on national values and sovereignty”\(^{26}\). That conclusion was made after the events that had great importance for understanding of mechanism used to mould a new ethno-political construction of Romanian Communist nationhood.

In his speech, called “The Romanian Communist Party – Continuator of the Romanian People’s Revolutionary and Democratic Struggle, of the Traditions of the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Romania” and delivered on May 7, 1966, N. Ceauşescu actually developed in strict and plain manner the basic thesis which explained that the national priorities dominated and policy of “international centre” as the Communist International, converted by the Soviets into their tool, was rejected. The very reference to that theme has presented a serious challenge to Moscow. Furthermore, during expressly aggrandized solemnly opening of the Museum of History of the Party and revolutionary movement in Romania, established in the building of the former Museum “Lenin-Stalin”, ancient and modern history were demonstratively united into one entire and indivisible glorious pattern. The appearance in June 1966 issue of official propagandist party magazine “Lupta de clasă” (“Class struggle”) of the material written by such a person as its editor in chief Ştefan Voicu who has been a member of the Central Committee of the RCP did not passed off unnoticed abroad including the USSR. In his article Şt. Voicu actually strongly condemned cession of Bessarabia [to the USSR] on June 28, 1940\(^{27}\). In late September 1966,
during specially convened session of the Romanian Academy of Sciences devoted to celebration of its centenary N. Ceauşescu pointed out, that “in the second half of the nineteenth century, the intensification of the struggle for social progress, to achieve national unity and to conquest of Independence, with profound implications for social life, has given a strong impetus to scientific and cultural activity in the country”\(^{28}\).

On setting to mould national historical conception the Romanian leadership could not avoid contradictions and even sharp disputes with the Soviets. The latter on their part sought to eschew open confrontation and usually addressed to the pattern of “bourgeois” academicians who were allegedly distorting history in the nationalist interests. By referring to Western authors simultaneously Soviet side criticized indirectly Romanians for their reconsidering of national history. Western observers although analysing particular Soviet publications, made conclusions that could be applied to entire Soviet position. Thus, one of them Fritz W. Ermarth, who worked at the time at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and occupied later high-level positions both in the US security community and presidential administrations, while writing of one Soviet publication on Romanian national history has justly pointed out that “on the whole, the aim of the article\(^{29}\) is clear enough it is not to correct ‘bourgeois’ conceptions but to refute the conviction shared widely by Rumanians in the West and, what is no doubt more important, by people in Rumania that, as a result (underlined in the text – Ar. U.) of the 1940 ultimatum by which Moscow reacquired Bessarabia, Rumania had no choice but to join Hitler against the USSR. The author attempts to show, with detailed references to Western and Rumanian sources, that Rumania had, for all practical purposes, joined the Axis camp well before the ultimatum, which itself only brought an outstanding dispute to a just settlement. At the root of Rumania’s

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\(^{29}\) Н. И. Лебедев, Некоторые вопросы внешнеполитической истории Румынии в свете буржуазной историографии [Some Questions of Foreign Policy of Romania in the Light of Bourgeois Historiography], in “Новая и новейшая история”, 1967, № 3.
seduction by Germany lay ‘class hatred’ of the USSR felt by Rumania’s ruling class, the ‘fascist nature’ of Rumanian politics, and the ‘perfidy’ of the European democracies”\textsuperscript{30}. Escalation of the polemics has affected a delay in producing of a new version of the RCP history that early planned to come to light by late 1967. An official strivings to formulate basic principles and to shape “socialist nationhood with ethnic face” have called into being the definite aspirations among Romanian intellectuals, and channelled their feelings into socially and ethnically coloured bucolic traditionalism. The appearance at the fall of 1967 of the 2nd volume of the novel “Moromeţii” (“The Moromete Family”), which volume 1 was published in 1955, written by well-known Romanian author and translator Marin Preda, has been not only event in literary life but above all the political one. Western analysts pointed out that “Preda’s novel is an artistic presentation of the new history of the Rumanian Communist Party, according to which the ‘Moscow group’ in the Party leadership is to blame for all the failures of the regime. The novel contains many anti-Soviet hints, while the nation and the ancestral wisdom of the peasantry – which was exposed to all the misfortunes that have occurred in Rumanian history – are continually praised... Though from, an artistic point of view the novel has certain qualities, from an ideological and political point of view it lags behind other recent Rumanian works on the same topic”\textsuperscript{31}.

The Romanian fierce and strong protests against the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 seriously influenced not only international positions of N. Ceauşescu both in East and West but also assisted him to consolidate society and to extol him personally in national public opinion to the level of national hero. Moreover, Bucharest was waiting possible active Soviet reaction to Romanian stance including military measures against Romania\textsuperscript{32}.

\textsuperscript{30} “Soviet Historian on Romania’s Pre-war Foreign Policy”, 17 July 1967, p. 2, [Electronic record] HU OSA 300-8-3-7465; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest– http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:b5b146cd-5b01-4745-95aa-f0aa2fd4b5cd5 [10.09.2013].


ideas of national sovereignty and historically determined territorial integrity of the Romanian state, an important political and cultural role of Romania both in regional and entire European history in durable pace of time, all of these was getting a more appropriate ground for new stage in moulding of Romanian "socialist" nationhood in a certain mode of ethno-political construction.

So-called liberalization process in Communist Romania that has been imitated by the authorities with the purpose to consolidate society and to achieve more independence from the USSR in the international relations lasted quite short period from the days of N. Ceaușescu’s ascendance to power in 1965 and until early 70’es. It allowed ruling faction to constitute general principals of ethno-political construction of Romanian nationhood. Its characteristic features were eternal historical continuation of Romanian political and ethnic nationhood; justness of Romanian international positions during the years when the country used to be really independent; integrity of Rumanian national territory despite the existence of some Romanian lands outside contemporary state borders of Romania and integrity of the Romanian nation regardless existed state entities under other names then Romania (such as represented by Moldavian SSR), and, at last, foreign influence in Romanian history has been portrayed as playing predominantly negative role. Each element of this construction was painted with certain Communist ideological exegesis on the principals of class struggle, progressiveness of the revolutionary traditions and freedom-lusting aspirations of the Romanian people, who cherished the dream to see their Motherland unified. In that scheme history and other several social sciences had to play important role. At the same time, to tighten ideological grip on them the Communist authorities resorted to administrative steps and on March 1970 Academy of Political and Social Studies came to life as new scientific structure with its own organization separated from National Academy of Sciences and with a dozen institutions earlier attached to National Academy33.

In early 70’es ethnic question has expanded its presence in official discourse of the Communist Romania to the extent that seriously strained relations with the Soviets. The latter continued, however, to labour with unwearied assiduity on the one hand to avoid open polemics with Bucharest but on the other hand, to rebuff Romanian statements on Bessarabian problem and Romanian subliminal rejection of distinct Moldovan identity, which legitimized

the very existence of the Moldovan SSR. The Kremlin has resorted to help of local historians and politicians in the Moldovan SSR to address Romanian side on those problems and to express its dissatisfaction with Romanian stance on them.

In his turn, the head of the Communist regime N. Ceauşescu showed growing concern regarding possible weakening of his personal power. The reason of his anxiety rooted in the fear of either possible pro-Soviet conspiracy against him or dangerous openness to West demonstrated by Romania in the late 60’s. The policy of national sovereignty of Romania actively forwarded by Ceauşescu has received more space in official ideology and was being cultivated on the basis of Communist doctrine. Even in propaganda among children of junior age in the school manuals and books designed for compulsory reading in view to indoctrinate people from very nascent years of their life there were openly asserted ideological coined terms like “Party, Ceausescu, Romania!” (“Partidul, Ceauşescu, România!”), “besieged fortress” (“cetăţii asediate”), “Heartful thanks to Party!” (“Mulţumim din inimă Partidului!”), “The great friend and mentor of the younger generation - Nicolae Ceausescu” (“Un mare prieten şi îndrumător al tinerei generaţii - Nicolae Ceauşescu”), “There can be no two histories, a history of the people and the history of the Party” (“Nu pot exista două istorii, o istorie a poporului şi o istorie a partidului”), “Do not forget, Stephan, that our law is to protect the earth of ancestor!” (“Să nu uïţi, Ştefâniţă, că legea noastră e apărarea pământului străbun!”) The latter one had a deep meaning in that address to young reader, since contains the name “Stephan” and implied connotation of prominent glorious rulers Stefan Voda Younger (Ştefâniţă Vodă cel Tânăr) and Stephan Lupu (Ştefâniţă Lupu).

Painstaking efforts have been undertaken by the authorities to bind Romanian reality with “classic Marxism” and therefore special references were made to the “fathers-founders” of Marxism, i.e. K. Marx and F. Engels. As several Romanian researchers and students of history (that is noteworthy to refer to) pointed out now touching upon Ceauşescu’s thinking, the latter “reconstructed through his argumentation the Stalinist explanation of the Leninist self-

Thus, stressing the correctness of chosen course, Ceauşescu pointed out that “it is known that progressive and revolutionary movement in Romania had connections with Marx and Engels, Marx and Engels have paid special attention to our history, social and national struggles of the Romanian people, that in their writings reflected this concern, sympathy for the way in which the Romanian people knew how to fight to defend their right of living free and independent”\footnote{Cuvânt la solemnitatea dezvelirii busturilor lui Karl Marx şi Friederich Engels. 27 mai 1971 [Speech at the Solemn Encovering of the Karl Marx and Friederich Engels Busts. 27th May 1971], in N. Ceauşescu, România pe drumul construirii societăţii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate [Romania on the Way of Building the Socialist Multilateral Developed Society], vol. 6, Bucureşti, 1972, p. 35.}.

But the stake on ideology of national unity was fraught with hidden menace to regime, since “the thesis of national unity had already produced effects that were threatening to become more difficult to control ideologically and politically. It had made possible the emergence of several methodological approaches within framework of one profession and even in several directions of thought, which, without denying the Marxist-Leninist, could no longer complain constantly against it. There was hard to imagine a personal dictatorship in this liberalized atmosphere”\footnote{M. Martin, Cultura româna între comunism şi nationalism (III) [Romanian Culture between Communism and Nationalism], in “Revista 22” [Journal 22]. 11.11.2002–http://www.revista22.ro/cultura-romana-entre-comunism-si-nationalism-iii-252.html [10.09.2013].}.

This fact was obvious to the Romanian ruler who considered it necessary to limit the risks.

**Profiling the national-communist approach of the past**

The constituency of “socialist nationhood” in its ethno-political construction could not be explained without special reference to N. Ceauşescu’s visit to Far Eastern and Asian Communist countries such as China, Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia. It was there where the head of the RCP learned more of the methods of totalitarian “reforming” of the society and of mechanism of ideological indoctrination. Soon after his arrival back to Romania he delivered the speech on July 6, 1971 before the session of Executive Committee of the RCP.
The speech called “Proposed measures for the improvement of political-ideological activity, of the Marxist-Leninist education of Party members, of all working people”\textsuperscript{40} contained 17 points and has come into history of the Communist regime in Romania as the “July theses” (“Tezele din iulie”). It fixed the main guidelines for further strengthening of Communist system in the country and imposition of ideological control over the society. In some ways “it seems that it took into account the possibility to import indoctrination methods used during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. This was not just a matter of personal preference: Ceauşescu was attempting to stem the movement of liberalization in Romania, to limit turmoil within the ranks of intellectuals and to prevent students to follow their fellow rebels from other Communist countries. He tried also to consolidate personal power and to get rid of those members of the apparatus who could dream of “socialism with a human face”. Therefore, in July 1971 he published a “proposal to improve ideological work,” which was a monument of Zhdanov’s obscurantism\textsuperscript{41}.

All of that have happened in the moment of worsening relations between Romania and the USSR since the Soviets looked at Romania’s flirt with Communist China with spleenful eye. In its turn, Romanian side propagated the policy which essence was formulated in the terms “Romania is pursuing an independent policy of deepening sovereign friendly relations with all the socialist countries, developing friendly relations with all the socialist countries, developing relations with the countries in the world, regardless of their socio-political orientation”, and does not accept pressure and will not yield to anyone who is going to change its policy and interfere in her internal affairs\textsuperscript{42}.

\textsuperscript{40} Propuneri de măsuri pentru îmbunătățirea activității politico-ideologice, de educare marxist-leninistă a membrilor de partid, a tuturor oamenilor muncii. 6 iulie 1971 [Proposed Measures for the Improvement of Political-Ideological Activity, of the Marxist-Leninist Education of Party members, of all working people], in N. Ceauşescu, România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate [Romania on the Way of Building the Socialist Multilateral Developed Society], vol. 6, București, 1972, p. 185-195.


\textsuperscript{42} 30 iulie 1971, Moscova. Telegramă a secretarului I al Ambasadei României în URSS, Ilie Georgescu, către Direcția I Relații referitoare la informațiile parvenite Departamentului de Stat al SUA privind convocarea unei consfătuiri speciale a țărilor membre ale Tratatului de la Varșovia în problemele securității europene; relațiile dintre statele din Balcani; vizita delegației de partid și guvernamentale române în RP Chineză [Telegram of the First Secretary of the Romanian Embassy in the URSS, Ilie
In October 1971, the British military attaché in Bucharest reported to
London that he learned from a reliable source of N. Ceauşescu’s order to
strengthen control of the security services over the army due to existed
in military circles discontent with “eastern policy” (pro-Chinese as they considered)
it carried out by the head of the RCP43. On November 3, 1971 the “July theses”
have been adopted as official document of the Plenum of the RCP under the title
“Exposition regarding the PCR programme for improving ideological activity,
raising the general level of knowledge and the socialist education of the masses,
in order to arrange relations in our society on the basis of the principles of
socialist and Communist ethics and equity”44.

Deterioration of the Soviet-Romanian relations in late summer–early fall
1971 had put Bessarabian question again on the front-line and Soviets started
publishing archival materials of the pre-war period to legitimize their possession
of this territory45 and to unearth stance taken by the Romanian authorities. In
fact the latter have denounced a support rendered on the side of the RCP to the
Comintern in 1940. As the Romanian researchers pointed out in their resent
studies “until 1971-1972 Nicolae Ceauşescu had used the various occasions that

Georgescu, to the First Direction Relations regarding the Information arrived at the
State Department of the USA regarding the Assembly of a Special Meeting of the States
Members of the Warsaw Treaty in the Matters of the European Security, Balkan State
Relations, the Visit of the Party and Governmental Delegation in the PR of China].
Ambasada Republicii Socialiste România [Embassy of the Romanian Socialist
de convorbire, in Documente Diplomatice Române [Diplomatic Romanian Documents],
series no. 3, p. 326.

43 M. Retegan, Chinezii doreau o Românie suverană [The Chinese wanted a Sovereign
44 Expunere cu privire la Programul P.C.R. pentru îmbunătăţirea activităţii ideologice,
ridicarea nivelului general al cunoaşterii şi educaţia socială a maselor, pentru
așezarea relațiilor din societatea noastră pe baza principiilor eticii şi echităţii socialiste
şi comuniste, 3 noiembrie 1971 [Exposition regarding the PCR Programme for
Improving Ideological Activity, raising the General Level of Knowledge and the
Socialist Education of the Masses, in order to arrange Relations in our Society on the
Basis of the Principles of Socialist and Communist Ethics and Equity, 3rd
November 1971], in Ceauşescu N., România pe drumul construirii societăţii socialiste multilateral
dezvoltate [Romania on the Way of Building the Socialist Multilateral Developed
Society], vol. 6, Bucureşti, 1972, p. 620-687.
45 “Moldavian Daily Raises Bessarabian Issue Again”, 24 September 1971. [Electronic
record] HU OSA 300-8-3-8207; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research
Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at
Central European University, Budapest– http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:f1244e9c
872b-43d5-8f83-65d9417c9f21 [10.09.2013].
appeared to attack subtly the presence of the Soviets or of the Russians in the national history”\textsuperscript{46}. Special attention in growing numbers of publications the Romanian writers paid to fact of indigenous, autochthonous character of Romanians and alien character of the Slavs as new settlers in the region.

To serve the ends of producing complete ethno-political construction ideologically formulated and painted with national colours the Romanian authorities have made next step in January 1970. By joint decision of the highest RCP’ and governmental bodies the Museum of Romanian History has been established. On May 8, 1972 it’s solemnly opening ceremony demonstrated importance which the regime attached to that fact. Besides revolutionary and Communist history themes exhibited in the Museum, the problems of ancient history, struggle for unification of the Romanian state and its independence occupied significant place and got special stressing on “glorious past of the Motherland”. Foreign analysts have noticed in that connection the importance, which the Romanian authorities attached to that event and pointed out their message at the opening ceremony. In late May 1972 new statement found in analytical report issued by the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute that high Romanian officials accentuated the theme of re-establishing historical truth and necessity to “avoid all distortions of historical reality” when they extolled the fact of ancient presence of Romanians in the territory they now occupy including region of Transylvania disputable with Hungarians. Moreover, special significance in that scheme was assigned to Bessarabia as an integral part in historical evolution of Romanian statehood\textsuperscript{47}. An absence among presented exposition any reference to period since 1918 till August 23, 1944 has raised the question of the analysts, but in fact, it demonstrated wish of the Romanian authorities to avoid grooving of negative feelings at home and to stir up Soviet reaction to new Romanian assessments regarding territorial and political questions of the inter-war period.

Started in early 70’es with prominent historian and archaeologist C. Daicoviciu’s publications the conception of proto-Romanians took an enlarging

\textsuperscript{46} G. Moisa, Absence from the map. The problem of Bessarabia in the historiographical imaginary of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s regime, in “Revista Română de Geografie Politică” [Romanian Journal of Political Geography], 2011, May, XIII, 1, p. 76.

form in ideological schemes of new ethno-political construction. The paradox of the situation demonstrated the fact that during the earliest years of the Communist regime the historians of older generation who supported ideas like those were sharply criticized by authorities from ideological and political point of view⁴⁸. The ideology of “Ceaușism” demanded its ethno-historical justification in view of creating Romanian model of nationhood convenient to the system that Ceaușescu was constructing along his own interests. As the modern researchers noted, concept of “socialist nation” in its new form defined by the regime was quite contradictory and combined, on the one hand, classical Marxist approach to the definition of nation, and, on the other hand, it included ideological element which was assigned to identify domestic and external enemies “who had multiple and changing identities are assigned: first, the USSR, then Hungary, the imperialists or at once all together”⁴⁹.

Actually, the turnover to retro-concepts of ethnogenesis of Romanians started in early 70’es has revived and elucidated old discussion that existed in public-intellectual and political discourse of Romania since late 19th till first third of the 20th century. In simplified form the gist of the dispute unleashed in those years could be described as intransigent rivalry, on the one side, between the adherents of ideas of positive influence (although with some problems) of political, cultural and intellectual contacts between Western Europe and Romania for the latter, and those, on the other side, who defended the thesis of prevailing Romanian historical heritage over European one and were passionate to extol idealization of its ancient past pointing out its uniqueness. Confrontations between two opponent groups only at first sight bore intellectual and philosophical character but in fact, from the very nascent years of its appearance in public and political discourse it had political dimension. It called to life the definitions for the former and the latter proponents as “synchronists”


and “protochronysts” correspondingly. To Ceaușescu from political point of view it was important that “protochronysts” insisted on exclusiveness of Romanian historical path and questioned the viability of the European model in Romanian case. This fact was evident to many intellectuals in Romania, who considered that in reality protochronism, “a cultural symptom that, by departing from an inferiority complex, almost always ends in a denial of Europe” ⁵⁰.

Under new conditions the ideas formerly popular among a certain segment of Romanian intellectuals in late 19ᵗʰ – early 20ᵗʰ have been renovated. New impact received the idea of promoting the theses of the Dacian ancestry of the Romanians with large territorial extension of their settlement allegedly stretched over the huge space of Europe and Asia, and special important place, which the Thracian civilization occupied in constituency of Romanian identity ⁵¹. Propaganda of ancient ancestry found its way in so-called historical movies and gave birth to distinct direction in Romanian movie industry ⁵². The reasons of abrupt turn to archaic, as the modern Romanian historians noted, had twofold goal and “artificial resurrection of autochthonism was the turn of official policy what we call Dacianism, the course that, at the time, was the expression of a deeply anti-Western sentiment, but equally anti-Soviet by promoting theory of indigenous [character of the Romanians]” ⁵³. Actually, as present Romanian researchers characterized what happened in Ceauşescu’s Romania it was “forced marriage of theory of Romanian protochronism and doctrine of national communism supported by several groups of pseudointellectuals concomitant with megalomania of the ‘Golden Age’” ⁵⁴.

The Romanian Communist regime addressed to ancient in view to complete the ethno-political construction of nationhood in its ultimate form ⁵⁵.

⁵² A. Tiseau, Discursul politic în filmul istoric românesc (anii ’60-’70) [The political Discourse in the Romanian Historical Film (the 60’s and 70’s)], in “Bibliorev”, no. 17.
⁵⁵ On the role of historical mythos in constructing Romanian national consciousness see:
Final replacement of the existed system with totalitarian one with N. Ceaușescu on the top has received impetus through establishing a new political institution of Presidency in April, 1974. The “enthronement” of Ceaușescu by awarding him with symbolic sceptre should have present in the latter’s opinion that his personal legitimacy as significant person of historical importance makes him a prominent statesman and creator of new Romanian state with deep roots in glorious ancient national history. It should have been an explanation of peculiar historical path of Romanians and their state which differed from Western (European) model, since it was allegedly more ancient then those. At the same time, the figure of Nicolae Ceaușescu should have symbolized some sort of “reincarnation” of the ancient king Burebista who was known as the ruler of “the first centralized and independent state under the leadership of Burebista” who united the Geatae and Dacians between 82-44 BC. It was not by accident when Communist authorities have turned their eyes to history but there is a long-term tradition in the Balkan states, neither excluded Romanian, that history constitutes an important part of national consciousness. In some ways, it demonstrated trustiness of classical pattern of employment of the results of archaeological studies and ancient history research in the interests of political (nationalist) propaganda. Next step has been made to justify ideologically subliminal but quite transparent this plan in July 1974. The literary critic and specialist on literary theory Edgar Papu has published a small but with serious pretension to attach it fundamental and guiding character article under the title “Romanian Protochronism”56. In its essence, that material contained all features of political manifesto not by chance appealing to protochronism at such pertinent moment when its real stone-corner was the idea of prevailed role of proto-Romanian or Dacian and Thracian heritage over the rest European traditions and which could justify “peculiar Romanian path” in politics. Actually, that publication in semi-official review “Secolul 20” marked very important step towards completion of the nationhood under Romanian Communism which employed history to legitimize “distinctive path”, but in practice to veil personal

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dictatorship. In reality “his [Edgar Papu’s] theory has been, however, stimulated, amplified, distorted, malformed and, finally, totally enclosed to tacky patriotism promoted by the Romanian Communist Party ideology, since [RCP] saw in it the only chance of survival for socially, politically and economically bankrupt system”\(^57\). The paradox of what had happened showed inconsistent position of those among the followers of protochronistic world view who considered that “protochronism proposed no ‘direction’ namely simply because its advocates were less concerned with critic of time-being and bind themselves up with literary history”\(^58\).

At the XIth congress of the RCP that took place on November 25-28, 1974 “newly-elected” president and the head of the Communist party N. Ceauşescu openly referred to the problem in terms which left no doubts and sounded as follows “In generalizing existing experience one should learn also everything which is valuable and progressive in international scale! Let’s implement experience of other nations with our revolutionary spirit, with our conception of the world, giving birth to a new culture, taking into account historical, social and national peculiarity of our people, its spirit of justice, its desire to build up a new life – a Communist society – to raise the level of civilization of our nation, the decision to contribute to the progressive transformation of human society, and to build up a better world on the whole planet! Ideological work in economics, philosophy, sociology, history is needed to be brought to close attention of our party, and carried out on the basis of one unitary concept. It demands from the Central Committee, its corresponding bodies to provide leadership and guidance in view to direct all activities in ideological, theoretical, the entire political and cultural-educational work. We must put an end to anarchic, petty-bourgeois belief, that the problems of history, of other different social sciences are the only such as the narrowly specialized issues. These are the problems of theory and Communist ideology, and with them cannot deal others than those who recognize and apply Communist ideology and world outlook”\(^59\). The “unitary

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57 G. Cormos, op. cit., p.10.
“approach” to social sciences and their role in so-called political education implied constructing of new conscience, which included such an element as semi-mythical and in some ways deliberately distorted historical facts and scientific knowledge. In practice, it witnessed phenomenon of Dacomania/Thracomania based in many ways on protochronistic conceptions of the late 19th – early 20th centuries thoroughly “copied” and innovated to define “special role” of Romania in history. Noteworthy that the authorities attached huge importance to archaeology that assigned to procure politically motivated conception. It has been pointed out an ancient character of Romanians, when from “stateless population” with rich glorious tradition through the years of bitter sufferings on the way to liberation, independence and unification they have achieved their goals in the “Golden Age” under the “Genius of Carpathians”, i. e. Nicolae Ceaușescu. In its essence that theory included several basic statements according to which “Romania is a key country internationally, led by a genius (the ‘Danubian thinking’ was just one of metaphors which has been used by Ceaușescu for its characteristics); national history was dominated by outstanding personalities such as Burebista, Decebal, Traian, Mircea the Elder, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, A. I Cuza and, evidently, ending the list with Ceaușescu”.

The offensive stance taken up by N. Ceaușescu in relations with the Soviets on several items of Romanian national history of disputable nature testified his decisiveness to play the role of implacable national leader. Thus in his speech on March 28, 1975 (the date was symbolic because the day is considered in Romanian tradition as the unification-day with Bessarabia) in strict accordance with earlier voiced warnings to fight against falsification of Romanian history Ceaușescu sharply criticized in public the work of one of the Soviet authors from Soviet Moldavia. The atmosphere of “national reviving” and a call for re-establishing of historical truth gave an impetus to certain feelings among Romanian intellectuals. Marin Preda was one of them. He published the book “The Delirium” (“Delirul”) which unequivocally focused on place of Bessarabian issue in Romanian foreign policy on the eve and during WW2 and fatalistically...


61 C.-A. Simion, Bibliografia naționalismului comunist din România perioadei ceaușiste [The bibliography of the Communist Nationalism from the Ceausist Age Romania], in “TERRA SEBVS. ACTA MVSEI SABESIENSIS”, Sebeș, 2009, 1, p. 357.
characterized Ion Antonescu’s person in the book. It was quite unexpectedly if to take into account the very assessment of that political figure in Communist Romania. Foreign analysts came to conclusion that “Preda’s view of history, his views on the role of the individual leader as opposed to determinism, undoubtedly represent a reaction to the excessively mechanical foundation on which dogmatic Communist historiography has always been based... It should not go unmentioned that this view of history, with its strong emphasis on consciousness as inherent in the process of socialist development (greatly enhanced in Rumania since the so-called ‘mini-cultural revolution’ of 1971) is in accord with the excessive importance attributed to RCP leader Ceauşescu, by himself and others, in all areas of activity — an importance that has given rise to what amounts to a personality cult”62. Next year in Milano the book by certain Petre Moldoveanu has been published under the title “How to falsify history?” and aimed against Soviet interpretations of Romanian history. Real name of the author was Constantin G. Guirescu who was one of the leading Romanian historians of the time63.

At the same time, it has become obvious that the more socio-economic situation in Communist Romania was meeting with hardships and increased tall of political repressions then stronger the regime was making emphasis on historic component of mass indoctrination. The accuracy of that conclusion could be proven if to remind the events of August 1-3, 1977 in the Jiu Valley region where the coal-miners have risen and when N. Ceauşescu had to visit personally with fear and to deliver speech to quell protesters emotions with lures and hypocrisy.

The situation has reached its climax on August 5, 1977 during negotiations between the head of the CPSU L. Brezhnev and his interlocutor head of the RCP and Romanian President N. Ceauşescu. In a long-running and durable conversation the problems of history of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations have been touched upon in hush and critical form at a moment when Brezhnev complained against writings of the Romanian historians and authors


although simultaneously he praised the fact that the head of Romania “took right stance” and had no territorial claims against the USSR. Ceaușescu on his turn openly declared his dissent on exoneration of positive role of Russian Empire in the Balkans and particularly her policy towards the Bessarabian question, he expressed doubts about existence of distinct Moldovan nation and language, and outraged by ascribing of the Romanian writers to Moldavian literature. Although both sides have agreed the settlement of the problem to be handed over the chiefs of the departments of corresponding Central Committees, the Soviet functionaries who has been discussing the subject with N. Ceaușescu noticed his good knowledge of the issues and made conclusion either of his involvement in preparing conceptions or his personal participation in working out historical doctrines. Actually it indirectly implied the head of Romania has been standing behind constructing not only historical conception as such but in more wider sense inspired formation of basic principles of Romanian nationhood in its new and adjusted to the regime interests’ form. The Romanian authorities’ attraction of history became the reason of serious concern on the Soviet part and the latter was not ready this question to be left to fend to itself. In view of that she seemed to use her close allies in the Eastern Bloc to vent Moscow’s spleen. This time as the Western analysts have noted, the Polish friends sought to put the Romanians “in tact” when well-known infamous Władysław Machejek who was one of the Polish literary functionaries wrote after his trip to Romania that “When the millennial history of the territories which today make up the Rumanian Socialist Republic is being debated, and it is just now being discussed in connection with the most topical contemporary events, we often come across an aggressive kind of rhetoric. This is due both to the fact that the spiritually mighty in those Danubian lands were never wont to use pedestrian tones, drawing their authorization in this respect from the Ovids and the Trajans, and secondly, that a vocabulary which does not mince words is often insupportable.” Independence


as important component of ethno-political construction meticulously constituted by the Romanian leader also did not pass off the foreign analysts’ attention when they referred in 1976 regarding official preparations undertaken by the regime to celebrate centennial of the Romanian independence in 1977. The wrote that “Romania has been stressing national independence as a basic element in its policy.” Inside Romania itself, there were explicit hostility towards any hint on compromise on official history’s interpretation and especially on the themes of independence and unity of Romanian nation. Independence as important component of ethno-political construction meticulously constituted by the Romanian leader also did not pass off the foreign analysts’ attention when they referred in 1976 regarding official preparations undertaken by the regime to celebrate centennial of the Romanian independence in 1977. They wrote, “Romania has been stressing national independence as a basic element in its policy.” Furthermore as the well-known essayist, journalist, writer and long-time employer of the RL/RFE George Ciorănescu noted in his analysis referring to exaggeration of medieval Wallachian ruler Vlad the Impaler and celebration of his 500th death the events “make it clear that, the ideals for which this medieval prince fought often correspond to those promoted by the RCP: internal discipline, concentration of all forces to attain specific large goals, and struggle to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Romanian people.” References to ancient history assisted to appearance the thesis of “great small country” which has been formulated by the same Edgar Papu and was within the mainstream of official ideology. As the modern Romanian historians pointed out

European University, Budapest. – http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:1ac2881c-0989-474d-8e9b-c4dc8b89942d [10.09.2013].


“Edgar Papu had been thinking over time the idea of “titanic small countries”, which is nothing else than the recognition of the rights of nations that seem are of no matter in given historical moment” and compared king Manuel I of Portugal and reign of Stephen the Great in Moldova69.

As the Soviet-Romanian relations were worsening then more expectations of possible Soviet military actions were being discussed attracting attention of members of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. Several of them, particularly British government, has already come to conclusion in 1978 that “the Romanians had always had strong views on the importance of their national sovereignty, and it was possible that they were now ready to put ever, greater emphasis on their independence. It was difficult to assess the significance of this development, though the picture might become clearer as a result of a public speech which President Ceauşescu due to make that day. How the Soviet Union would respond was uncertain: there were signs that they were reviewing their world-wide position generally and their policy towards the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. He was keeping the situation under close watch and would be discussing it at the Council of Ministers and in the margins of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council the following week. It was possible that the Russians might take steps against Romania which would require co-ordinated responses both by the Community and by the Alliance”70.

Conclusions

Thus by the second half of the 70es the Romanian Communist mode of ethno-political construction has been completely shaped in form of politicized historical doctrine transformed into some sort of “official religion”. Its core was the set of ideas. There were continuous evolutions of the Romanians from ancient time as the descendants of the Dacians till modern time; their distinct valiant contribution to World and European history and civilization as the most ancient inhabitants of subcontinent; long and persistent struggle of the Romanians for their national state and unification of their land; harmful and pernicious attempts on the side of the foreigners to establish the alien to Romanian traditions political and social institutions; an existence of permanent

69 G. Cormos, op. cit., p. 18.
threat to Romanian sovereignty and independence from abroad; a support of complex of “national insult” to the Romanians brought by those who has captured their national territories and ascribe themselves Romanian national history; an extolment of personality of incumbent “National leader” (i. e. N. Ceauşescu) as the saviour and defender of the nation with strong national colours; the establishment of “Socialist nationhood” under Ceauşescu’s guidance according to its “creator” has been developing in the new epoch, called later in early 80es as “Golden Age” (“Epoca de Aur”). Bizarre combination of different elements archaically looking but in modernized politically motivated form was to serve ideological basis of the Communist regime and the latter sought to legitimize itself both in domestic and foreign affairs by addressing to historical myths.