

**A CAMPAIGN OF THE GREAT HETMAN JAN ZAMOYSKI
IN MOLDAVIA (1595).
PART I. POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY PRELIMINARIES**

Dariusz Milewski

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw
d.milewski@uksw.edu.pl

Rezumat: *Relațiile polono-turce din secolului XVI au fost în general pașnice, între cele două state rămânând însă o sursă de conflict datorită ciocnirilor frecvente dintre tătari și cazaci și a pretențiilor polone, viabile, de suveranitate asupra Moldovei. Izbucnirea războiului dintre otomani și habsburgi în 1593 oferea Poloniei o oportunitate de a-și întări politica în sud-est. Trecerea vasalilor creștini ai sultanului de partea împăratului Rudol II a determinat relocarea operațiilor militare pe teritoriul de azi al României. Subordonarea teritoriilor românești de către habsburgi sau competiția lor pentru subjugare de către otomani era periculoasă pentru Republica polonă. De aceea, în vara anului 1595, cancelarul și marele hatman al Coroanei (polone) a decis să intre cu o parte a trupelor polone în Moldova.*

Abstract: *Polish-Turkish relations in the sixteenth century were generally peaceful, but the source of a conflict remained because of recurring bouts of Tatars and Cossacks, and the unexpired Polish claims to sovereignty over Moldavia. The outbreak of the war between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in 1593 offered for Poland an opportunity to strengthen its policy in the southeast. The movement of the Christian vassals of the Sultan to the side of the Emperor Rudolf II resulted in the relocation of military operations to the territory of today's Romania. The subordination of the Romanian lands to the Habsburgs or their complete subjugation by the Ottomans was dangerous to Rzeczpospolita. Thus, in the summer of 1595, the Chancellor and the Great Hetman of the Crown Jan Zamoyski decided to enter with a part of Polish troops to Moldavia.*

Résumé: *Les relations polonaises-turques du XVI-ème furent, en général, tranquilles; mais entre les deux Etats resta une source de conflit à cause des luttes fréquentes entre les Tatars et les Cosaques et des prétentions polonaises, viables, de souveraineté sur la Moldavie. L'éclatement de la guerre entre les Ottomans et les Habsbourgeois en 1593 offrit à la Pologne une opportunité de consolider sa politique dans le sud-est. Le passage des vassaux chrétiens du sultan de la part de l'empereur Rudolf II détermina la relocation des opérations militaires sur le territoire actuel de la Roumanie. La subordination des territoires roumains par les Habsbourgeois ou leur conquête totale par les Ottomans était dangereuse pour la République polonaise. A cause de cela, l'été de l'année 1595, le chancelier et le grand hetman de la Couronne (polonaise) décida à entrer avec une partie des troupes polonaises en Moldavie.*

Keywords: *Moldavia, Poland, Turkey, Habsburg Empire, Jan Zamoyski, expedition*

Poland and Turkey competed for Moldavia, and on the outbreak of the Ottoman-Habsburg war in 1593 the game was also joined by the Empire¹. The focal point of this competition was the first expedition to Moldavia, undertaken by Jan Zamoyski in 1595. The course of this expedition and its reasons are the subject of this study.

The overview of sources starts from printed Polish chronicles. The first mention is of *Dalszy ciąg kroniki polskiej* [The Continuation of the Polish Chronicle] by Joachim Bielski, contemporary to the described facts. This is a continuation of *Kronika polska* [The Polish Chronicle] by Marcin Bielski, which is a separate part of the *Kronika wszystkiego świata* [The Chronicle of the Whole World], published for the first time in Krakow in 1551². Similar values present the works of Reinhold Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do r. 1594* [The History of Poland from Sigismund August's death till 1594] and *Vita Joannis Zamojscii* [The Life of Jan Zamoyski]³. The author was close to Jan Zamoyski, and he participated in some of the events that he would later describe⁴ -

¹ The explosion of Turkish-Habsburgian war in 1593 and the political role of Moldavia in this period is discussed by J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäische Mächte und der „Lange Türkenkrieg“ Kaiser Rudolfs II (1593–1606)* [The European Power and the “Long Turkish War” of Emperor Rudolf II (1593-1606)], Wien 1993, basing mainly on: J. Macúrek, *Zápas Polska a Habsburku o přístup k Černému Moři na sklonku 16 stol.* [The Struggle between Poland and Habsburgs for access to the Black Sea in the end of 16th Century], Praha 1931. For the critical characteristic of the work of J.P. Niederkorn see the review of S. Augustowicz, in „Przegląd Historyczny”, 1994, vol. 85, p. 335-339.

² J. Bielski, *Joachima Bielskiego Dalszy ciąg Kroniki polskiej, zawierającej dzieje od 1587 do 1598 r.* [Joachim Bielski's the Continuation of the Polish Chronicle, including history from 1587 till 1598] ed. by F.M. Sobieszczanski, Warszawa 1851. On *Kronika polska* [The Polish Chronicle] by M. Bielski and its continuation by J. Bielski see: H. Barycz, *Bielski Joachim*, in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* [Polish Biographical Dictionary] (further: *PSB*), vol. 2, Kraków 1936, p. 61–64 and I. Chrzanowski, *Bielski Marcin*, *ibid.*, p. 64-66.

³ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do r. 1594* [The History of Poland from Sigismund August's death till 1594], transl. by M. Gliszczyński, Petersburg 1857 (the original title: *Rerum Polonicarum ab excessu Sigismundi Augusti libri XII* [Twelve books of the Polish History after death of Sigismund August], published 1672 in Frankfurt am Main); *Vita Joannis Zamojscii* [The Life of Jan Zamoyski] was written in 1605–1606. About the author and his works see: B. Kocowski, *Heidenstein Reinhold*, *PSB*, vol. 9, Warszawa 1960-1961, p. 342–344.

⁴ As an example here could serve the mission of transferring information to the King Sigismund III, returning from Sweden in 1594, about the transition of the Tatar Horde through Polish lands: „Revererat autem Rex Gedanum vigesima die Augusti, Cracovia die Secunda Mensis Octobris, ad quem primo Joanne Felicio Herburto Gedano proficiscentem Cracoviam, deinde Reinoldo Heidensteinio misso, cum de aliis rebus Zamojscius communicabat, tum Cracoviae praesertim invidiam transitus Tartarici a se transferebat” [“The King has come back to Gdańsk on August 20th, and to Krakow on October 2nd. Jan Feliks Herbut had left Krakow first and he has gone to the King, and after him Reinhold Heidenstein was sent. When Zamoyski communicated about the others things, especially

but he was biased in favour of his patron. The *Chronicle* of Paul Piasecki, bishop of Przemyśl, published in Krakow in 1645 as *Chronica gestorum in Europa singularium* [The Chronicle of the Individual Events in Europe] is of secondary track to the previously mentioned works, with less special weight. Author based on the chronicles of Bielski and Dimitri Solikowski, as far as, it is not excluded, on the manuscripts of Heidenstein. It fails when describing the number of Turkish-Tatar forces⁵. As for *Życie Jana Zamoyskiego* [The Life of Jan Zamoyski] by Franciszek Bohomolec, issued in 1775, it should be treated more as a version of the *Vita Joannis Zamojskii* than a separate source⁶.

A valuable source is in this aspect a chronicle of Miron Costin, a continuation of the work of Grigore Ureche⁷. However, it should be borne in mind that, in relation to past events, the author is sometimes imprecise. This includes the estimation of the

about the envy in Krakow caused by the passage of Tatars”, R. Heidenstein, *Vita Joannis Zamojskii* [The Life of Jan Zamoyski], Poznań 1861, p. 119. As P. Gawron has marked in his *Hetman koronny w systemie ustrojowym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1581-1646* [The Crown hetman in the Government System of Rzeczypospolita in 1581-1646], Warszawa 2010, p. 109, J. Zamoyski was de facto creator of the Polish politics towards Turks.

⁵ For example, the number of Tatars, whom J. Zamoyski opposed at Țuțora, is estimated at 70,000 – *Kronika* [The Chronicle], p. 127 – as Bielski, observing the mentioned facts from near distance, writes that „było ich wojska wszytkiego pewnie do czterdzieści tysięcy: acz drudzy więcej liczą” [“their army was about 40 000 men, but the others count them more”] (J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 250). Similarly the number of Hungarians, sent to Razvan by Sigismund Batory, is overestimated: „Zygmunt księżę Siedmiogrodu [...] wysłał Stefana Rozwana z 12000 Węgrów, aby Jeremiego wypędził i Mołdawię opanował” [Sigismund, Prince of Transylvania, sent Stefan Razvan with 12 000 Hungarians to expel Ieremia and occupy Moldavia”] (*Kronika* [The Chronicle], p. 128). The same is described by J. Bielski: „Rozwan przeszedłszy góry niewiadomie przyszedł do Wołoch, mając wojska wyższej trzech tysięcy” [“Razvan had passed mountains and he has come to Moldavia without being seen and his army was over three thousand men”] (J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 256), R. Heidenstein, in his turn, states that „Miał on 4000 piechoty i starych żołnierzy, nowo zaciężnych i Szeklerów nie mało, jazdy do 1000” [“He had 4000 men of infantry and experienced soldiers, just recruited and many Seklers; his cavalry was about 1000 men”] (R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], vol. 1, p. 356).

⁶ F. Bohomolec, *Życie Jana Zamoyskiego, kanclerza i hetmana wielkiego koronnego, krakowskiego [...] starosty* [The Life of Jan Zamoyski, the Chancellor and the Great Hetman of the Crown, the Starosta of Krakow], ed. by K.J. Turowski, Kraków 1860. About the author see: S. Bednarski, *Bohomolec Franciszek, PSB*, vol. 2, Kraków 1936, p. 224–225.

⁷ M. Costin, *Latopis Ziemi Mołdawskiej i inne utwory historyczne* [The Chronicle of Moldavia and the others historical works], ed. by I. Czamańska, Poznań 1998. For the disposition there is also the work, preceding M. Costin: G. Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, [The Chronicle of Moldavia], ed. by P.P. Panaitescu, București 1955.

number of troops involved in the campaign. M. Costin also wrongly considered Stefan Razvan to be invented by himself – Stefan Radul.

Finally, the collections of letters from the spoken time have to be mentioned; they were mainly published and edited by Romanian historians⁸. A significant part of these letters comes from Polish archives and are mainly of Polish authors⁹. Unfortunately, this correspondence concentrates on the events preceding the Polish intervention in Moldavia in 1595 and its consequences, so it is somewhat limited usefulness for the topic of the research. Instead, the collections of letters and Polish-Turkish treatises have to be mentioned (the Ottoman Porte was the head of Moldavia in the period). In the first place here have to be mentioned the edition works of Z. Abrahamowicz and D. Kołodziejczyk¹⁰.

In the mentioned correspondence particularly noteworthy is a letter from Jan Zamoyski to King Sigismund III, written in the camp of Țuțora (Cecora) a few days after the battle and entering a treaty with the Tatar-Turkish party, which has been published in the already mentioned Romanian edition of E. Hurmuzaki¹¹. It is one of the primary sources to learn about the Țuțora battle and the content of the agreement with the Tatars, which have opened the way for the Polish to Moldavia and was the culmination of a diplomatic struggle. Next to this material a similar role is to be given for the expedition diaries, also issued in print even in the interwar period¹².

At this stage of the research Ottoman chronicles will be useful to a lesser extent; proper use of them requires a separate study. However, it should be noted that

⁸ *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor culese de Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki* [Documents on the history of Romanians collected by Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki], suppl. 2, vol. 1, ed. by I. Bogdan, București 1893; *Documente privind istoria României. Veacul XVI. A. Moldova* [Documents on the history of Romania. XVI Century. A. Moldova], vol. 4, ed. by I. Ionascu, București, 1952; *Documente privitoare la istoria României culese din arhivele polone. Secolul al XVI-lea* [Documents on the history of Romania collected from the Polish archives. XVI Century], ed. by I. Corfus, București 1979.

⁹ For example, in the mentioned edition of E. Hurmuzaki there was published a considerable large correspondence between the Moldavian Hospodar Ieremia Movilă and Jan Zamoyski, preserved in AGAD, The Zamoyski archive (“Archiwum Zamoyskich”, further: AZ), sygn. 150.

¹⁰ *Katalog dokumentów tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455-1672* [Set of Turkish documents. Documents on the history of Poland and the neighbours countries in 1455-1672], ed. by Z. Abrahamowicz, in: *Katalog rękopisów orientalnych ze zbiorów polskich* [Set of oriental manuscripts in the Polish collections], ed. by S. Strelcyn, vol. 1, part 1, Warszawa 1959; *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century). An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents*, ed. by D. Kołodziejczyk, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2000.

¹¹ J. Zamoyski to Sigismund III, Cecora, 24 October 1595, in: E. Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare...* [Documents...], suppl. 2, vol. 1, No. CLXXXIII, p. 355-357.

¹² J. Jasnowski, *Dwie relacje z wyprawy Zamoyskiego pod Cecorę w 1595 r.* [Two relations about Zamoyski's campaign at Țuțora in 1595], „Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy”, 1938, vol. 10.

thanks to the Romanian editions they are also available to Polish researchers¹³.

Most of the archival sources, used in this study, come from the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw. Facing the damage of a considerable part of state archives during the World War II, of great importance seem birth records, especially the one of Jan Zamoyski. For example, extensive correspondence can be found in the Archives of Zamoyski, Ref. 150 (*nota bene* issued in Romania - see. Footnote 9), as well as among other diplomatic correspondence of the Hetman¹⁴. A lot of material could be found in copies of historical documents, prepared by A. Naruszewicz, covering the period of the reign of Stefan Báthory and Sigismund III Vasa - although they are not directly connected with the expedition of 1595.¹⁵

Rich is also a bibliography, which can be divided into two parts: the editions of works directly related to the 1595 expedition and its consequences, or studies of the broader context of the Polish-Moldavian-Turkish relations at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They also deserve attention as they explain the circumstances, without which it is impossible to fully understand the nuances of Polish or Turkish - or Habsburgian - politics, economical regards and cultural consequences. A full discussion of this literature would oversize this study; therefore we stop by signalling the most important positions.

From the range of works, directly relating to the 1595 events, in the first place there have to be mentioned old editions of priest J. Sas¹⁶, from later Polish authors – the works of Z. Spieralski, L. Bazyłow and J. Demel¹⁷. These are long-metric studies, and quite often of general character because of their synthetic nature. Among recent developments, concerning the effects of the expedition or its political or financial aspects, the works of V. Ciobanu, D. Skorupa and A. Filipczak-Kocur could be mentioned¹⁸, as well as the articles of J. Rzońca, C. Bobicescu, P. Gawron, A.

¹³ I have here in mind the selection from the Ottoman chronicles: *Cronici turcești privind țările române. Extrase* [Turkish chronicles on Romanian countries. Extracts], vol. 2, ed. by M. Guboglu, București, 1974. Here information about the fights between Turks and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) could be found, which are described, among others, by the chronicles of Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, *Tarih* [The History], *Ibid.*, p.126-165 and Müneğğimbaşı, *Sahaif ül-ahbar* [The Clear of Greats], *Ibid.*, p. 233-275.

¹⁴ See: AGAD, AZ 637, 863, 865 i 867.

¹⁵ See: AGAD, Naruszewicz records (“Teki Naruszewicza”, further: TN) 9, 10, 11 and 12.

¹⁶ J. Sas, *Wyprawa Zamoyskiego na Mołdawię* [Campaign of Jan Zamoyski in Moldavia], „Przegląd Powszechny”, 1897, R. 14, vol. 66.

¹⁷ Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie* [Moldavian rows], Warszawa 1967; L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród a Polska 1576–1613* [Transylvania towards Poland 1576-1613] Warszawa 1967; J. Demel, *Historia Rumunii* [The History of Romania], Warszawa 1970.

¹⁸ V. Ciobanu, *La cumpănă de veacuri (Țările române în contextul politicii poloneze la sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea și începutul secolului al XVII-lea)* [On a scale of centuries (Romanian countries in the context of Polish policy in the end of 16th and at the beginning

Barwicka and V. Constantinov¹⁹. Another category consists of biographies of the main actors in the events, Jan Zamoyski²⁰ and Stanisław Żółkiewski²¹. There is no biography in Polish of Ieremia Movilă - quite a lot of information about him can be found in the works of I. Czamańska²².

-
- of 17th century)], Iași 1991; D. Skorupa, *Stosunki polsko-tatarskie 1595-1623* [Polish-Tatars relationships 1595-1623], Warszawa 2004; A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość Rzeczypospolitej 1587-1648. Projekty-ustawy-realizacja* [The Finance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 1587-1648. Projects-Acts-Realisation], Warszawa 2006.
- ¹⁹ J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita wobec propozycji przystąpienia do Ligi Antytureckiej u schyłku XVI wieku* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth towards a proposal of join the Anti-Turkish coalition at the end of 16th century], „Sprawozdania Opolskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk. Wydział I – Nauk Historycznych i Społecznych”, seria A, No. 21, Opole 1988, p. 15-30; C.A. Bobicescu, *Unia, inkorporacja czy lenno? Kilka uwag o stosunkach Moldawii z Rzeczpospolitą podczas panowania Jeremiego Mohiły (1595-1606)* [Union, incorporation or feud? Some remarks on the relationships of Moldavia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during Ieremia Movilă reign (1595-1606)], in: *Rzeczpospolita w XVI-XVIII wieku. Państwo czy wspólnota?* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 16th-17th century. The state or the community?], ed. by B. Dybaś, P. Hanczewski, T. Kempa, Toruń 2007, p. 219-239; P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski, kanclerz i hetman wielki koronny, wobec zmagañ turecko-habsburskich w latach 1593-1605/6* [Jan Zamoyski, the Chancellor and the Great Hetman of the Crown towards Turkish-habsburgian fights in 1593-1605/6], in: *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV-XVIII wieku* [Poland towards great conflicts in the modern Europe. From the history of diplomacy and international relations in 15th-18th century], ed. by R. Skowron, p. 23-47; A. Barwicka, *Rzeczpospolita w planach dyplomacji papieskiej i habsburskiej w okresie wojny austriacko-tureckiej 1593-1606* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in plans of papal and habsburgian diplomacy in the period of the Austrian-Turkish war 1593-1606], *ibid.*, p. 297-307; V. Constantinov, *Moldawia w stosunkach międzynarodowych w końcu XVI i na początku XVII wieku*, [Moldavia in the international relationships at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century], in: *Rzeczpospolita wobec Orientu w epoce nowożytnej* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Orient in the Modern Era], ed. by D. Milewski, Zabrze 2011, p. 10-21.
- ²⁰ A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski, kanclerz i hetman wielki koronny* [Jan Zamoyski, the Chancellor and the Great Hetman of the Crown], Warszawa 1947; S. Grzybowski, *Jan Zamoyski*, Warszawa 1994 and recently S. Leśniewski, *Jan Zamoyski. Hetman i polityk* [Jan Zamoyski. Hetman and Politician], Warszawa 2008 and M. Plewczyński, *Jan Zamoyski herbu Jelita (1542-1605) hetman wielki* [Jan Zamoyski, arms of Jelita (1542-1605) the Great Hetman], in: *Poczet hetmanów Rzeczypospolitej. Hetmani koronni*, [List of hetmans of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Hetmans of the Crown], ed. by M. Nagielski, Warszawa 2005, p. 115-130.
- ²¹ A. Prochaska, *Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski*, Warszawa 1927; J. Besala, *Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski*, Warszawa 1988; L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, Warszawa 1988 and M. Nagielski, *Stanisław Żółkiewski herbu Lubicz (1547-1620) hetman wielki* [Stanisław Żółkiewski, arms of Lubicz (1547-1620) the Great Hetman], in: *Poczet hetmanów...* [List of hetmans...], p. 131-144.
- ²² I. Czamańska, *Rumuńska imigracja polityczna w Polsce XVII wieku* [Romanian Political Immigration in Poland in 17th Century], „Balcanica Posnaniensia”, vol. 6, Poznań 1993, p. 5-

Among the other category of works, which includes texts, discussing the socio-economic and political relationship of the region of the Danubian Principalities and the Black Sea in the period of interest to us, it is worth mentioning, for example, several positions that are most accessible to Polish researchers. These are the works of A. Dziubiński, H. Inalcik or Ch. King, mostly discussing economic issues²³, books, describing the structure of the Ottoman Empire²⁴ and, finally, a number of works, highlighting the political events preceding the Polish intervention in Moldavia or describing its effects and accompanying events or policies affecting the leading players in this region²⁵. The final chord of the Polish-Ottoman struggle for the influence in Moldavia, started with the 1595 intervention, was the expedition to Țuțora by Stanisław Żółkiewski and the defense of Chocim (Khotyn) in 1621. Literature, concerning these events, closes the considered by us problems²⁶.

22; I. Czamańska, *Wiśniowieccy. Monografia rodu* [Wiśniowieccy. The Monograph of the Family], Poznań 2007 (especially p. 113-127). In both works we can find more about the activity of Ieremia Movilă's daughters and his sons-in-law than *hospodar* himself.

²³ A. Dziubiński, *Na szlakach Orientu. Handel między Polską a Imperium Osmańskim w XVI-XVIII wieku* [On the routes of Orient. Trade of Poland and Ottoman Empire in 16th-18th century], Wrocław 1998; *Dzieje gospodarcze i społeczne imperium osmańskiego 1300-1914* [An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914], ed. by H. Inalcik, D. Quataert, Kraków 2008; Ch. King, *Dzieje Morza Czarnego* [Black Sea: A History], Warszawa 2006.

²⁴ J. Reychman, *Historia Turcji* [The History of Turkey], Wrocław 1973; *Sulejman Wspaniały i jego czasy. Imperium osmańskie we wczesnej epoce nowożytnej* [Süleyman the Magnificent and his Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World], red. M. Kunt i Ch. Woodhead, Wrocław 1998; H. Inalcik, *Imperium Osmańskie. Epoka klasyczna 1300-1600* [The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600], Kraków 2006; A. Decei, *Istoria Imperiului otoman pînă la 1656* [The History of the Ottoman Empire till 1656], București 1978.

²⁵ We can mention here following works: A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană* [The History of Romanians from Traianus Dacia], vol. 5, București, without date; A. Dziubiński, *Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie w latach 1500-1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym* [Polish-Turkish diplomatic relations from 1500 to 1572 in the international context], Wrocław 2005; W.A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny do 1648 roku* [On the far Ukraine. The History of Cossackdom till 1648], Kraków 2008; L. Podhorodecki, *Chanat krymski i jego stosunki z Polską w XV-XVIII w.* [Crimean Khanate and its relationships with Poland in 15th-18th Centuries], Warszawa 1987; T. Górski, *Flotylle kozackie w służbie Jagiellonów i Wazów* [Cossack flotillas in the service of Jagiellons and Vasas], Gdańsk 2006.

²⁶ R. Majewski, *Cecora – rok 1620* [Țuțora – year 1620], Warszawa 1970; K. Śledziński, *Cecora 1620* [Țuțora 1620], Warszawa 2007; J. Tretiak, *Historja wojny chocimskiej* [The History of the Khotyn war], Kraków 1921; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, *Wojna chocimska 1621* [The Khotyn war 1621], Kraków 1979; L. Podhorodecki, *Chocim 1621* [Khotyn 1621] Warszawa 1988; П. Сас, *Хотинська війна 1621 року* [The Khotyn war of 1621], Біла Церква 2012.

Polish – Turkish relations before 1593

After the subjugation of Moldavia by Suleyman the Magnificent in 1538, the country has become a Turkish buffer zone, separating them from the Christian Polish, and also a source of considerable income²⁷. However, the Poles tried to maintain their influence there, sometimes introducing to the throne friendly Hospodars - as in 1552 - and defending them, not always successfully, against the Turks (as in 1572)²⁸. At the turn of the 80s and 90s of the 16th century, the situation intensified. On the one hand, Moldavia increasingly felt the effects of the fiscal drain as destabilizing the internal situation of the country²⁹, on the other hand, the interventions of Zaporozhian Cossacks intensified in the Black Sea region. Only in 1589 they plundered and let go up in smoke the Tatar Kozłów (Gözleve) as far as the Turkish Ochakov, Belgorod and Tehinia (Tighina = Bendery)³⁰. In response to these acts the Horde entered Russia, coming to Lviv and bringing away captives. The activities of the two crown Hetmans - newly appointed field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski and the great Hetman Jan Zamoyski – did not bring effects³¹. Polish activities were harmed by the

²⁷ About the status of Moldavia in Ottoman Empire see M. Maxim, *An Introduction to the Juridical-Legal Foundations of the Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Romanian Principalities*, in: M. Maxim, *Romano-Ottomanica. Essays & Documents from the Turkish Archives*, “Analecta Isisiana”, vol. 58, Istanbul 2001, p. 11-22; Idem, *Le statut des pays roumains envers la Porte Ottomane aux XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles* [The status of the Romanian countries towards the Ottoman Porte in 16th-18th centuries], *ibid.*, p. 23-45; V. Panaite, *Pace, război și comerț în Islam. Țările române și dreptul otoman al popoarelor (secolele XV-XVIII)* [Peace, war and trade in Islam. Romanian countries and the ottoman law of nations (15th-18th centuries)], București 1997, p. 278-283 and C.A. Bobicescu, *Unia...* [Union...], p. 220. About incomes from Moldavia see P.V. Sovetov, *Cît a costat Țării Moldovei dominația străină (forme economice de dependență a Moldovei în secolul al XVII-lea – începutul secolului al XVIII-lea)* [How much did it cost for Moldavia the foreign domination (economical forms of Moldvian dependence in the 17th century – at the beginning of 18th century)], „Revista de istorie a Moldovei”, A. 1, vol. 4, Chișinău 1990, p. 17-19; T. Gemil, *Românii și Otomanii în secolele XIV-XVI* [Romanians and Ottomans in the 14th-16th centuries], București 1991, p. 213-215.

²⁸ In 1552 Hetman Mikołaj Sieniawski helped to reach the throne to Aleksander Lăpușeanu, in 1572 Mikołaj Mielecki intervened when defending Aleksander's successor, Bogdan – see: D. Milewski, *Walka o tron moldawski w 1572 roku*, [The struggle for Moldavian throne in 1572], in: *Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej. Epoka staropolska – czasy zaborów – czasy najnowsze* [From the Polish military history. The Old Polish era – the period of dismemberments – the recent period], ed. by D. Milewski, Kraków 2011, p. 29-47.

²⁹ V. Constantinov, *Moldavia...* [Moldavia...], p. 10-12.

³⁰ A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 13 and T. Górski, *Flotylla...*, p. 132-133.

³¹ Żółkiewski successfully has gained back a part of the captives at Glina, Zamoyski, in his turn, organized a military demonstration at the Dniester and fought a victorious combat at the passage of Kamionka River – J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 81. Also see: M. Nagielski, *Stanisław Żółkiewski...*, p. 132 and S. Leśniowski, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 189.

insubordination of Princes Konstanty Ostrogski and Janusz Zbaraski, reluctant to Zamoyski. Meanwhile the grand Vizier Koca Sinan pasha requested tribute from Poland and began to build a bridge over the Danube³². The situation was so tense that Sejm, convened in March 1590, passed the high taxes on the military purposes, gave the appropriate powers to Hetmans in the event of an emergency, decided to appeal to the Cossacks and the Pope. Zamoyski wanted to take this opportunity to push through a pre-planned war of aggression against Turkey, which included, among others, the conquest of the Danubian Principalities, building the foreground for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth³³.

The war did not happen. Although the field Hetman Żółkiewski stood with the army in Bar to protect Russia from the Tatars³⁴, but artillery waggons were his only opponent. In Turkey, there was in fact another palace coup, which resulted in the loss of the office by the Grand Vizier Sinan pasha, while the English diplomacy, led by the Ambassador of Elizabeth I in Istanbul, Edward Burton, greatly helped to lead the Porte to renew the covenant with Rzeczpospolita³⁵. It was finalized by the royal secretary royal of the coat of arms Grzymala, Jan Zamoyski, in October 1591³⁶.

The Cossacks, however, were not wasting time and tried to overthrow the Moldavian Hospodar Petru, to enthrone Lazarus, the son of the former Moldavian Hospodar Ioan III cel Cumplit (John III the Terrible) - from which the Polish deputies shunned, blaming the Habsburgs, who encouraged Cossacks to attack Turkey. Meanwhile, in 1592, the Cossacks supported another Petru, a brother of the year ago

³² It was at the beginning of 1590; the Turks started to build a bridge in February 1590 – A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 14.

³³ Sejm took place from 8 of March to 21 of April 1590. More about Turkish requests, resolutions of Sejm and the offensive plans of J. Zamoyski see: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 142, S. Grzybowski, *Jan Zamoyski*, p. 232–236, J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 82–83 and D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, p. 125.

³⁴ J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 82.

³⁵ England and Holland were in the spoken time in war with Spain, ruled by a member of the Habsburg dynasty, Philip II. Turkey was therefore a natural ally of England. Even more, the explosion of Turkish-Polish war could relate Rzeczpospolita with the Habsburgs, while England was interested in Polish grain, exported to the countries, fighting against Spain. This is the reason of the activities of English envoy, Edward Burton, which are in detail presented by: J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäische...* [The European...], p. 111–114 and Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 142–143. Also see: F. Braudel, *Morze Śródziemne i świat śródziemnomorski w epoce Filipa II* [The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II] vol. 2, Warszawa 2004, p. 550–551, where, among others, Turkish policy are characterized in the background of the war with Persia, finished in 1590, and troubles with rebellions in Africa.

³⁶ Ahdname Murad III to Sigismund III, 10–18 October 1591, in: D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, No. 23, p. 289–293 (I quote English translations of the documents in this edition). Also see: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 143.

imprisoned by the Turks in Moldavia Hospodar Aron. He has gained power for a period of time, but was quickly driven out by the Turks³⁷. For these actions, moreover, were hiding Jan Zamoyski and Sigismund III, who would like to see in the Hospodar of Moldavia a friend (in the years 1574-1591 it was Peter V the Lame (Petru V Șchiopul))³⁸. And despite the fact that in January 1593 Sinan pasha came back to power in Turkey, it ended up at this time with the letter protests of Murad III³⁹. Turkey has already found another, more important direction of aggression. The war with the Habsburgs started⁴⁰.

Habsburgian endeavours for an alliance with Rzeczpospolita

The outbreak of the Ottoman-Habsburg War, Turkish put Rzeczpospolita in a difficult position because it had not perfect relations with both countries. Neutrality was difficult and unfavourable, as it meant giving up the opportunity to use the war of neighbours for achieving own objectives⁴¹. Mainly it was going about the rebuilding of influences in Moldavia, as Zamoyski has already thought at the time the Polish-Turkish crisis of 1590⁴². Now it seemed to be easier and soon became a necessity, due to developments in the region.

Turkish blow fell on the Hungarian possessions of the Habsburgs in the spring of 1593⁴³, however, the offensive has grown sluggishly. Imperial commanders had even two wins in field - at Sisak on June 22 and at Szekesfehervar on November 3. The Turks responded with getting two Hungarian fortresses - Veszprém and Palota - and laid out their army in winter quarters near Belgrade. They demanded support from their vassals for the next year's campaign: from Prince Sigismund Báthory of

³⁷ G. Ureche, *Letopisețul...* [The Chronicle...], p. 209-210. See: A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 15 and Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 143.

³⁸ C.A. Bobicescu, *Unia...* [Union...], p. 224; J. Demel, *Historia...* [The History...], p. 158.

³⁹ Murad III to Sigismund III, Istanbul, March or June 1593, in: I. Corfus, *Documente...* [Documents...], No. 195, p. 367-369. Sinan pasha came back to power on 29 January 1593 - T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce* [The history of wars and the military in Poland], vol. 2, Lwów 1923, p. 109.

⁴⁰ The conflict started from border combats, the Turks declared the war after their defeat at Sisak and – as it was their common way of acting – imprisoned the imperial envoy, Friedrich von Krechwitz (J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäische...* [The European...], p. 10; J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski* [The History of Poland], vol. 3, Lwów 1864, p. 141; F. Braudel, *Morze...* [The Mediterranean...], vol. 2, p. 551-553; A. Decei, *Istoria...* [The History...], p. 262-299).

⁴¹ Among others, see: T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 109-110.

⁴² J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 83 and S. Grzybowski, *Jan Zamoyski*, p. 236.

⁴³ J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäische...* [The European...], p. 10; J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III* [The History of reign of Sigismund III], Warszawa 1819, p. 149-150; R. Murphey, *Ottoman warfare 1500-1700*, London 2001, p. 7; A. Decei, *Istoria...* [The History...], p. 265.

Transylvania and the Crimean Khan Gazi Giray II⁴⁴. Rudolf II was afraid and had to distract the Turks from the offensive to the Habsburg countries.

The Habsburgs began by persuading the Cossacks to attack Turkey, hoping to incite a war between it and Rzeczpospolita. In Zaporizhia appeared imperial emissaries, promising to the Lowlanders (as their main seat was situated in the lower part of the Dnieper river) military service pay, granting them imperial trumpets and banners, and calling for an attack on the Sultan property⁴⁵. They were led by Chłopicki, "the former bailiff of King Stefan⁴⁶," and now an outlaw, who reached his campaign to Moscow⁴⁷. Stanisław Żółkiewski decided to curtail his activities, captured him and transported to Krakow, but he managed to escape from prison and fled to Silesia⁴⁸. Meanwhile, the Cossacks, persuaded by him, led by Hryhoryi Loboda, attacked the city Jurgów near Belgorod during the fair, plundered it and then fled before the Turkish-Tatar-Moldavian pursuit⁴⁹.

The persuasion of the Cossacks to attack the Turkish property but did not cause the outbreak of the Polish-Turkish war, therefore other measures were employed. An imperial delegation went to Poland, mainly to get two things: first, to persuade Poland to not let through their territory of the Tatars, who have to go to Hungary and, secondly, to contract an alliance against Turkey⁵⁰. Because of the

⁴⁴ T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 109.

⁴⁵ A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 13 and J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski* [The History of Poland], p. 142.

⁴⁶ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do r. 1594* [The History of Poland from Sigismund August's death till 1594], transl. by M. Gliszczyński, Petersburg 1857, p. 321.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 321.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 321. About Chłopicki see: A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 15 and W.A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej...* [On the far Ukraine...], p. 127-129.

⁴⁹ J. Zamoyski to H. Rozrażewski, the Bishop of Kujawy, Zamość, 12 January 1594, in: I. Corfus, *Documente...* [Documents...], No. 197, p. 375. There we can read: „Jego m. pan hetman polny dał mi znacz ze nie ze włości, ale z pustyń z samego Nizie kilka tysięcy Kozaków, między którymi snadź i Moskwa by miała być, wyszło i temi pustyniamiż idąc w miasteczko wołoskie Jurgiów, które nie barzo daleko jest od Białogrodu i Tehini, w targ wpadli i ono splądrowali krepcze, między którymi y Turcy beli, posiekli, potem około tegoż Jurgiowa na kilka mil zagony rozpuściwszy popustoszyli i tak zaś *cum praeda* odeszli. Obawiać się tego trzeba, żeby poganin tego za *violationem pactorum* sobie nie brał” [“The Field Hetman has communicated to me that Cossacks have gone not from the Ukraine, but from the Nizh. Probably there are also Russians among them. They have passed deserted places directing to Moldavian small town Jurgów, which is not far away from Belgorod and Tighina. They have come into this town during fair and strongly plundered it. In this town were also Turks who have been killed by Cossacks. Then Cossacks plundered the area around the town in space of seven miles and then they left it with the spoils. We must be afraid that Turks can consider it as a break agreements”].

⁵⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 321: „naprzód, żeby Tatarom przejścia przez Polskę do Węgier nie pozwalał [the Primate – D.M.] i powtóre, że dla

absence of King Sigismund III, who stayed in Sweden, where he had gone in the previous year, after the death of his father, John III⁵¹, the Primate Stanisław Karnkowski convened Senate on April 19, 1594, and there answers to the imperial delegates were formulated⁵². As it would be expected, the answer was non-committal. It was stated that without King there could not be negotiated on a possible alliance. As for the Tatars, it was confirmed that in case they will enter into the Rzeczpospolita, they would be opposed⁵³. Also at the occasion it was complained that the Cossacks are incited to attack Turkey⁵⁴. The Emperor felt fear about Turks, and the amount of this fear was demonstrated by the fact that on the occasion of the official delegation a special Habsburg envoy, Wacker, arrived with a letter from the Emperor to the biggest enemy of Habsburgs Rzeczpospolita, Hetman Jan Zamoyski⁵⁵. He convinced to ally for the sake of Christianity with the Emperor against the Ottomans. Zamoyski, however, was so angry that disposed to spare good advices: let the Emperor issued general battle against the Turks, prepare for it, hold a strong fleet at sea and haste agreements with Spain, Moscow and Persia for the common war⁵⁶. Zamoyski was in the position to use Turkish problems for his own sake and to attack it, because he saw the danger for Rzeczpospolita, coming for total control of Hungary by the Turks, but he was too experienced

zawarcia przymierza przeciwko Turcji z Polską” [„first, to not let Tatars come to Hungary through Poland and secundo, to contrach an alliance with Poland against Turkey”]; idem, *Vita...* [The Life...], p. 118.

⁵¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 320. Describing the event of 1593, Heidenstein writes: „Dnia 3 sierpnia wyjechał Król z Warszawy do Szwecji” [“The King has gone from Warsaw to Sweden on the August 3rd”]. This journey was described by S. Łubieński, *Droga do Szwecji Zygmunta III, króla polskiego i szwedzkiego, w 1593 roku* [The passage of Sigismund III, the King of Poland and Sweden, to Sweden in 1593], ed. by J. Byliński and W. Kaczorowski, Opole 2009. Also see: A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 310-311.

⁵² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg kroniki polskiej* [The Continuation of the Polish Chronicle], Warszawa 1851, p. 212, as far as R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 321 – 322.

⁵³ R. Heidenstein, *Vita...* [The Life...], p. 118: „Responsum Legatis Caesariis, sine Rege nihil ordines statuere posse, de Tartaris, transitum illis prohibitum iri promissum” [“The answer to the imperial delegates is that the states of Poland cannot do anything without the King. The delegates have obtained a promission that Tatars will not get a free pass”].

⁵⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 321: „zarazem żalono się na Chłopickiego i na kozaków, że się dają uwodzić podszeptom i szarpią kraje sprzymierzone z Polską, do czego ich podobno Cesarz nakłania” [“Poles complained in the same time that Chłopicki and Cossacks listen to advices and attack countries allied with Poland and supposedly the Emperor induces them to do it”].

⁵⁵ R. Heidenstein, *Vita...* [The Life], p. 118; also compare with: T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 110.

⁵⁶ T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 110 and A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 311-312.

statesman, to push the Republic to war, simply basing on the participation of the Habsburgs. And since the league of Christians against the Crescent was by no means expected, it was safer to keep the peace with the Sultan⁵⁷. Thus, at the same convocation of Senate, where imperial delegates were accepted, a response was given also to the present Turkish Chaush. He was asserted that friendly relations with the Sublime Porte will be preserved, and as far as the Cossacks, on taming of whom the Sultan insisted, were concerned, it was replied that indeed there is nothing to be guaranteed, but „polecone jednakże zostanie pogranicznym starostom, żeby ile będą mogli, trzymali Niżowców na wodzy” [“the Starostas on the border will obtain an order to – if they can do it - control the Cossacks”]⁵⁸. Traditionally, it was complained about the Tatar attacks⁵⁹.

The Tatars' pass to Hungary

Adoption by the Republic of expectant attitude, without getting involved in the Habsburg-Ottoman games, could not, however, give peace. The new Turkish offensive in Hungary, which had to be supported by the Tatar Horde, involved the neutral Poland⁶⁰.

Rumours of a possible march of the Tatars to Hungary through the lands of Rzeczpospolita began to reach Poland already in spring⁶¹. The warning came from the Moldavian Hospodar Aron, and even from Moscow could be something to hear about⁶². Zamoyski have to protect Russian lands against the Horde. He called for vigilance the Field Hetman, standing with few regular quarter troops to guard the border, and the governor of Bratslav, Janusz Zbaraski as far as the Starostas of Sanok, Sambor, Przemyśl and Stryj⁶³. He asked for help the Primate, hoping perhaps for more cash to enlist soldiers⁶⁴. Every rumour about coming invaders induced a true avalanche of universal communicates to the nobility to have on their guard⁶⁵. And yet there was not known which way to go the Horde has chosen. The secret services failed all along the whole line⁶⁶. Finally Żółkiewski stood with his troops in

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 312; T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 110–111 and P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 26-29.

⁵⁸ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 322.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 321–322 and J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 213.

⁶⁰ The Hungarian offensive, planned by the Turks in spring 1594, is discussed in: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 144.

⁶¹ L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 75–76 and J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 94–95.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 94 and 95 and L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 75.

⁶³ J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 94–95. T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 111.

⁶⁴ A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 312–313.

⁶⁵ J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 95.

⁶⁶ Jewish were sent out to spy, and even boyar Koczanowski, trying to buy out his family from captivity in Belgorod (Akkerman), was trying to get any news, but all these efforts have

Chmielnik, watching the black trail, Zamoyski concentrated his forces near Gródek to start from there against the Horde if they will cross the borders of Rzeczpospolita⁶⁷. In April, it was already known that the Horde has passed the Dnieper, but which way they intended to go, remained, however, a mystery⁶⁸.

Meanwhile, the Tartars came up July 2, 1594, at Pokucie⁶⁹. They ran it quickly through, burning the towns: Śniatyń, Kołomyja, Obertyn, Gwoździec, Tyśmienica, Czesybiesy⁷⁰. The latter was defended by Jakub Potocki with a hundred horses, but when fire caught the castle and the gunpowder, which was gathered there, exploded, brave defenders broke through the line of the siege and fled from Horde⁷¹. July 7, Horde was already in Halych, which was defended by the governor of Bełż, Stanisław Włodek. He managed to get the Tatars to withdraw. Therefore they only plundered the neighbourhood area and went to Sambor⁷². Here, leading the regular quarter troops, Hetmans stood in their way. It was July 9, 1594, at the river Błazewka. Tatars, under the leadership of Khan Gazi Giray II, had almost three times outnumbered the Poles - there were probably about 25,000⁷³. Their goal was not a war with Poland, but only the passage to Hungary. Going through Russian territories they did not even take even captives. They were not going to fight at the moment, and because of it they used a war ruse – they dug in a forest, simulating the desire to fight next day – and slipped away under cover of night, rushing to Hungarian passages⁷⁴. Again, the chase was too late, only managed to tear down the rear guard of the Horde⁷⁵. It had good guides, including Polish nobleman – an outlaw⁷⁶. In this way, the Horde was in Hungary, and Zamoyski, who has reached the border and did not want to cross it, gave the signal to retreat⁷⁷. The failure was fulfilled by Khan's dashing letter, sent from Hungary to Zamoyski, demanding overdue “gifts” under the threat of returning to the Crimea through

failed. It is described by J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 95.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95. On Polish preparations to oppose the Horde in spring 1594 writes also J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 151, original sources are, however, better exposed by J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 215–216.

⁶⁹ See: L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 76.

⁷⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 322, J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 216.

⁷¹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 216–217.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 217 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 322.

⁷³ See: L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 76.

⁷⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], s. 322–323. Hetmans were supported by voivodes: of Sandomierz, Jerzy Mniszech, and of Braclaw, Janusz Zbaraski. Heidenstein describes both the Tatar trick and gives the information about not taking captives.

⁷⁵ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 218. The same is also described by J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 151–152.

⁷⁶ This information is given by L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 77.

⁷⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 323.

Poland and the capture the Hetman⁷⁸.

After the embarrassment of the two Hetmans the country stormy raged⁷⁹. The enemies of Hetman accused him that he took a bribe from the Tatars and let them slip away. It was feared that the brother of Khan, left in the Crimea, would attack Ukraine, when the Khan will go back from Hungary⁸⁰. Zamoyski seemed to be not worried about these accusations, but he wanted to clear the situation and try to protect the Republic before the expected return of the Horde from Hungary in spring⁸¹. So he sent messengers with letters to the King Sigismund III, who at the time he returned from Sweden⁸². He prepared the ground before the Sejm, planned at carnival 1595, and did not allow dissolving the army, which he left to guard the Beskidy Mountain passes for protection against the Horde. Even more, he decided to take a bold plan to impact on virtually stripped from the army and defenceless Crimea⁸³. Meanwhile, soon a radical change in the situation of the lands south of the borders of the Republic happened, which was rather caused by political games than military decisions.

The offensive of the Habsburg diplomacy in 1594–1595

Habsburg diplomacy tried to implement new measures and has made every effort to weaken the Turkish giant. The try to entangle it in a war with Rzeczpospolita by provocation of the Cossacks in the autumn of 1593 burned to nothing. The same effect was produced by exceptional efforts to conclude a formal alliance with Krakow. Even the painful march of the Horde in July 1594 through the Red Ruthenia failed to persuade Poland for immediate attack⁸⁴. However, while the Crimean Khan was a faithful vassal and ally of Padishah, whereas other his vassals did not follow his footsteps.

⁷⁸ L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 77. On the campaign against Tatars in 1594 also see: L. Podhorodecki, *Chanat krymski* [Crimean Khanate], p. 123-124 and M. Nagielski, *Stanisław Żółkiewski...*, p. 133.

⁷⁹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 323; J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 96 and P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 30.

⁸⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 323 and J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 152.

⁸¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 323; the plans of effective defense against the Horde in the future are presented by J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 218–220. Also see: P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 30-31.

⁸² They were Jan Szcześnie Herbut and Reinhold Heidenstein – R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, [The History of Poland...], p. 324; F. Bohomolec, *Życie...* [The Life...], p. 142.

⁸³ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 324–325.

⁸⁴ The same problem is raised by the priest J. Sas, *Wyprawa...* [Campaign...], p. 74–89.

In August 1594, Rudolf II managed to get the Moldavian Hospodar Aron to recognize his country as part of the Roman Empire⁸⁵. It was a hostile move, not only against Turkey, but also of the Republic, which also claimed the right to Moldavia. The Habsburgs, however, steadfastly followed in the chosen direction, seeking to drag on their side and take their "care" of the Christian vassals of Murat III⁸⁶. A key role played here the Transylvanian principality, which remain in the hands of an irresponsible nephew of Stefan Báthory, King Sigismund. He betrayed the Sultan in 1594 for the Roman Emperor, married a princess from the house of Habsburgs and signed a treaty in Prague on Jan. 28, 1595, which foresaw, among others, that his duchy could be taken by the Emperor in the event of his death or the resignation from Transylvania⁸⁷. As a vassal of the Habsburgs Sigismund Báthory now claimed the right to sovereignty over the Danube principalities. Being in a difficult situation, both Hospodars agreed to his request⁸⁸.

Moldavia survived the Cossack invasion in autumn 1594. It was indirectly connected with the Polish plans for an attack on the Crimea. On their own, but with the tacit approval of Zamoyski, the governor of Śniatyń, Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, undertook this expedition. After the agreement with the Cossacks, he went to Belgorod. However, the Cossacks chose to take the spoils, but not to fight and abandoned the governor, who barely escaped back to the borders of the Republic⁸⁹. Cossacks, again incited by Chłopicki, who gave them the imperial flags, burst into Moldavia and burned Tehinia. Hospodar Aron did not remain indifferent and, allied with the Turks, drove the attackers⁹⁰. They have returned in greater strength in November, led by Hryhoryi Loboda. They captured and burned Iași and Suceava, plundered the treasures of Hospodar, who had to run away, and returned with the

⁸⁵ A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 15.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸⁷ L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród...* [Transylvania...], p. 79–82; V. Ciobanu, *La cumpănă...* [On a scale...], p. 99–101; I. Horn, *Andrzej Batory*, Warszawa 2010, p. 209–214. At this occasion Sigismund Báthory got rid of oppositional Transylvanian magnates with the brother of his uncle, Balthazar – see: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 325–326.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 326; L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród...* [Transylvania...], p. 81; V. Constantinov, *Moldawia...* [Moldavia...], p. 12–13.

⁸⁹ On the expedition of Mikołaj Jałowiecki: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 326 and J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 224–225.

⁹⁰ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 225, writes about it: „było [Kozaków – D.M.] jako powiadają do dwunastcie tysięcy, i szli do Wołoch. Nad któremi był hetmanem Łoboda i Nalewajko porucznikiem. Mieli wszystkich chorągwi do czterdzieści: a na dwu były orły cesarskie. Potym wołoską ziemię zawojowawszy, i Aarona Hospodara wygnawszy szli ku Tehinicy. Tamże znowu hospodar złączywszy się z Multany i z Turki wyparł je” [The Cossacks were – as they say – about twelve thousand men and they were going to Moldavia. Their hetman was Łoboda and Nalewajko was lieutenant. They had about forty banners and two of them had imperial eagles. After conquest of Moldavia and banishing Hospodar Aron from the country, they were coming to Tighina. Hospodar had joined there Turks and has expelled Cossacks”].

spoils to Bar⁹¹. In their turn, pressed by Żółkiewski, they returned to Moldavia, where they allied with the Hospodar Aron, recently robbed by them. He tried to use them to rebound from the hands of the Turks Belgorod, was, however, beaten and escaped, while his army dissolved⁹². Already in February 1595 he sent letters to the Hetman Żółkiewski, begging for help from the Tatars⁹³. In this desperate situation Sigismund Báthory decided to take advantage and to win Moldavia, which was promised him by the Emperor.

The Sejm of 1595 and rebels in Moldavia

Tatars did not return from Hungary to the Crimea, passing Polish lands, as it expected, because they preferred not to expose their gains in a fight against Polish troops, guarding the borders. Therefore Zamoyski left in January 1595 his camp in Lasków and followed to Krakow on Sejm⁹⁴.

It began on 7 February and was held in an atmosphere of war, caused by the recent Turkish victories in Hungary⁹⁵ and rebels in Moldavia. Delegates from neighbouring countries appeared here - imperial Pawłowski, Bishop of Olomouc and Vaclav Berka⁹⁶, the Speaker of Czech, the Papal nuncio Germanicus Malaspina, and the envoys from Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. They all sought for Polish help in the fight against the Turkey⁹⁷. However, they committed a mistake, coming only at the end of the Sejm and losing the opportunity to use the initially favourable sentiment for the league that prevailed among the senators.⁹⁸

⁹¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 327; both Cossack expeditions to Moldavia in autumn 1594 are discussed by: A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 16 and W.A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej...* [On the far Ukraine...], p. 131-132.

⁹² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 229. Also see: A. Prochaska, *Hetman...*, p. 16 and W.A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej...* [On the far Ukraine...], p. 132.

⁹³ J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 97.

⁹⁴ On the Tatar resignation to cross Poland on their way back to the Crimea and their march through Sultanian countries and Polish preparations to oppose them see: J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 223-224, R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 327-328, also J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 154-155.

⁹⁵ The Turks conquered Raab, also named Jawaryn, on 17 November 1594 – see: J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 221-223 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 327.

⁹⁶ P. Piasecki, *Kronika* [The Chronicle], p. 125.

⁹⁷ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 227, R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 329.

⁹⁸ At the beginning the league was appreciated by J. Zamoyski as far as Cardinal Jerzy Radziwiłł and Krakowian Starosta, Prince Janusz Ostrogski – see: J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth...], p. 17-18.

The delegates of the Emperor, who in the name of Hospodar Aron complained about Cossack attacks, it was answered with a blame of inciting these Cossacks. They replied that the Emperor was misled by Chłopicki, who allegedly told him that the Cossacks are not tied with Rzeczpospolita⁹⁹.

After this initial exchange of mutual allegations, Sejm passed to the most important case, around which „nuncjusz papieski Malaspina żywo się krzątał”¹⁰⁰ ("the papal nuncio Malaspina lively bustled"), namely, to the discussion of the draft anti-Turkish league with the Emperor. Zamoyski advised at first „opatrzyć Rzplite w wojsko i pieniądze, postawić ja na stopie groźnej powagi i wtedy dopiero albo wejść w przymierze z Cesarzem, albo własnymi siłami pomścić się na Turkach, Tatarach i Kozakach, za rozbójnicze napady i zniszczenia”¹⁰¹ ("to supply the Commonwealth with troops and money, put it on the rate of serious seriousness and only then either enter into an alliance with the Emperor, or to avenge the Turks, Tatars and Cossacks with own forces, for extortion attacks and destruction"). From the imperial delegates there was demanded to enter real obligations, they, however, promised only general things, and because of it the case was sent to the Senat commission¹⁰².

Polish commissioners demanded from the Emperor great military support, money to pay the troops, and to grant Poland all possible rights to the Danubian Principalities¹⁰³. For the latter the bishop of Olomouc was especially keen, the more confident the Emperor strengthened his influence there¹⁰⁴. An issue of Archduke Maximilian also came out again, as he has not yet sworn the treaties of Będzin-Bytom. Commission spent time on arid debates, what in fact was liked by imperial envoy, but it was not the taste of Poles, and finally it was found out that without reference to the Emperor the envoy cannot make any certain promises, and even his master must first consult the states of the Empire¹⁰⁵. The Sejm ended, and in the case of an alliance there were no certain postulates accepted. It was only agreed that, in the

⁹⁹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 329.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 329.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, s. 329. Heidenstein, in his turn, names the following members of the commission: Cardinal Jerzy Radziwiłł, the Bishop of Kujawy Hieronim Rozrażewski, the Bishop of Przemyśl Wawrzyniec Gościński, the Bishop of Łuck Bernard Maciejowski, the Krakowian Starosta, Prince Janusz Ostrogski, the Krakovian Voivode Mikołaj Firlej, the Voivode of Lublin Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the Voivode of Trakai Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the Crown Chancellor Jan Zamoyski and the Lithuanian Chancellor Lew Sapieha.

¹⁰³ It was going about 80,000 soldiers – R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 330–333 presents Polish claims; also see: W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej* [The History of Modern Poland], vol. 1, Warszawa 1986, p. 183.

¹⁰⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 334.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 333. It is worth to add that the fact that the Emperor granted leadership in Hungary to the Archduke Maximilian changed the Polish approach towards the planned league - J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth...], p. 18.

case of the final approval of the Polish conditions by Rudolf II, Sigismund III would convene an extraordinary Sejm, which will ratify the alliance¹⁰⁶.

Zamoyski, seeing that the negotiations with the Habsburgs lead to nothing, presented his plan to strike at the Tartars with own efforts and to determine the political and military complications south of the Polish border in accordance with the interests of Rzeczpospolita¹⁰⁷. This project made King Sigismund III, who insisted that as much army as possible would be enlisted from the taxes, passed at the Sejm, and even has committed a large sum of borrowed money for this purpose and gave it to the Hetman¹⁰⁸. Taxes came in slowly, and there were also problems their passing. Volhynian delegates, although mainly in their interest the expedition against Tatars was organized, did not consent to the collection of taxes. Also Lithuanians protested, and the Wielkopolska delegates advised at after-Sejm assemblies to call a general levee en masse rather than to raise taxes on army. This was explained by the influence of the Primate Karnkowski, who belonged to the group of opponents of military action against Turkey, and has even published a deliberate brochure "Festina lente", containing a collection of arguments against breaking peace with the Sultan¹⁰⁹.

Meanwhile it just had to be hurried, because the accidents of rebels against the Sultan in the principalities began to take place ever faster. Sigismund Báthory, preparing to launch an offensive against the Turks, wanted to be safe from the Moldavian side and decided to get rid of the reigning there Hospodar Aron, and to enthrone in Iași his own supporter and to consolidate his influence in this principality. He aroused a certain Stefan Razvan, half-gypsy, half-Wallachian, who had served under King Stefan Báthory, and now he was a mercenary commander of the army of Hospodar Aron, the army was composed almost entirely from Hungarians. This treacherously captured Aron, restrained him in shackles, sent with his family to Transylvania, while Razvan sat on the Hospodar throne and accepted the sovereignty of Sigismund Báthory over himself¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 228; R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 336. About the negotiations also see: J. Macurek, *Zápas...* [The Struggle...], p. 44-52; P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 31-32 and A. Barwicka, *Rzeczpospolita...* [The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth...], p. 301-302.

¹⁰⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 338: „Tak się skończył Sejm – przymierza [with the Emperor – D.M.] nie zawarto i wrócono znowu do zdania Zamojskiego, żeby wojnę zaczępną przenieść w kraje tatarskie” [„So the Diet was finished. The alliance was not concluded and everyone has returned again to the Zamoyski's opinion to transfer the offensive war to Tatar countries”]

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

¹⁰⁹ All these problems are described by R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 338–339, as far as W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 183. In total, from the Sejm of 1595 to the next one in 1597 the Kingdom collected taxes in sum of 470,008 zloties – see: A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość...* [The Finance...], p. 88-89.

¹¹⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 340–341 and M. Costin,

This was already too much for the Turks. As soon the inner situation stabilized after the death of Sultan Murat III - what has been reported during the Sejm of Rzeczpospolita¹¹¹ - and the enthronement of his son Mehmed III, which was related, normally in such cases, with the slaughter of Sultan brothers and uncomfortable dignitaries, the Turks took the pacification plan against the rebellious principalities¹¹². It was intended to remove the rebellious princes. After overthrow of Michael the Brave Wallachian ruler has to become the Turkish favorite Bogdan, in Moldavia it was intended to completely remove the remains of independence and to turn it into ordinary Turkish province. Its Beylerbey was supposed to be the Sanjak-bey of Tehinia, Ahmed pasha. This task was set Sinan pasha, who had to tame Wallachia and Transylvania, and the Tartar Khan, whose nephew Ahmed pasha was, and who had to master Moldavia¹¹³.

The threat of the Turks, seated in Moldavia, just over the borders of the Republic, caused understandable concern in Poland¹¹⁴. Mikołaj Jazłowiecki advised King Sigismund III to master Khotyn, a Moldavian frontier fortress, which the King accepted¹¹⁵. Cossacks also were sent to Moldavia, but they were beaten at Tehinia¹¹⁶. It had to be more relied on the soldiers, who were gathered under the command of the Hetman. His army was not great in number. Sigismund III sent 1000 soldiers to the Hetman from the royal guard, but the Hetman, guarding Rzeczpospolita from sudden attack, had to leave in 1000 riders under the command of Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the governor of Lublin. He stood between Krakow and the main army, which in force

Latopis... [The Chronicle...], p. 102-103. Also see: V. Ciobanu, *La cumpănă...* [On a scale...], p. 105. About Stefan Razvan (in Rumunian: Ștefan Răzvan) see: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 145 and D. Dragnev, E. Baidaus, G. Bodeanu, *Domnii Țării Moldovei: studii*, [The Hospodars of Moldavia: studies], Chișinău 2005, p. 143 (entrance: Ștefan Răzvan).

¹¹¹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 229 writes: „Na tenże sejm przyszła nowina o śmierci cesarza tureckiego Amurata na którego miejsce był obran Mahomet syn jego” [“The news have come on this Diet about death of Turkish Sultan Murad, who was replaced by his son, Mehmed”].

¹¹² The enthronement of Mehmed III is described by J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...* [The History...], p. 159 and H. Inalcik, *Imperium Osmańskie* [The Ottoman Empire], p. 72-74. The new Sultan ordered to kill his nineteen brothers. On Turkish plans against rebellious principalities see: T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 112; Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 145-146; A. Decei, *Istoria...* [The History...], p. 271-272.

¹¹³ M. Costin, *Latopis...* [The Chronicle...], p. 104; Müneğğimbaşı, *Sahaif ül-ahbar* [The Clear of Greats], in: M. Guboglu, *Cronici turcești...* [Turkish chronicles...], p. 258. Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 146.

¹¹⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 342.

¹¹⁵ Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 146; P. Gawron, *Hetman koronny...* [The Crown hetman...], p. 109.

¹¹⁶ Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 146.

of 5,000 riders and 1,000 infantry gathered in Mogilnica near Trembowla¹¹⁷. The Hetman also stood there on 12 July 1595¹¹⁸.

The situation before entering Moldavia

August 9, 1595, the Perkulab (Rom. "Pârcălab") of Suceava came to the camp of Zamoyski with the news that Sinan pasha burst at the head of a strong army to Wallachia and crossed the Danube, what Michael the Brave was not able to prevent. At the same time he asked on behalf of the Hospodar Stefan Razvan for help¹¹⁹. Zamoyski did not intend to provide any help, without having certain knowledge of the Tatars. The situation was becoming more and more complicated, what was clear for the Hetman¹²⁰. He feared that after the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia Turks will take Khotyn and tempt to Kamianets-Podilskyi (in Polish: Kamienec Podolski), and in the case of the defeat of Transylvania they will threaten the Russian lands of the Crown¹²¹.

Meanwhile, on August 15 arrived at the camp a Cossack, sent to scout, and reported that the Tartars crossed the Dnieper¹²². So the Hetman moved the army towards Kamianets in order to be closer to the ground for future action and, if the Tatars would try to fall within the boundaries of Rzeczpospolita, stand on their way¹²³. Gradually he obtained more information about the movements of the Horde. The Perkulab of Sorooca sent a message that Tatars have crossed the river Dnieper near Belgorod. On 21 August the Perkulab came to the Hetman, asking on behalf of Hospodar Razvan for help against the Turks. Zamoyski refused, advising Hospodar to retreat to Transylvania, if his army is low in number. He declared to guard the Dniester and the borders of Rzeczpospolita¹²⁴. Having lost hope for Polish assistance, Stefan Razvan fled with his indeed small army from the Turks to Transylvania. Moldavia was left without any protection, army or ruler¹²⁵. Only in the castle of Khotyn a Hungarian crew was in a force of 200 people was left, but they were not opponents for the Turks¹²⁶.

¹¹⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 339–340.

¹¹⁸ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 232.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹²⁰ The situation before Zamoyski's entrance into Moldavia is described by J. Macurek, *Zápas...* [The Struggle...], p. 74–76.

¹²¹ T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...* [The history of wars...], p. 112–113.

¹²² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 236.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 236–237.

¹²⁵ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 344.

¹²⁶ „W Chocimiu jak mówiłem stało załogą 200 Węgrów, a więc żadnego oporu nie mogli dać Turkom” [“As I said there was a crew of 200 Hungarians in Khotyn, so they could not resist Turks at all”] – *ibid.*, p. 344.

Zamoyski had now to decide how to proceed. His planned expedition to the Crimea had to be abandoned due to scarcity of the army, which he disposed of, and the unwillingness of Cossacks to co-operate with the Hetman¹²⁷. To stay on the Dniester meant to give the initiative in the hands of the Turks. This would allow them to conquer Moldavia and beat Transylvania. In that the entire southern border of Poland would be threatened. In the event of a disaster the Turks, the Habsburgs would increase in power. Polish neutrality would be tantamount to consent to waive any claim to the Danubian Principalities, especially to Moldavia. For Zamoyski it was unacceptable. Also the closer threat would not be forgotten – if the Turks would take Moldavia, the Tatars would have an open way to cross Polish borders¹²⁸.

To remain in Kamianets and watch accidents over the Dniester seemed to bring any benefits neither for Zamoyski nor for Rzeczpospolita. On the contrary - the neutrality in this situation would lead to heavy defeat. It was necessary to avoid the seizure of Moldavia by the Tatars. Although the Cossacks refused to help, claiming for the pay, which could not have been paid them because of lack of financial sources - the Hetman also felt that they should rather ask for forgiveness for arbitrary expeditions to Moldavia, but not for the pay, which they have taken themselves, robbing Iași the previous year, this accusation lessened their enthusiasm¹²⁹ - but

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 342. See: D. Skorupa, *Stosunki...* [Polish-Tatars relationships...], p. 61.

¹²⁸ See: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 341–343 (among other things, he writes: „Skoro by Turcy Mołdawiją zajęli, wtedy Podole i Ruś znowuby spustoszyli, bo podług ich zdania, byle tylko twierdz żadnych nie zabierać, nie gwałci się przymierza, jeżeli się niszczy lub pali. W obecném zaś położeniu rzeczy można było przewidzieć, że konieczność sama zmusi ich do napadu na granice Polski, bo Mołdawja wojnami zniszczona, żadnych zasobów żywności nie miała” [“If Turks take over Moldavia, they would devastate again Podole and Ruthenia because they state that the agreement is not broken, even if you devastate or burn country, when you do not take any castles. In present situation you might foresee that the necessity itself will force them to attack Polish borders, because Moldavia was devastated by wars and had not any food resources”] – p. 342). The anti-Habsburgian connotations of the actions of J. Zamoyski are stressed by Л.Е. Семенова, *Княжества Валахия и Молдавия. Конец XIV – начало XIX в. Очерки внешнеполитической истории* [The Principalities Wallachia and Moldavia. The end of 14th – the beginning of 19th century. Studies of external political history], Москва 2006, p. 169-170.

¹²⁹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 342, writes: „Zamojski chciał koniecznie wciągnąć kozaków do wojny, posłańca zatrzymał [który doniósł mu był o przejściu przez ordę Dniestru – przyp. D.M.], a do nich napisał, że właśnie mają sposobność przebłagania Króla i Stanów. Kozacy nie bardzo ufali i żołdu się domagali. Odpowiedział im Zamojski, że nie o żołd tu idzie, a na przebaczenie wprzód trzeba zarobić. Nic tedy nie zrobiono” [“Zamoyski absolutely wanted to draw Cossacks to war. He has kept a messenger [who had brought him an information about crossing of the Dniester by Tatars – D.M.], and has written to Cossacks that they already had an opportunity to appease the King and the States. The Cossacks did not trust him and they

Zamoyski thought that the very news of his invasion to Moldavia would mix the Turks and delay their actions. He also supposed that the army, though few in number, but decked and well armed, would be exaggerated in stories, as it usually is, and such hyperbolized news will reach the enemy¹³⁰.

Zamoyski had to consider and prepare a project is not only military but also politically. He did not intend to interfere in the interests of Moldavia because of the pro-Habsburgian Razvan. If, however, he left the country, it seemed to better to use this opportunity and, not exposing to the Habsburgs formally - what would happen if Zamoyski tried to remove their vassal Razvan - put a stop to their snares to Moldavia, on the occasion to stop the Turks and stretch the Polish influence over the country. Rzeczpospolita and Zamoyski became the proverbial "third" player, who had the advantage in fighting two enemies - the Habsburgs and the Turks. There should only be found a suitable candidate for the throne of Hospodar from grace and on behalf of the Commonwealth, and having found a convenient excuse, he had to enter Moldavia and forestall the Tatars in its mastering¹³¹.

It must be admitted that the decision of the Hetman to invade Moldavia was a brave and independent at the same time. During the councils of the Senate, completed in the summer and autumn of 1595, the King and his advisers occupied various positions. While in June, when considered possible military cooperation with Stefan Razvan, King left the decision to Zamoyski, whereas in July supported the opponents of intervention, which included Primate Stanisław Karnkowski and the castellan of Krakow, Prince Janusz Ostrogski. In the spoken time Sigismund III feared the war with Turkey. But when the Hetman has already taken Moldavia, in autumn is the same royal council decided that Hetman has to stay there to secure Polish influences. He also was taken in defence because of the Pope's accusations of collaboration with the Turks, arguing that it is the Hetman who saved Moldavia before the Ottoman conquest. It thus appears that bold actions of Zamoyski met with approval, if they brought success¹³².

demanded their soldier's pay. Zamoyski answered them that it is not intent on their soldier's pay, but they have to deserve a forgiveness first. So nothing was done".

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

¹³¹ The decision to intervene Moldavia was taken by Zamoyski after a council with senators, present in his camp, what is mentioned by R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 343. It is interesting that the papal nuncio Germanicus Malaspina was encouraging Poles to act, counting that these actions would cause Polish-Turkish war and the creation of the anti-Ottoman League; this fact is marked by J. Macurek, *Zápas...* [The Struggle...], p. 77. Such move of the nuncio was not without influence in the polemic with the Habsburgs – another side of the story is that the Poles went to the expedition, pursuing their own, not papal, interests.

¹³² P. Gawron, *Hetman koronny...* [The Crown hetman...], p. 338-339. The aversion of Prince J. Ostrogski to the actions of J. Zamoyski in Moldavia emerged from his pro-Habsburgian sympathies – see: T. Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525-1608), wojewoda*

The Polish entrance to Moldavia

The crossing of the Dniester was begun by the Field Hetman Żółkiewski on August 27, 1595¹³³. Due to low water the army went over the river by swimming. Three days later it was crossed by the Great Hetman, who the same time sent a messenger to Sinan pasha. He asserted that he will not break the peace with Turkey, but he forbids stepping into Moldavia, which should not be a Turkish province¹³⁴. At the same time he called the Prince of Transylvania on behalf of Rzeczpospolita to restore to the throne of Moldavia the trapped Aron¹³⁵.

Zamoyski collected the whole army on the territory of Moldavia and divided it into five regiments, whose leaders were: Jan Potocki, the Starosta of Kamianets, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Stanisław Gulski, the Castellan of Halicz, Stanisław Przerębki and the Hetman in own person¹³⁶. The Hungarian crew under the pressure of the local population left Khotyn and retreated to Transylvania¹³⁷. Against Razvan, who tried to oppose in fight, Zamoyski sent Gulski with five hundred horses - two hundred hussars and three hundred Cossacks. He attacked Razvan, who escaped from Iași and stood with a thousand of Hungarian infantry at Płoniny, awaiting reinforcements from Transylvania. However, he did not dare to face the Poles and fled to Sigismund Báthory, when he heard about Gulski¹³⁸.

On 31 August Zamoyski stood with the army at the Prut River, where he was greeted by Moldavian boyars delegation, asking to appoint for them a Hospodar¹³⁹. Hetman had in his camp two great boyars: Luca Stroici, the former Treasurer of

kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej [Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ca. 1524/1525-1608), the voivode of Kiev and marshal of Volhynia], Toruń 1997, p. 212-215.

¹³³ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 238.

¹³⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 343-344.

¹³⁵ See: A. Prochaska, *Hetman...* [Hetman...], p. 17-18.

¹³⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 238.

¹³⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 344.

¹³⁸ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 241. He writes: „[Rozwan] z Jass uchodząc okopał się był pod Płoninami w lesie: mając Węgrów piechoty do tysiąca, usarzów trzysta, a kozaków Polaków pięćdziesiąt i więcej się ludzi spodziewał mieć od siedmiogrodzkiego, do którego o pomoc pisał. O czym gdy wziął sprawę dostateczną hetman, posłał tam dwieście usarzów, a trzysta kozaków z Blinstruba o dwu koń: nad którym ludem Gulski był starszym. Lecz skoro posłyszał o naszych ludziach Rozwan, poszedł precz w góry: a potym do siedmiogrodzkiej ziemie ustąpił” [When Razvan was escaping from Iași, he made a trench near Płoniny in the forest. He had a thousand Hungarian infantry, three hundred hussars and fifty Polish cossacks. He also expected more people from the Prince of Transylvania, whom he was writing to asking him for help. When Hetman had got to know it well, he has sent two hundred hussars and three hundred cossacks of Blinstrub there: their commander was Gulski. But when Razvan heard about our men, he escaped in mountains: and then he retreated to Transylvania”].

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

Petru V the Lame, and Ieremia Movilă, the Marshal of the same Hospodar. Both fled with their ruler to Poland when escaping from the Turks. Zamoyski chose Movilă and recommended him to the boyars¹⁴⁰. Mohyla was a supporter of the Republic and encouraged the Catholic Church, even more, since 1593 he was a Polish indigene (a title, given for foreigners, acknowledging them as native nobles). He was an ideal candidate for Hospodar. Boyars chose him to the throne. It happened on September 4, after the Poles crossed the Prut, at Stepanowce (Ștefănești). There were sent letters, urging the Moldavian nobility to come to Iași to welcome the new ruler¹⁴¹.

He took the oath of allegiance to Rzeczpospolita. The ceremony was held in a closed tent in the presence of both Hetmans and Szczęsny Herburt. It had its reasons. Movilă loathed, besides the usual assurances of fidelity, the conditions that could appear to Moldavians at least unpleasant, namely the tolerance for Catholic faith and confinement to the dignity of ordinary Polish Voivoda in the event that Moldavia was directly incorporated into Rzeczpospolita¹⁴².

It is evident that Zamoyski wanted to establish permanent Polish influence in Moldavia, and if he could, to add it to the Crown as a normal state¹⁴³! This would provide a huge political and military benefit for Rzeczpospolita, as it would in fact cut the Crimean Khanate from the Turkish provinces, and the Turkey itself would be far removed from the Russian lands of the Crown. Moldavia would become a bastion of influence of Rzeczpospolita, which would shatter Turkish sovereignty in the nearby regions. It was clear that this plan was not acceptable for Turkey.

¹⁴⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 345. Also see: N. Stoicescu, *Dicționar al marilor dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova, sec. XIV-XVII*, [Dictionary of great dignitaries of Wallachia and Moldavia, 14th-17th centuries], București 1971, p. 318-319, entrance: Movilă Ieremia; p. 326-327, entrance: Stroici Luca (Lupu).

¹⁴¹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 239. The constitution of the Sejm of 1593 „Indigenatus panów wołoskich” [The indigene of Moldavian nobles], in: *Volumina Legum* [The Books of Laws], ed. by J. Ohryzko, vol. 2, Petersburg 1859, p. 345. *Diariusz Pawła Piaskowskiego* [Paweł Piaskowski's Diary] in: J. Jasnowski, *Dwie relacje z wyprawy Zamoyskiego pod Cecorę w 1595 r.*, [Two relations about Zamoyski's campaign at Țuțora in 1595], „Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy”, 1938, vol. 10, z. 2, p. 243. J. Bielski dates the naming of Ieremia Movilă on 1 September 1595, but the information of the naming of the Hospodar by J. Zamoyski is more precise presented by P. Piaskowski, stating it on 4 September. See: P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 34.

¹⁴² R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 345. The oath of Ieremia Movilă and boyars, Iași, 27 August [5 September] 1595, in: E. Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare...* [Documents...], supl. 2, vol. 1, No. CLXXVI, p. 344-345.

¹⁴³ This flow of facts is asserted also by: J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 98.

Temporarily, however, it could not be effective, because Sinan pasha was defeated in Wallachia by Michael the Brave in battle at Călugăreni (on 25 August)¹⁴⁴. Although Michael himself has not wined much, the Turkish forces were in fact of sufficient advantage to force him to withdraw to Transylvania. But Sinan pasha was unable to put an end with Michael and supporting him Sigismund Báthory, and definitely could not afford to catch the Poles. For the successful settlement of both of these things he needed the Tatar help¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁴ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...* [The Continuation...], p. 241; Müneğgimbaş, *Sahif ül-ahbar* [The Clear of Greats], in: M. Guboglu, *Cronici turcești...* [Turkish chronicles...], p. 258-259; Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...* [Moldavian rows], p. 147; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria...* [The History...], vol. 5, p. 160-165; A. Decei, *Istoria...* [The History...], p. 275-276; idem, *Relațiile lui Mihai Viteazul cu Imperiul Otoman* [Relations of Michael the Brave with Ottoman Empire] in: idem, *Relații româno-orientale. Culegere de studii* [Romanian-oriental relations. Collection of studies], București 1978, p. 226; Ș. Ștefănescu, *Mihai Viteazul. Între „Respublica Christiana” și monarhia absolută* [Michael the Brave. Between “Respublica Christiana” and an absolute monarchy], in: *Istoria României. Pagini Transilvane* [The History of Romania. Transylvanian Pages], ed. by D. Berindei, Cluj-Napoca 1994, p. 85.

¹⁴⁵ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...* [The History of Poland...], p. 348-349; A. Decei, *Istoria...* [The History...], p. 277-278.