CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIVITY OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF ‘MOLDOVAN ARMY’, M. I. KUTUZOV, FOR ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES

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Abstract: The Rapt of Bessarabia in 1812 was a direct result of expansionary policy pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIIIth century – beginning of the XIXth century. The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was influenced by M. I. Kutuzov, the supreme commander of the Russian army. The main objective of the study is to elucidate the activity of M. I. Kutuzov as the supreme commander of the „Moldovan Army” and to analyze the impact of his actions on the Romanian countries. The study analyzes the main factors which have influenced his socio-professional route until he was appointed as supreme commander. According to memoirs and documents from that period the moral portrait of Kutuzov was reconstructed and the negative consequences of his activities for Romanians were outlined. M. I Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme commander of the Russian army of occupation who robbed ruthlessly the Romanian Countries and who had an essential contribution to the dismemberment of Moldova.

Résumé: Le Rapt de la Bessarabie en 1812 était le résultat direct de la politique expansionniste, promu par la Russie et la Turquie aux Balkans dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle – début du XIXe siècle. L’étape finale de la guerre russo-turque de 1806-1812 a été influencé par le général M. I. Koutouzov. Le but de l’étude est de mettre en évidence l’activité de M. I. Koutouzov comme le commandant suprême de „l’armée moldave” et d’analyser quel est l’impact de ses actions sur les Pays Roumains. Dans cet article sont analysés les principaux facteurs qui ont influencé la trajectoire socio-professionnelle de Koutouzov avant d’être nommé comme le commandant suprême. Sur la base des mémoires et documents d’époque a été reconstitué le portrait moral de Koutouzov et ont été élevés les
conséquences néfastes de son activité pour les indigènes. Pour les Pays Roumains M.I. Koutouzov n’était pas que le commandant suprême de l’armée d’occupation Russe qui a pillé impitoyablement la population pacifique et a joué un rôle déterminant dans le démantèlement de la Moldavie.

**Keywords:** expansionism, Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Romanian Countries, Kutuzov.

The Bucharest Peace Treaty, signed on May 16, 1812 ended the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812, one of the longest and most expensive wars for Romanian countries. According to the estimates made by A. Agachi, in the six years of war, Romanian countries provided material goods for the Russian army in the amount of 110,057,245 lei. The numerous requisitions, taxes, abusive purchases are not included in this amount so it can be doubled without any exaggeration.\(^1\) After the annexation of Bessarabia, from a theatre of military operations it became the main base of support and supply of Russian troops, which continued to march towards the Balkans.\(^2\)

The signing of this treaty was an arbitrary act of expansion and conquest. Turkey, in defiance of international law, gave up the territory of a state that was in suzerainty relationship with it and, in fact, did not belong to Turkey. As a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Moldova has not lost its quality of sovereign state, maintaining its national statehood, political, economic, legal, administrative, fiscal systems and religion.\(^3\)

“The Russian Empire, without any historical, ethnic or political right” ripped off “half of Moldovan territory”\(^4\) – in this way M. Kogălniceanu qualified the act of 1812, showing his attitude of non-acceptance of the event. N. Titulescu mentioned that “Russian complicity to the violation of a contract from international law cannot create the right”.\(^5\) Thus by signing the Treaty of Bucharest neither “Suzerain power” nor “protector one” have respected their obligations towards Moldova.

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Taking into consideration the territorial Rapt in 1775, the ratio of the remaining territories of Moldova and those which were kidnapped is the following: Bucovina - 10,442 km\(^2\) (11%), Bessarabia - 45,630 km\(^2\) (48%), Moldova - 38,230 km\(^2\) (41%).

The Rapt of Bessarabia in 1812 was a direct result of expansionary policy pursued by Russia and Turkey in the Balkans during the second half of the XVIIIth century – beginning of the XIXth century. In a note written by the Russian government to the Austrian Cabinet on July 21, 1823 it was stated that: “The Cabinet of St. Petersburg has already actively involved into internal affairs of Walachia and Moldova for 50 years. Our rights and powers of attorney in this regard are based on agreements with Ottoman Empire, a multi-annual-and numerous previous practices.

The territory annexed by the Russians was 7,400 km larger than the territory to Moldova and it brought important benefits to the Russian Empire. Tsar Alexander I, during the manifest of August 5th 1812, asserted: “This peace given to us by God, brought brilliant benefits to Russian Empire, including in its boundaries a well-populated and fertile land which extends from Akkerman till the mouths of the Prut River, being at a distance of 6 miles (nine versts) from Iasi and from its mouths till the Cesarian border and thence to down of Dniester River, in total approximately 663 miles (1,000 verstes), encompassing its most famous cities: Hotin Bender, Chilia, Ismail, Akkerman and many other trade cities”.

The last period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 was influenced by M. I. Kutuzov, the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Russian historiography from all times glorified Kutuzov for the fact that he has ended the war until Napoleon’s invasion and has signed the peace with Turkey on terms beneficial for Russia.

How did Russian General Kutuzov succeed to become remarkable for Romanian countries? What impact did Kutuzov have on the prosperity of the Romanian people? Due to what merits until now there are streets named after him and busts which immortalize his image? For example, in Ploiesti there is a street named
after him, and a bust of Kutuzov sculptured by Michael Onofrei is located in the Philanthropy hospital courtyard in Bucharest. In Moldova, hitherto, in many cities, especially in the region of Transnistria and the Gagauz Autonomy there are streets named after Kutuzov. There was a district called Kutuzov in the Republic of Moldova until 1988.

In order to elucidate in a more veridical way the status of Kutuzov as the commander in chief of the Moldovan army, it is important to clarify primarily how the Russian general was treated by senior Russian officers and which were the main factors of influence of the social-professional route passed until being appointed as the commander in chief, due to which qualities, virtues or deeds he rapidly advanced in military ranks of the Russian Empire.

Over the years, a whole army of Russian image makers, and especially the Soviets had worked hard to polish the image of “saviour of the fatherland”.

The appreciation of Kutuzov's image was determined by the period of country development and promoted the ideological content of that period. The Kutuzov appreciation was made from the position of class struggle and visions of country leaders. The soviet propaganda exploited the historical past in order to create the new man in the spirit of love for the socialist homeland. The soviet ideology had a critical approach to the image of Kutuzov in the '20s of XX century, presenting it positively during the 30's and exalting it in the 40's. Beginning with 1947, the soviet historians have adopted as a methodological background Stalin's answer to the Colonel E. A. Razin’s letter which stated: “Our genius army commander Kutuzov ... has destroyed Napoleon and his army using carefully prepared counteroffensive.” And further:

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10 It is considered that the location of Kutuzov's bust in hospital courtyard was due to the fact that he was one of the initiators of the hospital foundation. According to the reports of a contemporary, Kutuzov deplored the lack of medical institutions in the city at a ball given in honor of his arrival in Bucharest, after which he put his hand in pocket and took out a fist full of coins in order to begin a subscription, this gesture was followed the other boyars. See: Alexandru G. Galeșescu, Eforia spitalelor civile 1832-1932 [The Ephor of civil hospitals 1832-1932]. București: Tipografia G. A. Lăzăreanu, 1899, p.656.

11 In this context I mention that in Russia there are 96 cities where the streets are named after Kutuzov. See: О. В. Шульгина, Д. П. Шульгина, Топонимика как объект нематериального наследия, связанного с Отечественной войной 1812 года в России [Toponymy as intangible heritage related to the Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia]. http://www.e-notabene.ru/hr/article_351.html (accessed in 23.10.2012)

12 Ialoveni district was created in 1977 under Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet RSS Moldova, no. 9th of March 25, 1495, with the initial name of Kutuzov, changed later (1988) in the historical name of Ialoveni.


14 Published in Bolșevic, nr.3, 1947, p.7-8.
“Engels noted, inter alia, that the Russian generals during the year 1812, Gen. Barclay of Tolly would be the unique commander of army who deserves attention.\textsuperscript{15} Certainly, Engels was wrong because Kutuzov as the commander of army stands head and shoulder above Barclay of Tolly”.\textsuperscript{16}

After this propagandistic impulse the efforts of soviet historiography were focused on the glorification of Kutuzov. The historical parallels were made between the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1812 and its failure in 1941. The idea of Stalin wisdom was confirmed, it was inspired by the brilliant theory of Kutuzov.

The study of contemporary memoirs and documents show that Kutuzov seen by the contemporaries differs from Kutuzov – the icon created by the inventive imagination of Russian historiography and especially of the Soviet Union.

M. A. Miloradovich said that Kutuzov was devoid of military capabilities considering him as a petty and sordid courtier, L. L. Bennigsen as an incapable man\textsuperscript{17} and P. I. Bagration regards him as a villain, able to betray for money.\textsuperscript{18} F.V. Rostopchin painted a gloomy picture of Kutuzov in the following way: “This man was a great tattler, a notorious lecher, a liar, a rude person and cringing. In order to obtain the favors from the upper class he was ready to endure everything, to sacrifice all, without any complaint and due to the intrigues and servile behaviour he got always the goal to be employed exactly in the minute it was thought forgotten forever”.\textsuperscript{19}

M. I. Kutuzov was born on September 5, 1745, the only son of General L. M. Kutuzov. Kutuzov’s mother died early and he spent his childhood with his grandmother. As a child he was gentle, smart but peevish and irresponsible at the same time, lazy in learning, he was fond of sleeping and languishing.\textsuperscript{20} This was the early life of Kutuzov. The Earl A. Langeron knew Kutuzov in the last years of his life and characterized him in following way: “...He is endowed with so much spirit, but with so little character so that all things expected from his qualities were paralyzed by his defects. His selfishness was more revolting. Everything is subordinated to his infamous pleasures and comfort.”\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{15} К. Маркс, Ф. Энгельс, Сочинения [Essays] (2-е издание), Том 14. М.: Издательство политической литературы, 1959, с. 94.
\textsuperscript{17} Из воспоминаний А. И. Михайловского-Данилевского [From the memoirs of A. Mikhailovsky Danilevsky]. In: Русская старина, 1897, № 6, с. 466-467.
\textsuperscript{18} Ф. В. Ростопчин, Записки о 1812 году [F.V. Rostopchin, Notes of 1812 year]. In: Русская старина, 1889, № 12, с. 693.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem, p. 694.
\textsuperscript{20} А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, Император Александр I и его сподвижники в 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 годах [The Emperor Alexander I and his associates in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815 years], Т. 3. СПб., 1846, с. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{21} Călători străini despre Țările Române în secolul al XIX-lea [Foreign Travelers about Romanian Countries in the XIX\textsuperscript{th} century]. Серия nouă, Vol. I (1801-1821). București, Ed.
According to the memoirs of his contemporaries, Kutuzov was known as the embodiment of three distinctive qualities: a) skilful courtier, b) plotter and double-dealer, c) incurable lecher. His military career and social progress were largely achieved due to these “virtues”.

Kutuzov succeeded to be noticed and accepted in the entourage of Catherine II and her successor Paul I. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov was among the guests invited at dinner in the evening that preceded the death of both monarchs.22

In the last period of the reign of Catherine II, her favourites practiced a system of promotion based on protectionism in the Russian army. A large part of the generals had permanently lived in Moscow or Petersburg and were more concerned with personal issues than those of the army. Many generals and senior officers of the Russian army used their subordinates systematically for personal purposes. The abuses had reached such proportions that senior officers treated military service as a profitable business.23

When Kutuzov returned from Constantinople in 1794, he had got special abilities in preparing coffee, acquired in Turkey. Having this ability he prepared coffee by a special recipe to P. Zubov, a favourite of Catherine II, and had just brought to him with an hour before he woke up under the public gaze.24

As a result of these flattering efforts, Kutuzov was appointed as the commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of Finland and of the Corps of cadets of the ground troops.

In Russian society “Kutuzov’s coffee pot” signified the superlative degree of flattery, and Kutuzov was called “the coffee pot of P. Zubov”. The Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, analyzing the ways in which Catherine II subjugated the Russian nobility, claimed that this activity was aided by her favourites. “It is necessary to remember, Pushkin wrote, about the palms offered generously to our Princes and Boyars by the favourites, about Potemkin’s ill-famed receipt, kept so far in a state institution, about the monkey of Count P. Zubov, about the coffee pot of Prince Kutuzov and other facts”.25

Kutuzov wanted his actions to be heard and to have much resonance in the court of Tsar. Kutuzov began to tremble while hearing the name of the Court,

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confirmed Langeron.\textsuperscript{26} In a letter to his wife on October 29, 1811 Kutuzov confessed about his worries that he has not yet received any news from Tsar about the victorious fight of October 2, 1811.\textsuperscript{27} Langeron stated in his memoirs that Kutuzov liked to use small matters, sordid intrigue, etc.\textsuperscript{28} P. V. Ciceagov sustained that: “this General used the intrigue as the main affair of his life”.\textsuperscript{29} Kutuzov’s qualities of intriguer were fully manifested in his detachment to the army in Moldova in spring of 1808. A. A. Prozorovski, having trouble with his health,\textsuperscript{30} requested to Tsar to be sent as Deputy M. I. Kutuzov, appreciating him as: “He is nearly my disciple and he knows my method”.\textsuperscript{31}

According to the rescript of Alexander I of March 4, 1808, Kutuzov had to resign his post, and to move with his the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 22\textsuperscript{nd} divisions to the Moldovan Army, commander in chief of which was A. A. Prozorovski. M. I. Kutuzov reported to Alexander I that he set out from Kiev to Iasi on April 5, 1808, where the location of Moldovan army general headquarters was situated, where he arrived on April 20, 1808, as stated the order of Field Marshal A. A. Prozorovski.\textsuperscript{32}

Kutuzov was involved in organization of intrigues even at his coming, in order to take the position of A. A. Prozorovski. Although Kutuzov reported to his wife on May 2, 1808 that he is on good terms with A. A. Prozorovski\textsuperscript{33}, the reality was different. The Count A. H. Benkendorf described the relationships between M. I. Kutuzov and A. A. Prozorovski in the following way: “Prozorovski weakened due to his advanced age, and Kutuzov, eager to be commander in chief, suspected him. They were more occupied with intrigues than with military operations. The siege of Braila fortress ended with heavy losses, but to no avail. Field Marshal accused Kutuzov for this state of things, but Kutuzov hoped that because of this failure the count Prozorovski will be revoked and he will stand at the head of the army. But Imperator decided otherwise: to end the humiliating clashes he appointed Count Bagration in place of Kutuzov”.\textsuperscript{34}
A. A. Prozorovski insisted upon the revocation of Kutuzov during the campaign in spring of 1809, especially after the failure of storming the Braila fortress. A. A. Prozorovski reported to Alexander I that Kutuzov incited the officers to distrust him, defamed his actions and this situation creates obstacles for him rather than benefits, insisting to be revoked.\textsuperscript{35} Considering the A. A. Prozorovski’s request, Alexander I ordered the drafting of rescript through which Kutuzov was appointed as the commander of Moldovan corps reserve.

Due to the resignation of the General Rimsky-Korsakov as military governor of Lithuania, there was drawn the second rescript by which Kutuzov was appointed instead of the last.\textsuperscript{36} Both rescripts were sent to A. A. Prozorovski and he should decide which of them to present to Kutuzov. Obviously, A. A. Prozorovski, wanting to escape the intrigues of Kutuzov, handed to Kutuzov the second rescript.\textsuperscript{37} General P. I. Bagration was appointed instead of Kutuzov, on July 25, 1809, as the commander of the main body of Moldovan Army.\textsuperscript{38}

An extreme manifestation of cynicism and malevolence was the case of Kutuzov’s vengeance upon P. V. Ciceagov for the negative emotions caused by the appointment of Ciceagov as the commander in chief of Moldova and because he has revealed the numerous abuses and frauds which have occurred in the Moldovan Army.

As the supreme commander of the Russian army, Kutuzov was complaining to Alexander I that P. V. Ciceagov did not provide him the information on his activities and directions of movement of the army commanded by him.\textsuperscript{39} The culmination of Kutuzov’s revenge was the way of how Kutuzov has exposed P. V. Ciceagov while Napoleon crossed over the river Berezina. About this, Denis Davydov reported: “Kutuzov, in turn, wanting to avoid the clash with Napoleon and his bodyguard, did not pursue persistently the enemy and remained far behind. This didn’t prevent him to announce P. V. Ciceagov about his appearance in the enemy rear-guard. Being signed retroactively, the Kutuzov’s disposals had arrived with delay to the admiral. P. V. Ciceagov often chastised the couriers but they answered him that they were sent from headquarters much later than the dates indicated in the disposals and, in fact, they

\textsuperscript{35} Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, с.101; А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, op. cit., p.25.
\textsuperscript{36} Both rescripts were published in: Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и материалов [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a Compilation of Materials and Documents. Moscow]. Москва, 1947, с.102-103.
\textsuperscript{37} А. И. Михайловский-Данилевский, op.cit., p.25.
\textsuperscript{38} Багратион в Дунайских Княжествах (сборник документов) [Bagration in the Danubian Principalities: Compilation of Documents]. Кишинев, 1949, с.17.
arrived to him in time.”

Regarding this episode, P. V. Ciceagov has communicated to Count S.R. Voronțov on September 15, 1813: “... My biggest fault is that I arrived at the location indicated by the Emperor, while others who did not arrive there, have proved to be correct. Unfortunately, I have positioned myself so that during the military campaigns my army followed and attacked the enemy who stood before; this fact contradicts our new tactics, which state: «To win is to withdraw». P. V. Ciceagov insisted in his letter of May 25, 1813 to Count Vorontsov: “You must know that I have resigned not because of excessive sensitivity, but because of unfounded claims of Marshal K. (Kutuzov). He endeavoured to hinder all my actions, even if it was detrimental to his own glory ... I am accused of having committed some mistakes, but what did they consist of? Nobody told me. The main criticism is that I did not take Napoleon as the prisoner, but did I promise this? Did I get such kind of order? Did I have such assignment? Was this possible to do?”

During his lifetime and long military career, Kutuzov had a double behaviour. The same topic was addressed under different ways, depending on the person with whom he has interacted. Analyzing Kutuzov's correspondence two parallel attitudes emerge: on one side the fawning and patriotic tone used in official letters and selfish and opportunist, on the other side, used in correspondence with his family.

In this regard, Kutuzov's correspondence on his possible appointment as the commander in chief of Moldova is interesting. Kutuzov was informed by the Minister of Tolly's M. B. Barclay about his possible appointment as the commander of the army of Moldova on February 23, 1811. In a letter to his daughter Elizaveta from February 27, 1811, Kutuzov, while mentioning about his appointment as commander in chief of Moldova, stated: “I assure you I am not happy of the appointment, on the contrary, it grieves me, I swear. The Minister prepares me for this appointment. But I keep it a secret and tell you this. Never disclose this news until it will be published. And if, fortunately, it will be cancelled, then, generally do not talk about it. Someway or another, this detachment, mentioned above, worries me deeply. At my years to split out from my friends, abilities and tranquility!”

But in the official correspondence the tone of speaking was different, in the address to the Minister of Tolly M. Barclay dated on March 1, 1811, Kutuzov noted that “the trust showed by Tsar in a matter so

important includes everything that can flatter any man, even if he is ambitious in the slightest measure.\textsuperscript{44}

Being detached in March 1808 in the Army of Moldova, Kutuzov wrote to his wife on March 18, 1808: “...I am full of trouble, I prepare two divisions for march and I’m facing many difficulties, ... I would have to go also but the worries retain me here, if someone asks you about me in Petersburg, tell them that you think I’ve already gone ...”.\textsuperscript{45}

Following the official correspondence of Kutuzov on the eve of the Battle of Borodino one can notice the firmness to fight a decisive battle with Napoleon and the confidence in success, but at the same time, in a letter to his daughter Ana Hitrovo of August 19 1812, he insisted that she had to withdraw away from the theatre of military operations and to keep simultaneously his letters in the greatest secret, because if they will be made public, they will bring him the great harm.\textsuperscript{46}

Kutuzov was known as a notorious lecher, this fact was confirmed by his behaviour during his stay in the Romanian lands. The local nobility and Russian body of officers were surprised by the actions which were undertaken by the newly commander in chief of Moldovan Army. Kutuzov’s first concern while arriving to Bucharest was to find a mistress, according to the memoirs of A.F. Langeron. The choice was made in favour of “a child of 14 years”\textsuperscript{47} who “unfortunately” soon she dominated him, as happened to all women of all quality who obtained from him any advantages both for pleasure and for their family”.\textsuperscript{48} “... She was a true lover for him, a favourite sultana. She came to him every night and together spent time in front of everyone: the familiarities that degenerated into indecency, revolting the honest people who were forced to go to him. When he was invited to dinner, it was necessary to invite Mrs. Guliano, after dinner they locked themselves into a cabinet for intimacy... I saw this puny and shameless creature always near him: at balls, clubs, public places. She often sits on knees of her lover of 70 years playing with his decorations and leaving him overwhelmed of her hugs and smile.” Joseph de Maistre the messenger of the Sardinia Kingdom to the court of Petersburg confirmed that Kutuzov in place to deal with the peace negotiations was “smitten by a Wallachian,

\textsuperscript{44} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{45} М. И. Кутузов. Сборник документов [M. I. Kutuzov: Compilation of Documents]. Том II. Москва, 1951, c.508.
\textsuperscript{46} Кутузов М. И. Письма и записки [Kutuzov M.I. Letter and notes]. Москва: Воениздат, 1989, c.310.
\textsuperscript{47} Lucsandra Bărcănescu (daughter of Ioan Bărcănescu, the great chancellor and Catinca Ghica), married to Nicholas Guliano.
It seems that Kutuzov himself was not too bothered by this situation. On April 28, 1812, Kutuzov invited his daughter Elizabeth, who has reached by that time Odessa, to visit Bucharest, where “she will see new faces, inter alia, a married woman of 13-14 years, very naive and very pleasant.” It is obvious that the status of a “naive and pleasant” woman was not a secret for his daughter, who was very attached to her father and as before he informed his daughter about the ladies of his entourage.

Even during the time when Russia was at the lock, Kutuzov did not change his habits. In his letter to Alexander I from September 20, 1812, the military governor of Moscow F. V. Rostopchin reported: “The Prince Kutuzov no longer exists - no one sees him, he is always in a state of lying and sleeping. The soldiers despise and hate him. He did not dare do anything, a young, dressed in Cossack uniform occupies all his time. ... Kutuzov, as an old gossipy, has lost his head, thinking to do something through nothing.”

This was broadly the old general Kutuzov, appointed as the commander in chief of the Moldovan Army by Alexander I on March 7, 1811.

Kutuzov arrived in Bucharest on March 31, 1811 and entered on duty the next day. By this I would like to emphasize that Kutuzov was in the Army from Moldova, but as I have already mentioned, due to the conflict with A. A. Prozorovski he was assigned in Lithuania. The “Moldovan Army” counted about 46,240 people when Kutuzov became the leader. Only one fifth of the persons promoted to officer grade had military training between 1806-1811.

Kutuzov took the lead from General Langeron, who has shown in his memoirs a little bit of dismay by the activity of the new commander in chief: “Kutuzov had ceased to constrain soon after his arrival. Laziness, as a dominant his quality covered everything and I realized quickly, how blackguard he is. Kutuzov has always had

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49 Ibidem, p.381-382.
55 Л. П. Богданов, Русская армия в 1812 году [Russian army in 1812]. М.: Воениздат, 1979, с.75.
enough mind, but his defects were more pronounced than his degree of wisdom ...”.

The abusive involvement of the supreme commanders of the “Moldovan Army” into the internal affairs of the Romanian countries, including the appointment of loyal people in high administrative positions, became a common practice. On April 3, 1811, Kutuzov ordered to Major-General Stetter, vice-president of the Romanian Country Divan to impose Divan to undertake the necessary measures to build very soon two bridges over the river Olt, obviously for Russian army needs.

M. I. Kutuzov excelled at getting involved into people promotion to loyal administrative functions and at providing various facilities and privileges to his entourage. Thus, in his letter to V. I. Krasno - Milașevici of November 22, 1811 M. I. Kutuzov insisted to appoint the officials who were appointed in 1812 with his approval because of “the current political circumstances.” General Langeron, in his memoirs, noted that Kutuzov during his stay in Bucharest “was no longer ashamed of anything, moving towards the most shameful rascals, facing the most revolting degree of respect for himself.” And after the detailed description of the group of charlatans and opportunists who surrounded Kutuzov in Bucharest, Langeron noted regretfully that: “an old man of 68 has appeared in public decorated with all orders of Russia. In the midst of this dirty society he spent his life. Nothing was more disgusting than a dirty old man and the condemned relations with those people who surrounded him. He could refuse nothing to these ‘parasites’. They had all places and all favour.” (...) “Kutuzov's Chancellery was also the core of all intrigues. The weak and guilty man was teased by all people who were looking to profit of his confidence and once they got some trust, they abused with indecency and without remorse... Every one of these employees, of these parasites, defendants had a purpose: the desire to obtain a job or wealth at any cost”.

According to General Langeron, Count Vorontsov said nastily but well-suited that this company lacks the presence of Kutuzov's wife and of the two daughters.

The abuses committed by the Russian soldiers during the stay of Kutuzov as the commander in chief of Moldovan Army were considerable; this prompted the Metropolitan Gavrili Banulescu-Bodoni to intervene to clarify or resolve this kind of situations. This led to the fact that relations between them became tensed and Metropolitan opponents were supported by Kutuzov. It is eloquent in this sense the case of Bishop Ignatius. Metropolitan Gavrili Banulescu-Bodoni sent P. Kuniți to Bucharest in order to clarify the activity of the Metropolitan. P. Kuniți discovered a

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56 Memorii contelui Langeron ... p.327.
58 Ibidem, p.706.
59 Memorii contelui Langeron ... p.382-383.
60 Călători străini despre Țările Române ... , 184 note from the footnote of the page 356.
lot of irregularities and abuses, and then presented them in a report to Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni, who in turn sent it to the Ober-Prosecutor of Synod. Although the decision was made to dismiss the Metropolitan Ignatius, Kutuzov not only refused to comply but he expelled P. Kuniţki from Bucharest. 61

The local authorities and people was in charge of the maintenance of the large occupation army. The care for continuous and safe supply of the army imposed the Russian command to intervene periodically in order to prevent the robberies and abuses which could exterminate completely the inhabitants. Kutuzov stated, into the disposal given to the General F. F. Erteli at August 10, 1811: “I should pay attention not to have the situation of the country depletion of grain, in order to prevent the circumstances from the last year when people were starving to death.”62

The admiral P. V. Ciceagov reported that after his appointment as the commander in chief of the Moldovan Army, Alexander I gave him a detailed memorandum which included the complaints of unfortunate inhabitants of Moldova and Romanian Country regarding the Kutuzov’s army. Thereafter, checking these complaints, he found them absolutely valid and Kutuzov replied to all these requests in the following way: “They will remain only with eyes for weeping”.63 He noted that “the discipline was neglected in such a way that robberies were committed conformably and soldiers took from the merchants everything they needed”. „But you should wonder of soldiers’ debauchery”, Ciceagov said while General Kutuzov thought only of his own pleasures. And moreover, to please his mistresses, he freed their friends and favourites from the customs duties.64

The inhabitants complained on one part about the increasing taxes, requisitions, records, benefits and on the other part about the arbitrary abuse, robberies and murders committed by Russian soldiers. People left the villages and hid themselves into less accessible places. The peasants’ situation was described by Langeron as follows: “Unfortunate Romanian peasants were so terribly tortured that many of them fled to Transylvania. They perceived themselves as subprefects putting women on coal and whipping children to snatch little money remained after their husbands or fathers have fled. ... but none of these killers was punished than through the loss of job but some of them have even kept it. In this circumstance Kutuzov showed an inexcusable indifference.”65 Ciceagov passing through Moldova

62 Călători străini despre Țăriile Române ...., p. 431.
63 Из записок адмирала Чичагова [From the notes of Admiral Chichagov]. In: „Русский Архив”, № 8-9, 1870, c.1525.
64 Ibidem, p.1534.
65 Călători străini despre Țăriile Române...., p.358.
and the Romanian Country remarked that everywhere houses were abandoned and the inhabitants were hiding in the forests to escape the authorities’ requisitions and soldiers’ persecutions.”

Ecclesiarch Dionysius, a contemporary chronicler, expressed the feelings of the inhabitants against an army that came to free them, but which has acted more severely than the Ottomans “they were not satisfied with houses and places to fit (...) they even stole everything they found”.

This situation has generated an attitude of hostility among the Russian authorities, or as L. Casso said, ‘population has lost confidence in our government's ability to reduce their sufferings.” The Russian officials admitted in 1813, that this country ... robbed and deserted from the military operations of 1806-1810 presents a vast and unpopulated wilderness.

The tradition of robbing the peaceful population was deeply rooted in the Russian army. The looting of civilians was a big problem during Napoleon's invasion, the population was robbed of its own army. Kutuzov mentioned in his letter of August 18, 1812 to the commander of Muscovite Guard (opolchenie) the General Lieutenant I. I. Markov that robberies have taken huge proportions and necessary measures must be taken to combat this phenomenon. At the same day, the order no. 2 issued by him as commander in chief of the Russian armies said that military police captured more than 2,000 deserters. And “the habit of dealing with robberies, tolerated by commanders, has influenced the morality of soldier.”

Through his rescript of September 29, 1812 Alexander I requested Kutuzov to take the most severe measures to exterminate the phenomenon of people robbing, the most criminal vice of a soldier who is obliged to defend his homeland.

If the Russian soldiers, at home, have robbed their countrymen during harsh times for their country, it is easy to imagine what kind of behaviour these foreign soldiers had on the occupied territories, such as the Romanian Countries. Meanwhile, Kutuzov showed a great concern for arranging and careful treatment of

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66 Ibidem.
68 Л. Кассо, Россия на Дунае и образование Бессарабской области [Russia on the Danube and the formation of Bessarabia]. Москва, 1913, c.203.
69 Valentin Tomuleț, Reflexii generale privind dezvoltarea social-economică a Basarabiei (1812-1868) [General reflections on social and economic development of Bessarabia (1812-1868)]. In: „Cugetul”, 1992, nr. 2, p.11.
70 Русская старина, Т.88,1896, c.648.
72 Собрание высочайших манифестов ..., с. 40.
Transdanubian colonists in the Romanian territories occupied by the Russians. In order to create favourable conditions the Transdanubian colonists were removed from the jurisdiction of Divans. A Ward Committee was created for their administration, led by the colonists’ curator - A. Koronelli – the state counsellor. According to Kutuzov's disposal of April 26, 1811, Transdanubian colonists have been freed from any type of labour conscriptions and taxes for three years “with possibility of extension by few years.”

On July 16, 1811 Kutuzov requested the support of Metropolitan Gavriil with regard to the exemption of the colonists established on the monastic lands from the Tithe, for the benefit of the owners. These quantities of grain were expected to accumulate in a reserve fund to help the poor colonists managed by A. Koronelli who was characterized by the General Langeron as: “the worst from the miserable and disgraceful persons of this dead ends”. In March 1812, more than 20 000 families have profited from the conditions created and have established their residence on the left shore of the Danube.

One of the tasks set to Kutuzov as the commander in chief of Moldovan Army was the speedy conclusion of peace with Turkey. But, as noted later in the court of Petersburg, he did not show enough interest to achieve this task. Besides his proverbial inactivity, Kutuzov was in no hurry to conclude the peace because he feared being removed from the army command. On April 18, 1812 Kutuzov wrote to his wife: “If thank God I will sign for peace, I fear that I will not be allowed to St. Petersburg. Finally, it seems I’ll have nothing to do in the army. Thank God the posts are filled by worthy people. All will be done only if there will be peace with Turks...”

As the war against Napoleon was imminent, Alexander requested insistently Kutuzov to speedily conclude the peace with Turkey. The case of ex-ambitions on the principalities was not mentioned. Thus, in his rescript on March 22, 1812 to M. I. Kutuzov, Tsar Alexander I insisted on concluding the peace with Turkey as soon as possible: “You will do a great service to Russia concluding a speedy

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73 Устройство задунайских переселенцев в Бессарабии и деятельность А. П. Юшневского. [Device of Transdanubian settlers in Bessarabia and activity of A. P. Yushnevskov] Сборник документов. Кишинев, 1957, c.4-5, 18-19.
76 Memoriile contelui Langeron ... , p.382.
77 Устройство задунайских переселенцев... [Device of Transdanubian settlers in Bessarabia and activity of A.P.Yushnevskov], c. 37.
78 Из записок графини Эдлинг, урожденной Стурдза [From the notes of the Countess Edling, born as Sturdza] (писано в 1829 г.). In: „Русский Архив”, 1887 г., т. I., с. 209.
peace with Porte. I beg you, as a manifestation of love for the motherland to pay
attention and put your efforts into this goal. You will have eternal glory. There is
no time to lose in this situation. Give up secondary activities, and with the
clairvoyance which characterizes you, assume this important work.” Alexander I
allowed Kutuzov to accept his own responsibility as an exception, the setting of
the border on the Prut River only if the Ottoman Empire would agree to sign a
treaty of alliance with Russia.\footnote{Фельдмаршал Кутузов. Сборник документов и
материалов [Field Marshal Kutuzov: a
Compilation of Materials and Documents]. Москва, 1947, c.136-137.}

Meanwhile, the court’s dissatisfaction on M. I. Kutuzov work had increased
because the matters did not advance in the direction desired by Tsar. This is
confirmed by Langeron who wrote in his memoirs: “On December the negotiations
did not advance. Petersburg was not content. There has already been a talk of
Kutuzov’s recall. His wife sent him the rumours and advised him to establish peace
before arrival of his successor. She did not know the successor but there was a talk in
Petersburg that Ciceagov will be.”\footnote{Мемуары контула Ланжерона..., p.365.}
The rumours about his dismissal made Kutuzov more active and he seriously began to negotiate with the Turks. As reported by
Lanjeron, Kutuzov summoned him in one of the days, at 7.00 o’clock but usually he
is available at 10.00 - 11.00 o’clock and Kutuzov spoke to him “of what he was
instructed to do, and what he has not yet succeeded to do and he will lose his
reputation and glory if he did not sign this peace”\footnote{Ibidem, p.366.}

Alexander I, in a discussion with Admiral P. V. Ciceagov, assessed this
situation as follows: “... our peace with Turkey does not advance; instead of
advancing it seems to be going back. The excesses of our troops in Moldova and the
Romanian Country have exasperated the inhabitants; the negligence and the intrigue
prevail here. Besides, I do not think that the current commander (General Kutuzov),
the author of this situation, is able to do something that would require energy,
goodwill and rapidity in execution.”\footnote{Călători străini despre Ţările Române..., p.536; Из записок адмирала Чичагова [From the
notes of Admiral Chichagov]. In: „Русский Архив”, № 8-9, 1870, с. 1522-1523.}

F. V. Rostopchin wrote in his memoirs: “There is no doubt that the peace could
have been done earlier, but Kutuzov, being convinced that after the peace he will be
removed from command of the army and ignoring received orders, has considered
that best for him would be to delay the talks, but when he found out that Ciceagov has
been appointed in his place, he did not want to give him the honor of ending the war
and he concluded the peace in three days.”\footnote{Ф. В. Ростопчин. Записки о 1812 го де [Notes about the 1812 year]. In: „Русская
старина”, 1889, № 12, с.665.}
delayed unreasonably negotiations with the Turks conformable to the imperial court’s opinions, were justified from the perspective of the Napoleonic invasion. In this situation, Alexander decided to replace M. I. Kutuzov by the Admiral P. V. Ciceagov who was appointed as the supreme commander of Danube Army, of the Black Sea fleet and general governor of Moldova and the Romanian Country. Sending P. V. Ciceagov to replace M. I. Kutuzov, the Tsar handed him two rescripts: one of April the 5th – if the peace treaty was not signed, by which M. I. Kutuzov was recalled to St. Petersburg as a member of the State Council and another from April the 9th – if the treaty has already been signed M. I. Kutuzov was invited to the capital to be awarded for his merits. On May 6, 1812 P. V. Ciceagov arrived in Bucharest and found out that Kutuzov had signed preliminary documents of peace treaty the day before on May 5, he handed him the rescript dated on April 9, P. V. Ciceagov delayed only one day.

I mention that 1812 was the year of Kutuzov’s glory. Alexander I presented to M. I. Kutuzov his portrait adorned with diamonds for the successful end of the Rusciuc operation; on October 29, 1811 he was granted the title of Count for “successes in the war against the Turks”, and on July 29 1812, he received honorary title of Kniaz (Prince) for “contribution to the end of war and Peace Treaty with the Ottoman Empire.” For the battle near Borodino, Alexander I gave to Kutuzov the rank of general-field marshal on August 31, 1812, and for the Battle of Smolensk - the title of “Smolensk” (Титул Смоленского) on December 6, 1812. In a year M. I. Kutuzov has received different titles of nobility, functions and military ranks as have never been offered in the previous 67 years.

It seems that by granting titles of nobility and supreme military rank, Alexander I demonstrated that he gave up the antipathy towards M. I. Kutuzov. But there is a hint: both Ukases (decree) on giving titles of nobility had the following statement: “and to his heirs”, knowing the fact that Kutuzov had only daughters and

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86 Исторические записки о жизни и воинских подвигах князя М. Л. Голенищева-Кутузова-Смоленского [Historical notes about the life and military deeds of Prince M. L. Golenischev-Kutuzov-Smolensky]. Санктпетербург, 1813, c.103.
88 Собрание высочайших манифестов..., с.24.
90 Собрание высочайших манифестов..., с. 90.
could not transmit the nobility title.

General Kutuzov, who succeeded through deceptions and guiles, to end the long Russo-Turkish war on favourable terms for Russia, but with serious consequences for the Romanian countries, must not be excessively glorified. For the Romanians, Kutuzov was nothing more than the supreme commander of the Russian army of occupation who ruthlessly robbed the Romanian principalities and contributed to the dismemberment of Moldova.